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Abstract 
Defence procurement easily matches and exceeds virtually any other form of technology-intensive 
procurements by the government. Additionally, defence procurement often focuses on 
technologically advanced, engineering-intensive equipment. This represents a significant potential 
for technological innovation and subsequent diffusion of this innovation throughout the economy.  
The defence industry has often been considered insular and idiosyncratic, meeting the demands of a 
bureaucratic, central buyer, creating firms unable to compete in dynamic commercial markets, and 
posing a barrier for innovative firms to enter.  
This study poses the question: When is technology likely to transfer into or out of the defence 
sector? Which organisational-level factors facilitate or hinder the likelihood and success of such 
technology transfer? 
By combining organisational identity, capabilities and institutional theories, this thesis pursues a 
novel approach to the problem, and we find that organisational identity moderates the capability-
performance relationship – in essence, a strong organisational identity is negatively associated with 
the likelihood that a firm will deploy its resources in unfamiliar markets, or to exploit technologies 
present in them. The defence industry provides a salient context for the study of this phenomenon. 
This thesis presents a current overview of the UK defence sector, by reviewing the existing literature 
in the field and updating it with consideration to the significant changes which the industry has 
faced. This includes a review of the previous research on firm-level factors which influence the 
transfer of technology into and out of the sector. An organisational identity theory of capability 
deployment is then developed, and tested with a combination of expert interviews and quantitative 
analysis of the results of a survey of firms in the UK defence sector.  
The resulting analysis and discussion contribute to the understanding of the UK defence sector in the 
modern world, and the potential barriers to fully exploit technology developed in the defence 
context, and to the factors which may influence the UK armed forces’ access to technologies from 
non-traditional sources.  
Further, the recognition that institutional forces can influence organisational identity and 
subsequently affect the deployment of capabilities, I contribute to the management literature by 
suggesting a link between the rarely connected literatures on organisational identity and capabilities.  
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1 Introduction 
Defence procurement represents a major share of public-sector economic activity in many countries 
(Sandler & Hartley, 2007). In the United Kingdom, for example, the Defence Equipment and Support 
department of the Ministry of Defence employs over 22,000 people and administers an annual 
procurement budget of £14 billion (Great Britain. Ministry of Defence, DASA, 2011). At these levels, 
defence procurement easily matches and exceeds virtually any other form of technology-intensive 
procurements by the government. 
In addition to scale, defence procurement typically focuses on technologically advanced, 
engineering-intensive items (Alic et al., 1992; Rogerson, 1994). Because of its scale and technology-
intensity, defence procurement represents a major potential source of technological and economic 
advances (Ram, 2007). Examples of technological spill-overs from defence to the civilian economy 
are, indeed, numerous, including radar, numerous metallurgical applications, carbon fibre, Kevlar, 
semiconductors, satellite technologies, internet infrastructure, optical communications and nuclear 
power. Such examples of ‘dual-use technology transfer’ (DUT2) testify of a significant potential for 
technological innovation associated with defence-related government procurement (Molas-Gallart, 
1999). 
Although the technological innovation potential associated with defence procurement is significant 
and practical examples numerous, there has been fairly little micro-level research into the 
determinants of the likelihood and success of technological spill-overs from military to civilian 
application (Molas-Gallart, 1997).  Whilst there exists an important array of macro-level studies 
documenting links between defence and civilian sectors, as well as associated economic impacts, 
there are only few studies seeking to understand micro-level determinants of when, and under which 
conditions defence-related technological spill-overs are more likely to occur, and what determines 
the outcome of such spill-overs. This is an important gap, given that spill-overs actually occur at the 
micro-level rather than at the macro-level and that spill-overs do not occur automatically. For 
example, the massive investment of the Soviet Union into its defence sector produced little visible 
spill-over impact in the civilian economy. On the other hand, some studies claim that the Silicon 
Valley itself would not exist today, had it not been for the US investment in defence procurement in 
the State of California (Heinrich, 2002). Clearly, spill-over does not follow automatically from 
investment into defence procurement. We expect that the factors regulating spill-over are likely to 
be found at an organisational level of analysis. It is the general objective of this thesis to identify 
factors that facilitate or hinder the spill-over of technologies from the defence to the civilian sectors. 
The defence sector offers a distinctive context for the study of technology transfer processes, one 
that offers significant potential for the derivation of theoretical insights. The defence sector is 
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characterised by strong institutions and unique practices (Hartley, 2007), which define appropriate 
behaviours and acceptable practices (DiMaggio, 1988; Scott, 2001). In order to be accepted as 
legitimate suppliers, defence technology companies face strong pressure to conform to accepted 
institutional norms (Oliver, 1991; Rogerson, 1994). Such institutional pressures to conform are 
reinforced by the distinctive characteristics of the defence procurement environment, which prompt 
defence suppliers to develop capabilities that are idiosyncratic to the defence sector. Unlike in most 
civilian sectors, the defence sector is dominated by one dominating buyer, the Ministry of Defence 
(MOD). Defence procurements typically take the form of large, long-term projects, often 
characterised by a high degree of technological uncertainty. Project deliveries in the defence sector 
are typically punctuated by milestones, defined in terms of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) 
(Hartley, 2007). The control milestones are designed to ensure that even high-uncertainty projects 
are delivered on time and within budget. To achieve timely delivery and to provide buffer against 
technological uncertainty, defence procurement contracts typically take the form of ‘cost-plus’ 
contracts that guarantee (within limits) a minimum profit for the supplier, thereby encouraging them 
to allocate appropriate resources whenever uncertainties emerge. We expect that these attributes of 
the defence procurement process will prompt defence suppliers to develop idiosyncratic capabilities, 
which, although optimised for defence procurement, may turn into a source of rigidity when defence 
suppliers attempt diversification to civilian sectors. 
In theoretical terms, this project also presents the opportunity to advance the understanding of 
when organisational capabilities become rigidities, and how these rigidities play out in DUT2 
situations. The defence sector provides a complex context for research, being a well defined, 
distinctive, and rather insular industry sector (in terms of cross-sectoral linkages). The defence sector 
is subject to heavy isomorphic pressures and exhibits distinctive procurement processes. The chosen 
context of empirical research will therefore offer potential for generating new theoretical insights 
both for institutional and organisational capability theories, particularly when seeking to understand 
when isomorphic processes and distinctive optimisation of organisational capabilities give rise to 
organisational rigidities that inhibit the ability of technology-intensive companies to diversify beyond 
their home sectors (Leonard-Barton, 1992).  
The specific case of defence-related DUT2 is also likely to be generalisable to wider contexts, in 
particular to cases where one party to the technology transfer process operates in a highly regulated, 
idiosyncratic (in terms of inter-organisational transactions) and procurer-dominated environment. 
Overall, we expect that our empirical context is conducive to understanding how organisations can 
overcome the “wall of separation” (Markusen & Yudken, 1992) that demarcates the boundaries of 
adjacent organisational fields, when seeking to extend the applications of their knowledge-intensive 
products and services beyond their original setting.  
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Further, we expand our analysis of DUT2 to include the transfer of technology into the defence 
sector, i.e. the application of technologies developed elsewhere in the defence sector. This issue is 
increasingly important in the context of defence procurement.  
Consistent with the above, we seek three distinctive contributions in this research: 
1 To broaden the theoretical and empirical understanding with regard to the effect of 
defence sector involvement on the likelihood and outcomes of DUT2 processes; 
2 To broaden the theoretical and empirical understanding with regard to the effect of 
institutional isomorphic pressures on the likelihood and outcomes of DUT2 
processes; 
3 To broaden the theoretical and empirical understanding with regard to the effect of 
capability optimisation-induced rigidities on the likelihood and outcomes of DUT2 
processes. 
The above considerations suggest four specific research questions that this research should address. 
The overarching theme of this research addresses how technology and underlying technological 
capabilities flow from military to civilian applications, and vice versa. In order to study technology 
transfer processes in this empirical context, a hierarchical approach is necessary. The institutional 
environment of the sector must be analysed and mapped, in order to ascertain how the institutional 
context both constrains and facilitates technology transfer processes at the organisational level. 
Insights from such influences will then guide the analysis of factors influencing the probability of 
engagement in DUT2, as well as its success at the organisational level.  This research, therefore, 
addresses the following questions: 
RQ1 What are the institutional and isomorphic pressures that characterise the defence 
procurement sectors, and how do they facilitate and constrain DUT2 processes? 
RQ2 How are these pressures experienced at the level of defence supplier firms? 
RQ3 How does the idiosyncratic optimisation of delivery capabilities within the defence 
procurement sector constrain DUT2 processes? 
RQ4 In which situations is DUT2 most likely to occur, and what are the organisational-
level determinants of its success?  
In this research we seek to advance the understanding of the complex processes of DUT2.  
Next, we provide a brief overview of the empirical context of this research – i.e., the defence 
industrial base. After this, we provide a brief overview of the DUT2 literature. Following this 
literature review, we develop an initial theoretical model for empirical research. After the theoretical 
model development, we provide a new account of the research methods, focusing this time on the 
implementation of the different research stages. Subsequently, we analyse the results from the 
statistical analysis of the empirical research results, and continue by discussing these results, and 
finally outlining the implications of these conclusions. 
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2 Industrial Context – The UK Defence Sector 
This section intends to give an overview of the defence industrial context. This is imperative in the 
case of this project, as the sector exhibits many idiosyncratic characteristics. The sector is both 
complex and insular, and therefore a contextual description could be incredibly lengthy and involved, 
so here we focus on creating an overview of the most pertinent aspects, which contribute to the 
institutional forces which we suggest lead to the organisational adaptation specific to the defence 
environment.  
First we shall provide an overview of the scale and scope of the UK defence Industry. Subsequently 
the institutional environment and its implications will be addressed. At this point it is necessary to 
define the industry, as the MOD and other defence agencies procure from firms, which often also 
produce non-defence products and services. These can be differentiated into products with separate 
and distinct non-defence applications, and dual-use products.  
 
2.1 The UK defence sector, scale and scope 
The Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) provides statistics relating to defence spending in 
relation to wider government spending. They state that total government spending in the fiscal year 
2009/10 amounted to £655.2 billion. Defence spending accounted for £39.5 billion. MOD’s 
equipment spend for the period is estimated at £14 billion, of which ca. £7 billion constituted capital 
expenditure on equipment, £4.6 billion for equipment support and £2.4 billion for R&D (Great 
Britain. Ministry of Defence, DASA, 2011).  
£7.0
£4.6
£2.4£12.8
£12.7
Equipment
UK MOD Defence Spending by Category in £ 
billions, 2009/2010
Capital Expenditure on Equipment
Equipment Support
Equipment R&D
Personnel
Other (Depreciation, Property 
Management, IT etc.)
 
Figure 1: UK MOD defence spending by category in £ billions in 2009/2010 (Great Britain. Ministry of 
Defence, DASA, 2011) 
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Due to the nature of the equipment procured by the MOD, single firms often receive large contracts 
that extend from the R&D phase through to equipment support. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of 
contracts awarded to individual firms in 2009/2010 (Great Britain. Ministry of Defence, DASA, 2011):  
0 10 20 30 40
> £500 million
£250 - £500 million
£100 - £250 million
£50 - £100 million
Number of Firms awarded MOD Contracts 
by Size per Contract, 2009/2010
Number of Firms
 
Figure 2: Number of firms awarded MOD contracts by contract size in 2009/2010 (Great Britain. Ministry of 
Defence, DASA, 2011) 
With this level of spending on procurement, support and R&D, defence budgets represent a 
significant market for firms willing and able to sell to the MOD.  
 
2.2 Dual-Use and the intersection of the defence sector and the wider economy 
Dual-use products (and technologies in general) can be defined as any products or technologies, 
which have both defence and non-defence applications (Molas-Gallart, 1997)1. Such products are 
present through all levels of technological sophistication, from e.g. clothing and food supplies, to 
complex systems such as transport helicopters. Although military specifications may require some 
customisation to fulfil military requirements, certain helicopter designs can be effectively used in 
either sector. The same can also be said for the less technologically sophisticated, but highly 
important products and technologies associated with military operations, such as the 
aforementioned clothing and food.  
As this study is focused on the relationship between defence and non-defence technologies, we 
primarily focus on the effect that defence spending has on technological development, and the 
subsequent effect on non-defence products and technologies. Therefore this study will concentrate 
                                                          
1
 For a more detailed definition and discussion on technology and dual-use, please refer to section 3.1, p. 36 
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on technological innovation, and pay less attention to the procurement of commodities and “low-
tech” products.  
Many firms, which are involved in many technological fields, are involved in defence procurement. 
The potential for DUT2 will of course be related to the particular field. For example, there is less 
scope for civilian applications for missile systems, or stealth technology, compared to developments 
in navigation or telecommunications. Arms control regulations and military secrecy can also affect 
the potential for transfer, particularly for technologies such as those relating to stealth or nuclear 
power.  
Defence spending represents one of the largest, if not the largest technology-intensive government 
procurement activities in many developed countries. Defence agencies are often willing to pay a 
premium to obtain a technological advantage (Middleton et al., 2006). Therefore they will often take 
on the role of early adopters of new technologies. Practically this means that through the volume but 
also the structure of defence spending, technology research, development and maturation can be 
funded which may not have attracted investment in a free market context.  
This phenomenon has been conceptualised as the cash flow “valley of death”, whereby a lack of 
funding may cause an R&D project to fail due to a lack of funding and high costs associated with the 
pre-commercialisation phases of the project (Murphy & Edwards, 2003). In essence, as no revenue is 
being generated, costs are being incurred, and the project has a high level of risk and uncertainty 
associated with it, such that external impetus may be required to ensure the project proceeds to 
completion. In such cases in the defence context, defence agencies may provide the necessary 
funding which was unavailable from other sources, in order for the technology to reach the market. 
 
2.3 The changing strategic defence context 
The context surrounding defence procurement has changed significantly in the last quarter of a 
century. The end of the cold war, and the emergence of the threats related to international terrorism 
have greatly affected the volumes and the nature of military systems. The following statement from 
a retired senior military officer sums up the significant changes: 
“The cold war was about large mechanical weapons (tanks, guns etc.) slogging it out in 
the East European land mass, together with sophisticated aircraft and nuclear weapons. 
Not much use for any of these technologies in the civil sector. Also the procurement of 
these weapon systems could take 10 - 15 years (the civil sector would go bust if 
anything took this long!). But now, the changing threat requires rapid acquisition and a 
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high electronic component in all systems. This is much more akin to the civil sector and 
there is much scope for some synergy. Just as the military will use civil technologies, so 
there is also huge potential for spin off from military technologies to the civil sector”  
One aspect of the contribution of this study is that it will provide insights into the contemporary 
defence environment. The DUT2 phenomenon has not been intensively studied, and many studies 
are now several decades old. This study aims to update the frontier of knowledge in reaction to these 
changes. It would seem that these changes have affected the DUT2 phenomenon and increased its 
potential in some areas.  
 
2.4 The defence sector institutional environment 
Due to the large level of defence spending in the UK, the government can influence the size and 
structure of the UK’s Defence Industrial Base (DIB) (Hartley et al., 1997). By means of Defence 
Industrial Strategy (Great Britain. Ministry of Defence, 2005) and subsequent publications (Defence 
Technology Strategy (Great Britain. Ministry of Defence, 2006) and Defence Technology Plan (Great 
Britain. Ministry of Defence, 2009)), the government also influences the set of technological 
capabilities retained onshore within the UK. In order to create a full set of military capabilities, the 
MOD can purchase additional military equipment from overseas markets. It would not be possible 
for the UK economy to support a full “cradle-to-grave” industrial capacity across all aspects of 
military capability, due to factors such as decreasing defence spending and increasing costs of the 
complex systems involved.  
To achieve this would require a much larger economy. Therefore, international trade in defence 
equipment is likely to occur. In the UK, the volume of defence exports is significantly higher than 
imports, greatly benefitting the UK’s trade balance. The UK is in fact one of the largest arms 
exporters in the world (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012). These markets 
create the opportunity for UK defence firms to increase their sales by exploiting these export 
markets through geographic diversification.  
The government plays a three-fold role toward the DIB, being a customer, supporter of export efforts 
and controller of procurement policy (Hislop, 1997). In essence, they can influence the size of the 
market through their own purchases and setting of export regulations; and also have the ability to 
adapt the domestic institutional conditions under which the DIB operates (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: The three-fold role of the MOD (adapted from Hislop, 1997) 
Alongside the sheer size of its military forces, a nation’s defence capability relative to other nations 
can be measured in how many years technological advantage they possess in their front-line 
equipment (Middleton et al., 2006). In essence, a nation wishes to acquire a technological advantage, 
which can be measured in years, over any potential rivals in order to have the capability to 
successfully win battles while ensuring the minimum level of casualties. There is also a strong 
incentive to invest in technology in order to reduce manpower requirements and the associated 
rising costs. Middleton et al. (2006) show that gaining this technological advantage is a strategic 
interest for the MOD, and that this advantage is correlated to defence R&D spending. This shows 
that defence spending can be a source of innovation, and subsequently that there will be 
opportunities for technology developed in the defence context to diffuse into the civilian sector, as it 
is likely to be “cutting edge”, and its development has been subsidised by defence spending.  
The MOD is therefore incentivised to acquire cutting-edge technology, which may not be available on 
the open market. The MOD is also likely to be willing to pay a premium for this technological 
advantage, and also invest in the early stages of its development, in order to ensure that it can be 
successfully procured as mentioned in the previous section regarding the “cash-flow valley of death”. 
In fact, early-stage R&D funding is often awarded on a cost-plus basis (Currie, 2011). 
There are many examples of the UK and other nations’ militaries having acquired cutting-edge 
technology, which is not likely to have been developed in civilian markets, at least not at that time. 
Some examples of novel technology include the jet engine, the Global Positioning System and the 
internet; which have all been applied in civilian sectors since their initial development in a military 
context. In addition, some military technologies have not transferred to civilian applications, there 
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are examples of a nation’s attempt to gain a military advantage by possessing unique, cutting-edge 
technology, such as the Harrier jump-jet or stealth technology, without civilian applications.  
Essentially, as the military is acting under a different incentive structure than profit-maximising firms 
in the wider economy, it is likely that the MOD and other defence agencies will invest in, and develop 
technology from which they gain a tangible advantage, but may not have been worthy of investment 
in a civilian context. This can constitute a source of innovation, which can diffuse into the wider 
economy. To better understand the DUT2 phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the factors, 
which influence defence procurement decisions. These are part of the MOD’s overall strategy and 
therefore will shape the institutional forces and demand conditions to which defence contractors are 
exposed. Understanding this environment is key to identifying firm-level effects within defence 
contractors, which may potentially affect the transfer of technology. 
There has been some academic attention to the institutional effects involved in military 
procurement. In particular, Eyre & Suchman (1992) provided an analysis of nations’ procurement 
policies using four theoretical approaches. Their goal was to explain what equipment is procured. A 
fifth has since been added to this model (see Figure 4).  
The first approach is the strategic-functional approach, which asserts that nation-level military 
strategic interests explain procurement outcomes. In essence, a nation will build a military capability 
in line with the strategic military intentions of the government. These are likely to be dependent on 
the procurement policies of neighbouring nations, as well as other nations, which are seen as 
competitors or threats. The nation’s own strategic military ambitions will also affect procurement 
policy.  
Procurement 
Decision
Strategic / 
Functional
Factional
GeopoliticalInstitutional
Technological 
Momentum
 
Figure 4: Factors influencing defence procurement (based on Eyre & Suchman, 1992) 
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The factional approach concentrates on competing internal political interests on a sub-national level. 
This suggests that procurement decisions are influenced by the actions of competing elements within 
the armed forces, i.e. the air force, navy and land forces. In particular in a time of increased 
pressures on military spending, each faction is likely to lobby to acquire the equipment it considers 
necessary and desirable. This effect has been identified in the recent Gray Report, a review on 
defence acquisition in the UK (Gray, 2009). Various factions within the MOD are likely to be in 
competition for resources. As there are increasing pressures on military spending, coupled with an 
increasing cost of weapons systems, this is inevitable. In fact, as most major procurement projects 
can be seen within the domain of a particular area of the armed forces (i.e. Astute class submarine & 
new Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Navy; Eurofighter for the RAF), this factional effect is likely to be a 
source of significant pressures within the defence sector, and is additionally affected by the fact that 
many individual decision-makers within the procurement process may have backgrounds in one of 
the armed forces.  
The geopolitical approach considers regional military conflicts to be extensions of superpowers’ 
global strategies. This approach is rooted in the Cold War era, and predicts nations’ procurement 
strategies to be influenced by their alignment with these superpowers, i.e. the USA and the Soviet 
Union. Regional conflicts can then often be seen as “proxy fights” between these superpowers (Eyre 
& Suchman, 1992).  
These three approaches are based on a logic of rational choice, with a nation’s procurement policy 
seen as a rational response to its environment and own strategic ambitions. However, their fourth 
explanatory factor takes an institutional approach, at a global-political level of analysis where 
procurement policies can be explained not only by “the autonomous decision-making activity of 
independent nation-states, but rather the metonymical iconography of the global cultural order” 
(Eyre & Suchman, 1992, p.150). Therefore, a procurement policy might be influenced by institutional 
logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) relating to the nation’s government’s perceived position in the 
global political order. This can be used to partially explain the high level of military capability 
possessed by the UK.  
Since the end of the cold war, it has been argued that some elements of the UK’s military capability, 
most notably an active nuclear deterrent, are far from cost-effective, as the threat of nuclear war 
with the Soviet Union has diminished. However, this institutional approach explains that certain 
pressures exist for the UK to maintain a nuclear deterrent. The UK is one of a small group of nations 
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possessing such a capability2. Giving this up would be seen as exiting this group of nations, therefore 
weakening the UK’s position in the global order (Eyre & Suchman, 1992).  
This model has can be complimented by a fifth factor, technological momentum (Hutton, 1995). This 
factor accounts for the government’s aim so support the national DIB. Defence procurement can be 
used to increase the utilisation of manufacturing facilities, therefore increasing employment, for 
example. The utilisation of the national DIB also prevents this capability from atrophying. This can be 
driven by an industrial policy aimed at strengthening these capabilities, but also can result due to 
domestic political pressures, e.g. to prevent unemployment.  
At the domestic-national level of analysis, i.e. the environment within which defence firms sell, the 
lens of institutional theory provides an effective tool to identify the forces affecting defence firms. 
The defence sector is subject to strong institutional forces, and therefore is a particularly good 
setting for the application of this theoretical framework. Specific coercive, normative and mimetic 
pressures act upon the organisations in the sector. These coercive, normative and mimetic pressures 
are rooted in the regulative, normative and cognitive institutional effects, respectively (Scott, 2001), 
and are heavily influenced by the MOD, due to its three-fold role.  
Several government publications give insight into the pressures exerted on the firms within the 
industry. For example, the National Audit Office (NAO) and the MOD have released a document 
outlining how the MOD aims to use effective contracts to maximise the likelihood of successful 
project outcomes (Currie, 2011; Great Britain. National Audit Office, 2006). Within this framework, 
the MOD has adopted a “gold-standard”, of effective relationships with suppliers in the context of a 
major procurement project. Defence firms are therefore encouraged to conform to MOD specific 
contracting requirements, transparency and standard practices of interaction and accounting (Currie, 
2011; Gray, 2009), contributing to the sector-specific regulative and normative effects. 
Other organisational documents, such as the Defence Industrial Strategy white paper (Great Britain. 
Ministry of Defence, 2005) and the Procurement Handbook (Great Britain. Ministry of Defence, 2004) 
signal to firms how they are expected to behave, organise themselves and interact with the MOD.  
Most commonly, the MOD uses the CADMID (for products) / CADMIT (for services) life cycle 
including two ‘gates’ of approval (see Figure 5). It is of particular interest that the main gate is set 
relatively early in the development process, therefore the MOD takes on a high proportion of the 
                                                          
2
 The other nations known to, or believed to possess nuclear weapons are the USA, France, Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan, Israel and North Korea (Kile et al., 2009) 
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projects technological uncertainty and risk. In addition, the development phase up to this point is 
commonly funded by a cost-plus contractual arrangement.  
Concept Assessment Demonstration
Manufacture/ 
Migrate
In-Service
Disposal/ 
Termination
IPT Activities
Initial Gate
Main Gate 
Products
Main Gate 
Services
 
Figure 5: The CADMID / CADMIT process (Great Britain. Ministry of Defence, 2004) 
 
An IPT is an Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is a team set up by the MOD to monitor the 
procurement process. Its members include technical experts, as well as management and contracting 
advisors. The IPT is set up in order to improve the efficiency of the procurement project, and to 
ensure that the project goals are achieved to the necessary levels quality and cost, and on time. The 
IPTs are in fact part of a larger framework applied to procurement decisions, namely the “Smart 
Acquisition” framework: 
1
Through Life Systems 
Approach
applying Whole-Life-Costing techniques
2 Integrated Project Teams
Team including managers with core skills to complete 
acquisition cycle (incl. Support and termination/disposal)
3 Industry Relationship effort towards a 'better, more open relationship'
4 Investment Structure higher investments during early project stages
5 Trade-Offs
effective trade-offs between system performance, through-
life-costs, and time
6
New Procurement 
Approaches
different procurement strategies
7 Approval Process streamlined and efficient project approval
 
Figure 6: Smart Acquisition Framework (Great Britain. Ministry of Defence, 2004) 
These processes indicate that the MOD is committed to taking a life-cycle approach to procurement, 
to counter the cost escalation issues which would occur in the case of a lack of forward planning and 
cost control. However, the Gray report (2009) shows that defence procurement is subject to a 
substantial degree of cost escalation, despite these efforts. This discrepancy indicates that although 
the MOD is aware of the lack of cost-focus in the defence industry, its attempts to counter this have 
not been as successful as desired. 
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Complex government procurement leads to the creation of incredibly complex supply chains 
involving a multitude of heterogeneous actors taking roles at varying points along the chain. For this 
reason it is very difficult to propose characteristics of all firms involved. However, an initial 
breakdown of the structure of the Defence Industry has been proposed by Hartley et al. (1997) and 
Hislop (1997) (see Figure 7). They propose a three-tier pyramidal structure, with the prime contractor 
at the apex of the pyramid. The second tier is made up of the major subcontractors, who provide 
major sub-systems, which are integrated by the prime contractor. Examples of these sub-systems 
include radars, navigation systems, engines, displays or radios. These are then built into the 
platforms which are created by the prime-contractors, hence the term “systems-integrators” often 
used to describe the firms at the apex of the pyramid. 
These two tiers have attracted a large portion of research attention, as they can be more easily 
defined as defence contractors, as they produce high value-added products and services, which are 
directly aimed toward the military customer. However, the third tier is made up of the suppliers of 
individual components or materials to the first- and second-tier firms. There are significant 
methodological issues related with obtaining an effective sample of these companies, due to the 
complexities inherent to the complex defence supply chains. However, they are inherently important 
as they are likely to be more “Dual-Use” orientated, as their products and services are likely to be 
less focussed on the defence application, the further they are removed from the final complex 
system / platform delivered to the defence customer (Hartley et al., 1997).  
Prime 
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1st Tier
2nd Tier
3rd Tier +
Defence 
specialised 
suppliers
Major 
Subcontractors
 
Figure 7: Three-tier pyramidal structure of defence suppliers (adapted from Hartley, 1997; Hislop, 1997) 
This three-tier structure does however have its limitations. In particular, the third tier is likely to be a 
very complex construct of suppliers of heterogeneous products and services, with a range of 
relationships with each other, as well as with the first- and second tier firms. Due to the complexity 
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and cost of the final product, as well as the major subsystems, the upstream supply networks will 
include firms of varying degrees of technological intensity. There will also be product-specific 
technical demands, which will permeate the supply chain to these suppliers (Hislop, 1997). 
For example, in an aerospace context, where weight minimisation is a significant factor, the supplier 
of components such as screws may be intensively incentivised to create high-value, lightweight, high 
performance screws, which will be integrated into subsystems such as the gearbox of a helicopter. 
However the same is not true for other applications, for example a maritime application, where 
more generic components may be applicable. Therefore the third-tier supplier of a specific 
component to aerospace may be subject to strong pressures to innovate, with the potential to earn 
significant revenues. The subsequent innovation can then potentially be leveraged to generate 
revenues in civilian sectors.  
This “third-tier” therefore contains a heterogeneous mix of firms regarding defence sector focus, 
ranging from highly specialised high-technology component manufacturers to suppliers of generic 
products. In this context it is remarkable to note that suppliers to the defence industry often do not 
realise that they are part of a specific defence supply chain (Hartley et al., 1997). This is reflected in 
the nature of their business (e.g. Steel stockholders & distributors, suppliers of seals, gaskets, 
washers, adhesives etc.), but also in the fact many suppliers at this level are not specialised defence 
firms. In some cases this is due to the fact that their business is based on sales of commodities. This 
further underlines the fact that this “third-tier” of suppliers deserves additional research attention. 
It is therefore useful to re-evaluate the structure suggested by Hislop (1997). Hartley et al. (1997) 
consider the second tier suppliers to be the direct suppliers to the prime-contractor. In this context 
they suggest a division in the second tier of the supply chain, with some firms falling into the group 
of sub-primes or “super” first level suppliers. This effectively indicates that the prime-contractor 
acquires complex sub-systems directly, but also a range of less sophisticated products and services in 
order to create the final product. However, the prime-contractor is able to acquire non-generic 
products and services, the adaptation of which may be essential for the final military application. 
Therefore the manufacturer of what may seemingly be a generic, “low-tech” product may hold a key 
technological capability within the supply chain for a complex government procurement project.  
Due to the MOD’s demand for cutting-edge high-technology products, it is likely that defence firms 
will develop specific technological capabilities. It is also clear that due to the high development costs, 
firms are likely to specialise on specific technological capabilities. It is not possible for an economy 
the size of the UK’s to develop and maintain a full set of capabilities for the production and 
maintenance of a full repertoire of military capabilities, especially considering full life-cycle costs. 
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This specialisation, driven by the costs of developing effective sub-systems and platforms, leads to 
the DIB being a set of oligopolistic markets.  
The prime contractor for a major complex defence procurement project can be seen as the focal 
point of the project’s complex Supply Chain. Therefore they must have strong capabilities in the 
construction of the relevant platform, and the integration of various sophisticated sub-systems and 
components. In the example of a military aircraft, this would mean constructing the airframe, and 
integrating components such as engines, radar, navigation- and other avionics systems, etc.  
Figure 8 shows a synthesis of the factors influencing MOD procurement decisions and the structure 
of the market. It can be seen that defence firms build specific, costly technological capabilities in 
order to meet the MOD’s demands. They must also adapt their organisation and practices to the 
MOD’s requirements and expectations. They are more likely to do this is if they have a high strategic 
focus on defence work. The prime contractor then integrates the various systems from the 
subcontractors and acts as the nexus between the MOD and the DIB. The prime contractor acts as a 
systems integrator, and also takes on significant management responsibility for the supply chain. 
Therefore, the prime contractor is more heavily exposed to the pressures to conform to the 
requirements and expectations of the MOD. The greater the focus of the firm on the defence sector, 
the stronger these forces are likely to be, therefore increasing the firm’s level of adaptation to these 
defence sector-specific forces. Each DCi box in Figure 8 represents a defence firm or business unit 
possessing a well developed technological capability in the specific field. Two boxes with the same 
index i will be two distinct technological capabilities embedded within the same firm. Firms can 
possess more than one capability, and will compete within markets, which are made up of firms with 
such a capability. As these capabilities are costly and difficult to imitate, these markets will generally 
be oligopolistic in nature. Such a capability can be in the field of, for example, radar, airframes or 
aircraft engines. Only a small number of firms globally compete in such markets, as the capabilities 
are resource intensive and the associated skills, knowledge and systems very specialised. 
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Figure 8: The defence sector procurement environment 
This visualisation represents the structure of the industry at the prime contractor and major 
subcontractor level. The prime contractor is also likely to have some of the necessary technological 
capabilities, and may produce some of the subsystems itself. In the UK context, BAE Systems is the 
largest and most representative prime contractor. Smaller firms may act as prime contractors in the 
case of smaller projects. It is also not uncommon for the prime contractor to be a consortium of 
various defence firms, set up specifically in the context of a specific procurement project, in order to 
increase their chances of winning the contract, as complex procurement projects often necessitate a 
combination of technological capabilities.  
These firms also draw upon the wider supply base of the economy; however, the greater the 
distance of a firm from the MOD, is likely to be associated with a lower strength of the institutional 
forces to which they are to be exposed. A lower level of exposure will then reduce their level of 
adaptation. The role and behaviour of the firms at these lower levels of the supply chain is 
significantly underexplored. However it is likely that these institutional forces will diffuse through the 
supply chain, and will be heavily influenced by how the prime contractor manages the chain, in its 
role as a nexus between the DIB and the MOD.  
As stated above, the level of exposure to these forces will affect the level of adaptation of the firm to 
these forces. This overview has briefly outlined the environmental characteristics to which defence 
firms are exposed, in the UK context. These include specific and highly regulated procurement 
processes and contractual arrangements, as well as the institutional forces which are affected by the 
fact that the sector is rather insular, and procurer-dominated. The following section will provide 
more detail relating to the competitive dynamics in the industry, subject to the structures described 
above. 
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2.5 Dynamics of the defence industrial base 
The contemporary defence industrial context has seen a high degree of supply chain rationalisation, 
leading to the development of supply chains consisting of a smaller number of suppliers, who are 
however more capable. The increasing complexity of the systems procured in the defence sector has 
greatly increased the difficulty for individual firms to possess the required capabilities to support the 
whole life cycle of a system. In this context, there is an inherent modularity within the supply chain, 
with specialised subcontractors developing subsystems, and adding more value by performing higher 
level assembly tasks, while the prime contractors develop their specialised systems integration 
capabilities, focusing on e.g. final assembly and after-sales services (Rebolledo & Nollet, 2011).  
The concept of systems integration as a core capability of modern high tech firms has attracted 
attention in the academic literature (Hobday et al., 2005). The authors state that modern high 
technology firms are increasingly willing to outsource certain productive tasks in order to focus on 
the coordination of the complex supply chains necessary to manage the production of complex 
systems, and integrate an array of complex subsystems. They also follow the development of 
systems integration capabilities to the defence sector of the 1940s and 1950s. It is apparent that 
these developments are still ongoing in the defence sector and have far reaching effects on defence 
supply chains and their members. 
Supply chain rationalisation and the development of more capable, specialised suppliers have led to 
the development of systems integration capabilities within these suppliers, particularly of major 
subsystems. These firms are expected to manage and coordinate their own supply chains, and are 
thus developing these sophisticated, specialised technological capabilities (Smith & Tranfield, 2005). 
Essentially, this focus on systems integration and effective supply chain management permeates 
from the prime contractors, indicating the complexity of the subsystems which are to be integrated 
within the context of a major defence contract.  
Although driven by the systems-integrator prime contractors, a degree of the supply chain 
rationalisation has been realised by the sophisticated high-level subcontractors who have engaged in 
significant M&A activity, but also taken on liaison roles with SMEs at lower levels in the supply 
chains. The effects of this are significant for the prime contractors; for instance, Antill et al. (2001) 
refer to one major European prime contractor whose supply base had been reduced from 400 firms 
in 1997 to 25 in 2001. This can potentially increase the understanding which prime contractors have 
of their suppliers’ capabilities, and can facilitate the involvement of suppliers at an earlier stage of 
the development process.  
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These factors have led to the establishment of complex supply chains which is characterised by the 
dispersal of knowledge within specialised firms, and by the principle of modular subcontracting. This 
has increased the dependency of prime contractors on such capable subcontractors, and has 
developed in the context of an increase in mutually beneficial partnering arrangements, and a move 
away from adversarial relationships. However, in order to compete as a subcontractor, a firm must 
first possess such valuable, rare capabilities, as well as organisational abilities necessary to integrate 
into such a complex supply chain, and generate appropriate interface capacities to enable modular 
subcontracting. At this point it is also imperative to recognize the gatekeeper role played by the 
prime contractors. 
A strong consensus emerged from interviewees from various points in the defence industry 
regarding the supply chain management and coordination role of prime contractors, particularly 
their power. Despite initiatives such as the Centre for Defence Enterprise, which has the goal of 
increasing engagement of “non-traditional” suppliers in the defence industry, SMEs wishing to 
engage must often do so by first engaging with a prime contractor. In fact several interviewees 
referred in particular to the considerable power held by BAE Systems, due to its size and also its well 
established links to procurement agencies.  
The opinions as to the benefits and drawbacks of this situation were not as unanimous. Some 
managers appreciated the organisational capabilities which large prime contractors bring to the 
relationship, e.g. in assisting in the contracting process and other administrative activities, which 
were particularly difficult for SMEs, particularly if they are not heavily focused on defence work. 
However, one senior SME manager stated:  
“MoD-proper (i.e. DE&S, etc) won't deal with small companies directly & large 
defence primes are so slow & laborious that we would go bust before they had 
finalised any contract.”  
Other respondents have stated that the institutional forces emanating from MOD and the 
government in general are in fact filtered by prime contractors, and the forces which then affect the 
suppliers can vary depending on which prime contractor they engage with. The role of the prime 
contractor is also interesting in this regard due to the fact that the prime contractor, in its 
gatekeeper role, represents the primary link between the primary buyer of complex systems, i.e. 
MOD, and the complex network of suppliers. In essence, MOD accesses the prime contractor’s 
organisational capabilities necessary to procure these complex systems by granting them this 
privileged position. However, it is necessary stress the point that MOD itself may not have these 
capabilities in house, a point made by Antill et al. (2001): 
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“There is considerable academic and practical evidence that strategic 
purchasing and supply chain management is most effective when the buying 
organisation is able to work closely with a limited number of highly preferred 
suppliers. Smart Procurement reflects this but the Ministry of Defence cannot 
be classed as a purely commercial organisation as illustrated in the literature. It 
is in fact a bureaucratic organisation that finds the entrepreneurial culture 
difficult to assimilate” 
This underlines the potential for prime contractors to play an important role by leveraging their 
systems integration and supply chain management capabilities to improve the procurement 
outcomes of the MOD. However, this presents unique challenges for SMEs wishing to enter or 
remain in the industry. As mentioned, there has been a degree of consolidation in the form of M&A 
activity, but another phenomenon in the industry has been the creation of regional consortia, such as 
the North West Aerospace Alliance, the Northern Aerospace Industries, and the Midlands Aerospace 
Alliance. In fact, this coordination is also present at and beyond the national level, in the form of the 
A|D|S group, which represents the UK aerospace, defence, security and space industries in the UK 
and abroad. Add to these the Aerospace, Aviation and Defence Knowledge Transfer Network, and it 
becomes apparent that there is a considerable drive to enable communication and co-operation.  
These networks create the potential for the discovery and assimilation of new technologies by 
leveraging the core and peripheral supply base. Therefore, there are efforts to support development 
and generate engagement at multiple levels of the supply chain. However, the fact remains that the 
industry is pyramid shaped and hierarchically structured, with high levels of concentration toward 
the apex of the pyramid. 
Therefore, firms must be aware of their current and intended position in such a structure, while 
taking into account the changes both in market structure but also both in the advancement of 
technology, as well as the changing requirements of the customer. Recent government spending cuts 
however, are likely to induce a reaction from firms involved in the defence sector, potentially 
increasing the relative value of certain avenues of diversification. The recent pressures due to 
reduced spending however magnify pressures which were already previously extant.  
The main routes for such diversification had been summarised by Antill et al. (2001) well in advance 
of the financial crisis: 
“-  Scope for diversification (related and non-related) into non-defence industry   
activity. 
- Scope for product development to increase areas of involvement within the 
defence sector 
- Defence sector exit strategies 
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- The need for strategic alliance / partnering agreements in order to 
maximise expertise and the opportunity to enter new markets in the case of 
contractor logistic support and facilities management”. 
The fact that this correlates with current market conditions underlines the fact that these cost 
pressures are likely to accelerate an already initiated trend in the market.  
Additionally, it is necessary to underline the potential to leverage strengths in exports as the defence 
industry has significant and growing customers in non-domestic markets, presenting firms with the 
following option: 
- Scope to increase engagement in existing foreign markets, or enter new 
foreign markets 
Traditionally, the competitive dynamics literature has focused on firm actions as outcomes of the 
competitive process. In the case of defence, with its pyramid structure and strong institutional forces 
emanating from a centralised buyer, presents the opportunity to expand this view to include the 
antecedents of such firm behaviour, to address the “why” question (Livengood & Reger, 2010). 
Therefore, when looking at the DUT2 phenomenon, it is not only necessary to address the 
substantive barriers which may affect technology transfer, but also the cognitive, affective or other 
psychological factors. In essence, despite varying degrees of dependence on the defence industry in 
terms of revenues, it is likely that involvement in the industry is facilitated by costly strategic 
investment decisions to both offer valuable technology but also be capable of engaging with the 
relevant stakeholders and conforming to the complex regulatory and administrative regimes present 
in the industry. Increasing levels of embeddedness in such an environment is also likely to lead to 
cognitive barriers which pose an additional obstacle. However, defence budget reductions will lead 
to increased pressures for firms to diversify away from traditional business. The following section will 
outline certain paths available to defence firms in more detail. Defence firm diversification paths 
The following section will outline a model based on the Ansoff matrix (Ansoff, 1957), but specifically 
targeted at the options which are available to firms with a defence focus regarding diversification. 
This model is based on DUT2 from defence to non-defence applications, and is focused on the 
diversification away from defence activities. In essence, it is based on an initial status quo of 
developing technology for defence purposes and selling it into traditional defence markets. In the UK 
context, the traditional market can be seen as the UK domestic “home” market. 
The two-dimensional model consists of four boxes with the Y-axis plotting geographic diversification, 
and the X-axis diversification away from defence applications (Figure 9). In the graph, the bottom left 
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box consists of the abovementioned status quo: Selling to UK MOD based on the technological 
capabilities on which the firm’s competitive advantage is built. Based on this model, firms can 
diversify by selling defence equipment into foreign markets, or by diversifying out of defence and 
leverage existing technological capabilities in non-defence markets. It is of course possible to 
combine these two approaches, and also to retain original activities alongside new ventures. There 
are numerous potential driving forces for such moves; however in the current climate opinion would 
seem to suggest that there is likely to be a reduction in UK defence spending in the coming years. In 
such a situation, defence firms with distinct technological capabilities are likely to be incentivised to 
leverage these capabilities in other markets. Nevertheless, either route is beset with challenges to 
firms wishing to engage in these diversification processes.  
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Figure 9: Defence firm diversification paths matrix (adapted from Ansoff, 1957) 
Any defence firm wishing to pursue a strategy of geographic diversification must be aware of several 
strong barriers and significant challenges. Export regulations set in place by home market 
governments have some academic attention, and are in fact a major constituent of the original 
definition of the concept of Dual Use Technologies (Parkhe, 1998). Governments are strongly 
incentivised to control the diffusion of technologies for two reasons: 1) these technologies may be 
used to nefarious ends or be otherwise dangerous in the possession of unsanctioned parties; and 2) 
the spread of such technologies may weaken the strategic interests of the home nation (either by 
eliminating a comparative military advantage or by furnishing a party with a military capability). 
The larger UK defence firms have been taking measures to “hedge their bets” geographically. For 
instance, BAE systems reports that it currently operates out of five home markets: the UK, the US, 
Saudi Arabia, Australia and India (BAE, n.d.). Interestingly, they also report that they have marginally 
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more employees in the US (39,200 employees) than in the UK (38,400 employees) (BAE, n.d.). It can 
in fact be argued that BAE is becoming an increasingly “American” company.  
BAE, QinetiQ, Rolls-Royce and Babcock International3, among many others, have been expanding 
through foreign acquisitions (Currie, 2011). Such acquisitions can be an effective market entry 
method, as it can be used to circumvent barriers to entry, i.e. regulatory and political challenges.  
Additionally, many global defence firms are refocusing on other markets, such as Brazil, Turkey and 
South-East Asia, for which the industry expects significant growth in the future. In fact, Thales’ CEO 
states in an interview that Thales has “embarked upon a transformation of [the] organisation 
worldwide. The future growth [he sees] in the rest of the world, as [one] should bear in mind that in 
total the world defence market is still going up at a two-figures growth per year.” When asked which 
countries he will envisage to be the “biggest spenders” in the coming years he replied: “Asia, where 
[Thales] continue[s] to invest, Brazil, Russia [and] India. In fact, the defence spending goes along with 
the economic growth.” (ReutersVideo, 2011, 0:36-1:10).  
Firms wishing to leverage their technologies in non-defence markets are faced with an array of 
challenges, which will be a significant focus of this thesis. It is very likely that the changes in defence 
procurement strategy since the end of the Cold War have increased the potential for DUT2, due to 
the higher level of electronic components, and the rapid acquisition and insertion of novel 
technologies (for instance the significant focus on creating strong networks between military assets, 
utilising communications, navigation, sensors, command and control and other electronic- and 
computer-based technologies). This coupled with the changing position and role of the DIB in the 
modern world creates a range of opportunities, but also challenges in this context. 
In summary, this model has captured the main options open to a defence firm, if either confronted 
by decreasing revenues in domestic defence markets, or if aspiring to grow when faced with stagnant 
defence revenues.  
2.6 Industrial context conclusion 
In conclusion, the UK defence sector is highly complex and subject to unique institutional forces that 
influence not only the structure of the market, but also the organisational structure and practices of 
firms operating in the market. The Government acts as a customer, a supporter of export efforts and 
as a controller of procurement policy, hence heavily influencing the nature of the sector as well as 
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 These are mentioned as ranking under the top 10 UK MOD suppliers (Currie, 2011) 
  34 
the size of the market. As a customer and supporter of export efforts to favour the trade balance, the 
MOD provides a significant commercial opportunity due to the scale of spending on the procurement 
of technology, its research, development and maturation and often represents an early adopter of 
technology. In fact, it invests in technology, even at early stages with high uncertainty, on a cost-plus 
basis, creating a source of innovation with the opportunity to diffuse in civilian markets. These 
investments, especially at early stages are often only possible in this context, as they would prove 
unattractive in civilian markets due to the high degree of uncertainty and simply the required capital 
expenditure. This is possible since the government acts upon a logic of rational choice rather than 
profit maximisation, with the goal to build and maximise capabilities on the basis of strategic 
ambitions and as a response to its environment. In this context, as the government seeks a position 
in the global political order, procurement decisions are highly influenced by other nations’ 
capabilities.  
In order to achieve this position of technological advantage, the government is willing to provide 
large scale budgets for specific customised products and systems, willing to pay a premium for 
technological advantages, often leading to cost escalation despite efforts to control cost with 
different measures aiming to maximise the likelihood of successful project outcomes. Despite the 
willingness to provide large scale budgets, the MOD is increasingly subject to significant budget cuts, 
while labour and technology costs constantly increase. 
These factors lead to significant regulatory measures directed at suppliers, who need to adapt their 
organisational practices and standards and need to respond to the MOD’s unique specifications and 
requirements. The closer a firm operates to the MOD, the higher the strength of institutional forces 
(regulative, normative and cognitive) that act upon the firm creating coercive, normative and 
mimetic pressures. This leads firms in the sector to conformity, which increases with stronger 
technological focus. The technological focus of a defence firm is not only dependent on the specific 
and costly technological capabilities that the MOD demands, but also on the position of the firm 
within the industry, i.e. whether the firm is a prime contractor (1st tier), a major subcontractor (2nd 
tier) or an individual component/material supplier (3rd tier), and the position in often highly complex 
project supply chains. Given that 1st tier suppliers are highly specialised and anchored in defence 
technological capabilities, working close to the MOD, these firms are subject to such strong 
institutional forces, such that their organisational structure, their practices and cognitive 
characteristics are strongly affected. However, it is important to note that the nature of military 
systems has significantly changed due to the end of the cold war and the emergence of intricate 
electronic technologies. During the cold war, governments demanded large mechanical weapons, for 
which other applications outside of defence would have been highly unlikely. The increasing need for 
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electronic components and telecommunications increases the likelihood of application in civilian 
markets, thus enhancing the transferability of technology. However, diversification into other 
markets is still likely to be difficult for firms strongly embedded in the sector due to the adaptation of 
organisational structures, procedures and cognitive patterns characteristic to the sector. While 
geographic diversification may be less difficult as other nations’ defence markets may be similar to 
the domestic market, export regulations may inhibit the effort to geographic diversification. 
Furthermore, diversification into other markets, namely civilian markets, maybe more difficult for 
defence firms due to the very different nature of the market and the customers’ needs as well as the 
possibly large number of customers. Logically, civilian market firms may also encounter difficulties 
entering the defence market due to the lack of experience with the requirements and institutional 
environment of the defence sector.  
The following theory section will begin with a review of the DUT2 literature, focusing on micro-level 
DUT2. This literature identifies several factors, which affect the likelihood and success of DUT2, at 
project level, firm level and contextual levels. Many of these factors are related to the idiosyncratic 
defence sector-specific forces to which defence firms are subjected. The literature review section 
serves to review existing knowledge, and to move closer to the development of testable hypotheses. 
Continuing from the literature review, the main theoretical constructs underlying the study will be 
described. As this study focuses on a complex phenomenon in an idiosyncratic context, the study 
employs a methodological combination of exploratory field work and empirical quantitative work. To 
this end, theory development was built around interviews with industry experts, in an iterative 
process designed to ensure validity of constructs to be operationalised, as well as to enable the 
capture of the complexity and richness of the factors involved.  
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3 Theory 
3.1  Micro-level Dual-Use Technology Transfer literature review 
This review intends to synthesise the literature on spill-overs at the micro level, from the defence 
sector to the wider civilian economy. It seeks to identify which conditions affect the likelihood, as 
well as the outcomes of such spill-overs. The organisational level factors and contextual factors 
affecting these spill-overs will be identified, by reviewing the literature specifically on the DUT2 
phenomenon at the micro-level. As this literature is considerably less extensive than the related 
macro-level literature (Hartley, 2006), other sources which specifically assess the specific 
characteristics of defence firms in general will also be used to compliment the review. The fact that 
the literature at the micro-level is not extensive has been addressed by macro-level researchers, and 
in a review of the macro-level literature, Hartley (2006) specifically addresses this gap in the 
literature. The macro-literature is noteworthy in its inconclusiveness, and therefore effective micro-
level studies would be valuable beyond the scope of this level of analysis, in particular because these 
spill-overs occur at the micro-level. 
In order to begin an exploration of the concept of DUT2, it is necessary to demarcate the field and to 
specifically address the concept of technology. Several definitions of technology are available in the 
literature, and can be seen as existing along a continuum, ranging from a very narrow definition 
restricting the term to products and artefacts, to a far more broad definition including the social 
relations and mode of production in which the development and production of artefacts occurs 
(Galtung, 1979; Molas-Gallart, 1997). Here we use the following definition for technology: 
“Technology comprises the ability to recognise technical problems, the ability to develop new 
concepts and tangible solutions to technical problems, the concepts and tangibles developed to solve 
technical problems, and the ability to exploit the concepts and tangibles in an effective way” (Autio & 
Laamanen, 1995, p. 647).  
Molas-Gallart (1997) builds on Autio’s and Laamanen’s (1995) definition and includes “capital 
equipment, software, scientific and technical knowledge, skills, research and production processes, 
designs, blueprints, management techniques and principles, and the resulting products developed to 
solve technical problems” (Molas-Gallart, 1997 p.369). 
In this project we define Dual-Use technologies as technologies with current or potential military and 
civilian applications, the definition adopted by Molas-Gallart (1997).  
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One main goal of this study is to identify the firm-level factors which influence the likelihood and 
success of DUT2. It is however necessary to also take into account technology- and project-specific 
factors. To this end it is necessary to outline the likely effects of technology attributes on DUT2 
Technology complexity has been extensively studied in the context of strategy and technology 
studies. The defence sector has been a particularly salient context for such studies, as defence 
agencies procure highly complex and costly weapons systems, which are often highly technologically 
sophisticated. This has led to a number of studies focusing on e.g. aircraft carriers (Roberts, 1990), or 
tanks (Demchak, 1992). 
Technology complexity increases the difficulty of acquiring and maintaining the requisite capabilities 
to construct components, but also integrate these into complex systems. High technology complexity 
also increases the organisational costs of commercialising technologies, leading to difficulties in such 
commercialisation projects (Hagedoorn, 1993; Langlois & Everitt, 1992). 
Singh (1997) defines a complex technology as “an applied system whose components have multiple 
interactions and constitute a non-decomposable whole”. These characteristics of systemicity, 
multiple interactions and non-decomposability lead to complex technologies being constituted of 
components which are likely to be highly complementary or in fact co-specialised (Teece, 1986).  
These attributes and their implications according to Teece (1986) would seem to depict a negative 
correlation between complexity and modularity, i.e. complexity, including multiplicity of interactions 
and non-decomposability lead to a difficulty in decomposition and recombination of modules 
without losing system functionality. In fact the concepts of “near decomposability” (Simon, 1962) 
and “loose coupling” (Weick & Orton, 1990) had previously been used to describe the strength of 
such structural dependencies (Campagnolo & Camuffo, 2010). 
The concept of modularity is of great concern in the defence industry, at various levels of analysis. 
Prime contractors as systems integrators must manage complex supply chains in which 
subcontractors supply technologically sophisticated and complex components. To this end, the 
challenge of integration of these systems involves significant investment in the interfaces between 
these components. Although individual components, such as radios, radar systems or 
communications equipment may have potential for DUT2, this potential will be affected by the 
degree of co-specialisation with respect to the components of a system. Stringent military 
specifications and the requirement of integration within complex systems can pose a barrier to 
DUT2.  
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Additionally, there is a high demand for integration of various military platforms and systems into 
higher-level networks which constitute military capabilities. In fact, the continuing focus on C4ISTAR 
and the integration of various military platforms serves to make the point that modularity can be 
viewed from varying perspectives. 
What becomes apparent is that modularity is a relative attribute, and is dependent on the unit of 
analysis. The potential for transfer of an individual module, i.e. component or subsystem, will be 
dependent on the ability to decouple it from the wider system, as well its level of specialisation. 
The central hypotheses of this research relate to the suggestion that organisational factors specific to 
defence firms negatively influence the likelihood and success of spill-overs from the defence industry 
to civilian industries. Taking an institutional approach, it is suggested that firms operating within the 
defence sector, and subject to the defence procurement process, will be subject to specific 
isomorphic pressures and institutional norms, which have an effect on the cognitive framework of 
these firms. This cognitive framework is likely to be inappropriate in the context of any attempts to 
operate outside the defence sector.  
In line with the lens of the capabilities literature, defence firms are also likely to develop highly-
optimised, defence-specific capabilities in order to meet the idiosyncratic needs of the industry, and 
the MOD’s requirements as the dominating buyer. These capabilities may function as rigidities if the 
defence firm seeks to diversify into civilian markets.  
To this end, we search the literature for insights into the nature of the idiosyncrasies of the defence 
industry, and their effects on the firms operating within the sector. Various authors have addressed 
specific factors, which affect the likelihood of spill-overs into the civilian economy on a micro-level. 
Other authors have identified defence-specific attributes, which are likely to affect DUT2, but have 
pursued research agendas focussing on other issues, such as the efficiency of the sector. However, 
these studies can also give rise to insights in the context of this research. 
Several authors have looked at the impact of export controls on the US and other countries’ Military-
Industrial-Complexes (Parkhe, 1992; Elder, 1992; Fuhrmann, 2008). This particular research topic 
raises an important point for the DUT2 researcher – the intended meaning of the term “Dual-Use”. 
There is a body of literature concerned with this topic, but more heavily focussed on the dangers of 
the diffusion of technologies which have legitimate civilian applications, but could be used in a 
military context, the so-called “dual-use dilemma” (Atlas & Reppy, 2005). In the past the term “dual-
purpose” has also been used. During the Cold War in particular, this issue was of current interest, 
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and has influenced policy as can be seen for example in the 1977 U.N. Report on the Economic and 
Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures, which asserts:  
“problems arise when technologies are applicable both for military purposes and for 
important civilian ends ( . . . ) for such dual-purpose technologies attempts to control 
the arms race, not by abolishing weapons systems but by confining their possession to a 
limited set of countries, will inevitably come into conflict with the aim of making 
existing technology available to all countries in a non-discriminatory manner”.  
(quoted in Molas-Gallart, 1997, from Krieger, 1981, p. 13)  
Traditionally the emphasis was on proliferation of nuclear technologies, but more recently includes 
the diffusion of technologies involved in the field of biological warfare (McLeish & Nightingale, 2007; 
Atlas & Reppy, 2005). 
Molas-Gallart (1997) argues that the emphasis has shifted from the focus on arms control to a more 
industrial view concerned with the exploitation of R&D and manufacturing outcomes beyond initial 
goals. However a review of the literature reveals significant gaps in research in the field. Gummett 
(1990) asserts that defence science and technology policy are under-studied, especially in relation to 
the level of defence R&D spending, and points out that previous literature on economic and 
sociological factors, and their impact on defence and technology policy were unsatisfactory.  
Due to the importance of the topic on the one hand, and the changes in the competitive 
environment for the defence industry on the other, subsequent research has been conducted in the 
area, however this has often been fraught with the data problems, i.e. problems of measurement of 
defence R&D, regarding data sources, interpretation and comparison across national borders (Molas-
Gallart, 1999). These aspects present the opportunity to undertake an up-to-date study of the field, 
using both a case study approach as well as a survey of a large population of UK defence firms, as 
well as other secondary sources in order to attain a degree of triangulation, and make a substantial 
and rigorous empirical contribution to the understanding of this important phenomenon.  
Molas-Gallart (1997) also identifies three main trends, which have driven the emergence of Dual-Use 
policies. These trends are (i) The decline in defence expenditures, (ii) The persistent growth in the 
cost of developing and procuring new arms systems and (iii) The changing relationship between 
military and civilian technologies. These trends have led to the increased promotion of dual-use 
policies, and at the firm level they incentivise diversification into non-defence markets.  
Regarding point (i), the end of the Cold War led to a reduction in defence spending and size of armed 
forces (Hartley, 2006), however considerable defence expenditure on the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan counteracted this trend to a certain extent, which is reflected in an increase in spending 
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in real terms, despite a decrease in the defence expenditure as share of GDP (see Figure 10 and 
Figure 11). 
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Figure 10: UK military expenditure as % share of domestic annual GDP 1988-2010 (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2011) 
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Figure 11: UK military expenditure in constant (2010) $US millions, 1988-2011 (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2011) 
 
Over the same time period, the costs of defence equipment and personnel have been increasing. 
Equipment costs have been rising by ca. 10% per year, whereas personnel costs have risen faster 
than wages in the civilian sector, due to the fact that UK has an all-volunteer force, which must be 
compensated for the disadvantages of military service (Hartley, 2006).  
Points (i) and (ii) constitute the “defence economics problem”, which leads to the MOD having to 
reduce the number of weapons systems it acquires, and make difficult choices in an uncertain 
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military environment. This has contributed to the third trend (iii), whereby, in terms of technology 
transfer, there has been a gradual shift from an initial logic of spin-off to the wider economy, to one 
of spin-in, where the defence sector is concerned with broadening its industrial and R&D base 
(Avadikyan & Cohendet, 2009).  
Dual Use has often been advocated as a policy to maintain military capability particularly in the 
presence of government spending cuts. In the early 1990’s, the defence industry was in transition 
from the Cold War era to a more modern defence industry. At this time the Dual Use concept 
attracted significant academic and political attention, particularly in the US (e.g. Round, 1993; U.S. 
Department of Defence, 1992; Gansler, 1989). In particular as a strategy to ensure the survival of a 
broad and capable on-shore defence industry, to ensure the potential for surges in production, and 
to justify defence spending by citing the benefits to the wider economy. Although interest in this 
particular avenue of research has declined, the current difficulties experienced by the financial crisis 
are likely to instigate renewed interest in the Dual Use phenomenon. 
The majority of authors in this stream of literature assume the existence of a division between 
military and economic sectors, leading to differing business practices and creating a barrier to the 
transfer of technology between defence and other sectors. Often these barriers are cited as being 
principally organisational or administrative in nature, rather than relating to the technologies 
themselves (U.S. Department of Defence, 1992). This underlines the need to reinvestigate the firm-
level factors which may be influential in such cases. There has been a general consensus that 
operating simultaneously in defence and civilian markets is extremely challenging. However, the last 
20 years have brought about significant changes in the challenges the armed forces face, as well as in 
the defence industry itself. 
Cronberg (1994) shows that the “traditional” military domain is changing and that the military is in 
fact losing its privileged position. Reduced military expenditure has weakened many defence 
contractors’ positions and has driven them to seek alternative opportunities in civilian markets. 
Principally, this is driven by a more competitive approach to procurement which is being pursued by 
defence agencies, as well as increasing international competition. Exacerbating this effect, innovative 
firms are refraining from taking military work, citing complicated military accounting requirements, 
IPR issues and highly detailed specifications. These specifications have often been so specific as to 
greatly inhibit the contractor’s “interpretive flexibility” (Cronberg, 1994).   
Round (1993) also notes that even at the time of writing, there was a great deal of convergence in 
the strategic R&D focus between the military and the wider economy. In fact, during this time the US 
Congress requested lists of critical technologies from both the DoD and the Department of 
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Commerce (DoC). Of the 21 technologies listed by DoD, only five do not appear on the DoC list. It is 
likely that this trend has continued, due to more recent changes in strategic goals in defence 
procurement.  
At this point it is necessary to focus more closely on the nature of dual use technologies, and to 
describe the landscape in which they exist.  
 
What are Dual-Use Technologies? 
Following Molas-Gallart (1997), we define Dual Use technologies as technologies with current or 
potential applications in military and civilian sectors. However, to capture the richness of the concept 
it is imperative to view the dual use concept as a continuum, with various technologies having 
differing potentials for dual use and applications having varying similarities between sectors. 
Intuitively, it can be argued that application similarity has a strong effect on the likelihood of transfer 
across sectors. For instance, strong technological developments in the civilian semiconductor 
industry, and the development of computer systems has led to the increased procurement of “off-
the-shelf” or slightly modified computer systems by defence agencies. However, to procure a fighter 
aircraft or warship, these agencies must turn to a more specialised industrial base.  
In this context, Molas-Gallart makes a distinction between Dual-Use outputs and inputs. These 
outputs can be products, but also codified knowledge or management principles, techniques and 
systems. The inputs on the other hand can be either fixed capital in the form of production or 
research facilities, or labour, in the form of skills and know-how (Molas-Gallart, 1997) (see Table 1). 
Inputs Outputs
• Fixed Capital
• Labour
• Products
• Services
• Management Principles,
Techniques & Systems
 
Table 1: Dual-use inputs and outputs (Molas-Gallart, 1997) 
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Dual-Use Technology Transfer 
In this project we substantially build on the work of Molas-Gallart, and adopt his definition of DUT2. 
Molas-Gallart (1997, p. 372) defines the concept as "a special instance of technology transfer across 
applications that takes place when a dual-use technology developed for a military (or civilian) use is 
transferred to a civilian (or military) application.”  
Whereas in general, technology transfer can refer to the transfer of technology between economic 
units or applications, in the case of DUT2 there must be a transfer from an original military 
application to a civilian application (or vice-versa). This becomes important when considering the 
broader literature on technology transfer. The transfer of technology between nations, from 
universities to industry or from research to production, have all attracted significant research 
attention, however, the necessity for the transfer to a different application is a distinctive trait of 
DUT2. 
Additionally, DUT2 does not necessarily involve the physical or geographical relocation of 
technologies. It is entirely plausible for a firm to diversify and reallocate its resources within an 
existing plant, and achieve a DUT2 outcome (Molas-Gallart, 1998).  
Focusing on the applications enables the emphasis on the differing requirements, specification and 
other potential expectations which may or may not be significantly different in the defence context 
than in the wider economy. For instance, military equipment deployed in the field is likely to have 
strict requirements for ruggedness and reliability, or potentially more technical requirements such as 
having a low electromagnetic signature in stealth applications. Such equipment may in principle 
however be based on technologies which have significant potential for applications in civilian 
markets.  
DUT2 Mechanisms 
Molas-Gallart (1997) suggests a typology of DUT2 mechanisms, with four types of DUT2, 
differentiated by whether they are straight or adaptational in nature. This difference regards 
whether the transfer mechanism encompasses the adaptation by the transferor of the technology to 
its new applications. Also, the typology makes a distinction between internal transfer within a single 
unit, and transfer between two or more units.  
Examples of Dual-Use products which are applicable with little or no modification are e.g. steel and 
generic computers, as opposed to those which require significant adaptation (e.g. Radar), and finally 
those which were designed for several uses from inception (e.g. transport aircraft, helicopters). 
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The subsequent two-by-two matrix is then used to classify the various mechanisms of DUT2, as can 
be seen in Table 2. This paper contributes to the field in that it clearly demonstrates that 
adaptational transfer is associated with a higher level of risk, due to the increased levels of 
technological uncertainty involved in the further development of the technology to meet the needs 
of the intended civilian application. However, it presents these two modes as a dichotomous 
distinction between straight transfer and adaptational transfer. Therefore, the introduction of scale 
variables to capture the level of required adaptation and customisation would be of great value. 
Mode
No Adaptation Adaptation
Actions
Transfer internal to 
a single unit
Internal straight transfer
• Dual-produce & integration
• Conversion
• Diversification
• Vertical repositioning
Transfer between 
≥2 units
• Technology Brokers
• Improving communication
• Internally-led   
commercialisation
• Publications
• User facilities
• Spin-off companies
• Collaborative Partnerships:
- Cooperative R&D programmes
- Joint Centres
- Direct finance of DU - R&D
 
Table 2: Dual-use technology transfer mechanisms (Molas-Gallart, 1997) 
Internal straight transfer refers to DUT2 within a single business unit, where a technology originating 
in e.g. defence is utilised in a non-defence application. This is often the case if a firm maintains a 
central database of technologies, which can then later be used to exploit new market opportunities.  
This is also the case if a firm sells a “commercial off the shelf” (COTS) product to a defence agency, or 
another defence supplier further downstream. This approach will generally be associated with lower 
risk, as the firm does not engage in the adaptation of the technology, and it is not dependent on any 
interfirm relationships other than between buyer and seller.  
Internal adaptational transfer efforts involve internal processes within the firm aimed at adapting the 
technology to enable its application in a new market. This can be a challenging process, as the 
adaptation process can bring with it technological and market risk, particularly in the case of entry 
into a new market. In the case of defence to non-defence technology transfer, this is likely to involve 
the move from engagement with a small number of customers, with which the firm has developed 
long-term relationships, to the engagement with a more heterogeneous population of customers 
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which are culturally different. The required marketing and other organisational capabilities for this 
switch may not be present within the firm, posing significant challenges.  
External straight transfer is another option for firms, and involves relatively low risk, but enables the 
firm to extract value from technology without engaging in the adaptation process themselves. By 
hiring technology brokers, or by creating a similar internal brokerage, firms may be able to generate 
e.g. licensing income by essentially selling the rights to their technology-based intellectual property.  
However, selling the rights to use technologies in such a manner can give rise to additional 
challenges, particularly if the exploitation of the technology requires tacit knowledge which is not 
transferred to the transferee. The development of complex technology within a firm is very likely to 
be dependent on the tacit knowledge possessed by technical staff, and the challenges in technology 
transfer in such cases have been documented in the literature (Molas-Gallart, 1998), and also 
confirmed in interviews.  
Several networks exist within the defence industry and beyond aimed at improving communication 
channels regarding the availability of-, and demand for technologies. For instance, the Technology 
Strategy Board (TSB) has set up a number of Knowledge Transfer Networks (KTNs), to facilitate the 
exchange of technology within various domains, e.g. the Aerospace, Aviation and Defence KTN. The 
defence industry is also characterised by well developed regional trade associations, as well as the 
former Defence Manufacturers Association, now part of the A|D|S Group.  
External adaptational transfer is perhaps the most challenging option in organisational terms. It can 
involve the creation of collaborative partnerships between firms, a phenomenon which seem to be 
becoming more common in the defence industry. However, such partnerships require substantial 
commitment and trust, and the management of IPR and other legal concerns. There is a broad 
literature regarding interfirm alliances, highlighting motivations such as gaining access to capabilities, 
other resources, or new markets (Hagedoorn, 1993). If we assume that firms heavily reliant on 
defence sales are exposed to strong sector-specific institutional forces, and adapt accordingly to this 
environment, this access may prove valuable; however success in such relationships is not 
guaranteed. 
Similarities in technological domains between firms have been shown to enhance the ability to learn 
from partners (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Also, Cohen & Levinthal (1990) show that R&D investments 
can improve a firm’s ability to internalise knowledge acquired from partners. As the development of 
knowledge is subject to path-dependency, we can assume that prior knowledge will affect the ability 
to acquire and assimilate knowledge in the future. In this case there may be considerable differences 
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in knowledge relating to the applications of technologies, as well as pertaining to the technologies 
themselves. Essentially, this mode of DUT2 poses considerable barriers to firms, particularly if they 
are engaging with firms which may possess potentially valuable capabilities, but have developed 
dissimilar knowledge due to their prior involvement (or lack thereof) in the defence sector. 
Spin-off companies also embody a mechanism of external adaptational transfer. The phenomenon 
has been studied in the context of government- and university spin-offs. This path provides the 
potential to extract value from technologies while compartmentalising the risk within the spin-off 
firm, which can be set-up specifically for the commercialisation of the technology. As such, it can be a 
manifestation of the parent firm’s unwillingness to perform the necessary adaptation in-house, 
either due to a lack of the requisite capabilities or a poor strategic fit.  
This typology is interesting since it represents an attempt to frame the study of DUT2 mechanisms, 
which is something that has not often been attempted. Alic et al. (1992) suggest eight different forms 
of relationships between military and civilian technologies; however their approach is not intended 
to focus on the technology transfer process in particular.  
Another contribution of the typology is to highlight the richness of the DUT2 concept, in that there 
are many mechanisms which can be employed. Combined with the heterogeneity of technologies, 
and the differing competitive pressures to which firms are exposed to at different levels of defence 
sector supply chains, it is apparent that this complex phenomenon cannot be dealt with in a “broad-
brush” manner. The review of the literature points to the fact that the area is understudied, for 
instance, Kulve & Smit (2003) state that the previous literature has “no unequivocal concept” of 
Dual-Use technology development, due to differing industrial contexts.  
More attention has been paid to the factors which may act as barriers DUT2, often taking a policy-
level perspective and reviewing various legal and regulatory developments. These studies mostly 
focus on a single factor in isolation. However, some insights can be gained from this literature, as it 
also addresses firm-level effects and strategies to overcome these barriers.  
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Barriers to DUT2 
Many examples of the process of adaptation from military to civilian use show that the process can 
be very long and difficult. The cases of Boeing-Vertol and Grumman4 in the 1960’s and 70’s show that 
major defence contractors can face severe difficulties when attempting to apply their capabilities to 
serve civilian markets (Molas-Gallart, 1997). The causes of these problems are said to be similar to 
problems affecting large defence systems contracts, namely high costs, quality deficiencies and 
scheduling problems. In the civilian commercial environment these can amount to insurmountable 
barriers to success.  
Other problems of operating in defence markets as well as civilian markets are addressed by 
Cronberg (1994). The first of these problems is stated to be the differing cultures in traditional 
military and civilian domains, where the former is far less cost-driven, with the emphasis being on 
equipment quality and a “performance at any cost” culture (Cronberg, 1994). The second is 
described as the "way military firms are organised and the networks in which they are embedded“, 
i.e. close client relations and the common occurrence of products being sold before they are 
produced. The third difference is said to be “psychological”, with military managers, scientists and 
workers often showing different behavioural patterns and opinions regarding their place within 
society, compared to their counterparts in civilian industry.  
In addition to this, Molas-Gallart & Sinclair (1999, p. 663) cite a study undertaken by Reppy (1994) of 
the US nuclear weapons laboratories attempts to transfer technology to commercial users, and 
offers the following list of obstacles: 
“ 
 Large bureaucracies linked to military-funded work and slow to downgrade their 
military work and establish new links with potential commercial clients 
 Pervasive security classification 
 Unfamiliarity with the needs and constraints of private industry 
 Technical staff preference to work on complex, high-profile projects 
 The trend to cast laboratory projects in terms of grand challenges rather than the 
more mundane problem of solving commercial work (Reppy, 1994, p.53).”  
 
                                                          
4
 Boeing-Vertol was involved in the rail passenger carriage industry; Grumman attempted to move 50% of their 
sales to commercial products such as buses, refrigerators, solar energy, canoes and incinerators (Markusen & 
Yudken, 1992 p.214) 
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As stated above, Cronberg (1994) argues that innovative firms are refraining from taking military 
work, due to complicated military accounting requirements, IPR issues and highly detailed 
specifications, inhibiting the contractor’s “interpretive flexibility”. It is likely that this effect will also 
be applicable in the other direction, as defence contractors will be highly adapted to this very 
different environment and may not have the capabilities to deal with a high degree of interpretive 
flexibility.  
Indeed, the fact that products are often sold before they are produced, and that defence contractors 
bid for procurement contracts which include highly detailed specifications, removes the need for 
organisational skills relating to marketing in the traditional sense. The lack of selective pressure to 
develop such skills within the defence sector can therefore represent a great disadvantage when 
attempting to diversify into civilian commercial markets.  
In addition to having strict specifications, military customers may also have security and control 
demands, such as in the realm of data management and sharing in collaborative civil-military satellite 
observation (Cervino et al., 2003). This case, involving a joint French-Italian programme, actually 
illustrates a shifting of control to the military, who gained priority access after they became involved 
in a project, which was initially planned to be civilian-led.  
The concern over control regarding the benefits of a project has also been addressed in other work. 
Bellais & Guichard (2006) addressed this problem with respect to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). 
They argue that an effective IPR framework could act as an incentive to civilian-military 
collaboration, and that the contract design is crucial. Often, spin-offs will fail due to security reasons; 
however, parts or processes of the programme in question could be used commercially without 
harming strategic superiority. This control issue is likely to be dependent on the nature of the 
technology, its strategic importance and its potential to be used for malevolent purposes (e.g. 
nuclear- and biological technologies). This element of the effect of the nature of the technology on 
the likelihood and success of DUT2 has not been fully explored.  
The technologies in question may also not be market ready, and therefore may involve considerable 
further development cost. This is related to the concept of adaptational transfer (Molas-Gallart, 
1997), and does address the issue that these increasing costs may be encountered to a varying 
degree depending on the specific project, however this article focuses mainly on the effect this has in 
relation to IPR.  
Increased costs will further increase commercial firms’ demand for sufficient control over the 
benefits to justify their investment, as they seek to justify the risks they are subjected to. Bellais & 
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Guichard (2006) go on to suggest the following proposals for strategies to foster a market for 
defence-born technology:  
 Revealing adequate information about innovations and technology  
 Determining the right perimeter for patents or other means of protecting 
intellectual property   
 Reducing uncertainty about contractual terms between the state and its 
industrial partners     
 Setting up mechanisms to facilitate the development of civilian applications  
These points indicate that there may be a degree of information asymmetry, whereby organisations 
wishing to commercialise defence-funded technology may not be aware of the existence of a 
potential for DUT2, or the necessary mechanisms to achieve successful commercialisation.  
Stowsky (2004) shows that Military R&D projects performed in an isolated environment result in 
inferiority in price and quality for dual-use technologies compared to the products supplied by 
commercial markets. The distinction is made between Shielded Innovation and Shared Innovation. 
The traditional military approach of Shielded Innovation has led to a competitive disadvantage for 
American businesses, as foreign competitors are allowed to develop their own technologies over 
time, whereas the US firms may have been able to establish themselves in these markets before the 
foreign competitors had developed them. This relates to the concept of the “Wall of Separation” 
(Markusen & Yudken, 1992, p.69), which is in essence the concept that there exists a degree of 
division of the defence industry from the wider civilian economy, which brings about “a business 
culture on the military side that is ill suited to engage in commercial production, and vice versa”.  
The concept of the Wall of Separation is however not universally accepted. One opposing view was 
introduced by Kelly & Watkins (1995). They oppose the view of Markusen and Yudken (1992) that 
“subcontractors have become more, rather than less specialized in military projects, as the ‘wall of 
separation’ reaches down into their ranks”. They counter by stating that commercial-military 
integration is in fact common within the US machining-intensive durable goods (MDG) sector.  
This study is one of few to provide quantitative empirical evidence in this context, however, it must 
be noted that the sample in this case was a very broad sample of 973 plants involved in the MDG 
sector. Most previous studies had focused more heavily on the defence sector involvement of firms; 
however, some analyses of individual defence supply chains had looked further upstream. (e.g. 
Hartley et al., 1997).  
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Kelly and Watkins found that the vast majority of these firms were not heavily specialised for 
defence work, and that commercial-military integration is in fact common. This does not disprove 
other work which has shown that the further away from MOD, the weaker the institutional forces 
will become, and the lower the level of specialisation will become, on average (Hartley et al., 1997). 
However, I contend that the true nature of the wall of separation is that its effect can be plotted on a 
continuum from the Markusen & Yudken concept as one extreme, and the Kelly & Watkins concept 
on the other. 
By conducting a large scale quantitative analysis I believe it is possible that the true picture is 
characterised by the existence of a subset of firms within the supply base which is more exposed to 
the defence sector-specific institutional forces. Toward the apex of the pyramid, these forces are 
likely to produce cognitive, structural and procedural and idiosyncrasies within firms with a heavy 
defence focus. This will then lead to rigidities in the firm, should it wish to engage in other markets. 
This would fall in line with the concept of “identity domains”, wherein a firm’s perceived identity will 
affect its awareness of other opportunities, the motivation to pursue them and the suitability of the 
firm’s capabilities for such an endeavour (Livengood and Reger, 2010). 
A great deal of the literature pertaining to DUT2 has focused on changes in the defence industry 
after the end of the Cold War. It is likely that the modern defence industry is subject to a far weaker 
“Wall of Separation”, due factors described in section 2. Some authors have concentrated on firm 
level factors which facilitate overcoming the barrier between defence and non-defence sectors.  
The resulting economic disadvantage of the Wall of Separation is also potentially mirrored in a 
disadvantage in a nation’s defence technology base. Kulve & Smit (2003) argue that Dual-Use can be 
a solution to this problem, by improving the technological base. They assert that the two forces 
dominating interactions between civil and military actors are (i) the availability of funding and 
expertise, and (ii) awareness of the potential duality. The fact that this awareness has been identified 
as a factor reinforces the concept of the wall of separation. However this concept of awareness must 
be complimented with a view of the cognitive framework within the defence sector – defence firms 
may not value such projects, even if they are aware of the potential duality, as it does not fit with 
their defence-specific identity.  
Kulve & Smit (2003) have taken an innovation networks approach to the DUT2 process and 
highlighted the complex nature of interactions between actors. Several kinds of actors are identified: 
The civilian actors, military actors and dual actors; but also gateway actors, dedicated network 
builders and other critical actors. These may all play a role in the network, and must all be 
considered. In essence, research into the phenomenon cannot be exclusively focussed on the 
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transferor and transferee, as contextual factors as well as third parties play a role in the process. 
These actors can be created through policy-level decisions, in order to enhance the performance of a 
nation’s R&D base, in response to the changes in the relationship between military and civilian actors 
in the economy. However more work is required to identify these other parties. Government 
agencies have been shown to be involved, however the actions of the defence firms involved, and 
their perception and responses to these developments requires further study.  
If the forces stated above (availability of funding and expertise; awareness of potential duality) are 
not sufficiently strong, the social-technical networks within the industry tend to lend themselves to 
concurrent technology development, rather than joint technology development (Kulve & Smit, 2003). 
The former implies integrated development with parallel but distinct civilian and military projects, 
which, although connected by mutual interactions, do not imply integrated development and co-
operation on one specific project. This concept approaches that of Shielded Innovation, whereas 
joint technology development, a deliberate degradation of the wall of separation, is similar to the 
concept of Shared Innovation (Stowsky, 2004). The recommendation is to develop “dual-capacity 
networks” to foster joint technology development. However, the authors point out that such 
“technology push-over” may have little positive effect on civilian utility, and may be implemented as 
it is seen as good defence policy (Kulve & Smit, 2003).    
Cowan & Foray (1995) add to the complexity by introducing a time dimension into their analysis. 
They state the need to pay attention to the life cycle of the technology in question, pointing out that 
different types of learning are necessary at different stages in the life cycle. They also assert that the 
nature of the technology, in particular if it is a process or a product technology, will change the 
relationship between the military and civilian sectors. They argue that duality is likely to be beneficial 
early in the technological life cycle, as more extensive and diverse approaches to learning about the 
particular technology can be lucrative. Process technologies can also benefit later in the technology 
life cycle, as the spread of this learning can lead to rationalisation between the activities of civilian 
and military actors, provided sufficient similarity in needs and standards. 
However, in many fields of interest to the DUT2 researcher, it can be extremely difficult to 
differentiate between process and product technologies, as is the case in advanced materials, where 
the materials scientist approaches a product development process often by designing a novel 
integrated manufacturing process (US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1988). Also, the 
generalisation that the scope for duality is greater in process technologies can be met with numerous 
examples, as some product-oriented development programmes and subsequent complex systems do 
offer substantial scope for duality. For instance, the technological similarity between ballistic missiles 
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and civilian space launch vehicles is substantial. The development of high-bypass aircraft engines, 
which are commonly used in civilian aviation, was originally a military project as part of the 
development of the C-5A military transport aircraft5 (Molas-Gallart, 1997). 
Dowdall (2004) shows that defence suppliers now often have a diversified product portfolio in which 
the defence industry is only one of many sources of revenue. In addition, this paper demonstrates 
that analysis of the defence industry must also include an international dimension. The increased 
internationalisation amongst industrial actors, coupled with the increase in cost and complexities in 
projects greatly enhance the breadth and depth of the UK defence industrial supply system.  
This review has demonstrated that there is a body of pre-existing knowledge pertaining to the 
potential barriers to DUT2, as well as other factors influencing the likelihood and success of DUT2 
projects. Broadly, these can be separated into cognitive/cultural effects and procedural effects. The 
cognitive effects are based on the assumption that there is a specific defence sector identity, which 
affects defence sector employees as well as organisations. The procedural effects however refer to 
specific attributes of the procedures, practices and organisational structures of defence firms.  
These insights will be used in the formulation of a model in order to predict DUT2 likelihood and 
success. It will be valuable to ascertain the relative importance of the defence sector identity and the 
resulting practices, procedures, and also the capabilities, which are constructed within this context. 
The model will be complimented with additional constructs relating to the maturity of the 
technology which is to be transferred – i.e. how much of the R&D process has been funded by 
defence agency investment. Also, the contextual factors of market similarity and the requirement for 
customisation will be included. Market similarity refers to the degree of difference between the 
target market and the defence industry. The requirement for customisation refers to the required 
level of customisation necessary to transpose the technology to the civilian application. 
Table 3 gives a brief overview of many of the articles which contribute to the identification of factors 
which may influence the likelihood and success of DUT2. This is followed by the development of the 
theoretical models predicting DUT2. 
                                                          
5
 55% of the initial R&D costs for their development were contributed by the US Department of Defense 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982), cited in Molas-Gallart (1997) 
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Table 3: Literature review summary of factors affecting DUT2 
 
Study Factors Factor classification Methods
Bellais & Guichard, 2006
Effective IPR frameworks IPR
Effective security control frameworks Security
Cervino et al., 2003
Defence firm's security and control demands regarding 
sharing and collaboration
Security
Literature synthesis & case 
study
Cowen & Foray, 1995
Duality more likely to be beneficial at early stages of 
technological life cycle
Technology
Development of conceptual 
framework based on 
literature synthesis 
Given similar standards and needs, process technologies 
can benefit later in technology life cycle since spread of 
acquired learning during the life cycle can lead to 
rationalisation between activities of military and civilian 
actors
Technology
Cronberg, 1994
Defence firm staff's psychological, i.e. behavioural patterns 
and opinions
Cognitive
Literature Synthesis
Differing cultures in military and civilian markets Cultural/Cognitive
Defence firm's Organisational structure and network 
structure embeddedness
Organisational
Innovative civilian firms refrain from military projects due 
to complicated military accounting requirements, IPR 
constraints and highly detailed specifications
Project specific requirements
Kulve & Smit, 2003
Lack of funding, expertise and awareness of potential 
duality lead to concurrent rather than joint technology 
development
Policy & Knowledge
Interview-based Case Study 
testing literature synthesis 
Awareness of potential duality of technology Knowledge
Development of "dual capacity networks" to degrade the 
wall of separation and enable joint technology 
development, but may not increase civilian utility
Cognitive
Availability of funding and expertise Policy
Complexity of network interaction between different actors 
in the network affects DUT2 as not only transferor and 
transferee are essential but also contextual factors and 
third parties such as policy-makers
Contextual
Markusen & Yudken, 1992
Wall of Separation leads to differing cultures,being "ill 
suited to engage in commercial production" (both 
directions of DUT2)
Cultural/Cognitive
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Table 3 continued: Literature review summary of factors affecting DUT2 
Study Factors Factor classification Methods
Molas-Gallart & Sinclair, 1999
Staff preference to work on complex, high-profile projects Cognitive
Qualitative analysis of semi-
structured interview based 
case study
Defence firm's organisational Inertia Organisational
Defence firm's unfamiliarity with civilian industry's needs 
and constraints
Organisational 
Defence firm products' pervasive security classification Security
Molas-Gallart, 1997
Information asymmetry between defence and civilian 
firms in regards to potential technological suitability for 
DUT2 application
Information asymmetry
Conceptualisation of DUT2 
based on synthesis of 
literature
Effective IPR frameworks IPR
Increasing commerical firm's demand for control in terms 
of IPR as costs rise, to justify risks, especially when 
product has low market readiness
IPR
Adequate provision of information about innovation and 
technology
Knowledge
Defence firm's cost structure Organisational
Reduction of uncertainty about contractual terms 
between the state and its industrial partners
policy-level
Defence firm's Scheduling Problems Organisational
Set-up of mechanisms to facilitate the development of 
civilian applications by the state
policy-level
Defence products' market readiness (adaptational 
transfer)
Product specific 
requirements 
Products' quality deficiencies to serve civilian and defence 
markets 
Product specific 
requirements / quality
Reppy, 1994
Defence firm's Tendency to cast laboratory projects in 
favour of more mundane commerical projects
Cognitive
Stowsky, 2004
Shielded Innovation leads to competitive disadvantage Organisational
Shared innovation as a deliberate degradation of the wall 
of separation 
Cognitive
Defence-born products are inferior in price and quality for 
dual-use technologies compared to those directly supplied 
by commercial markets
Product-specific 
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3.2 Factors influencing the likelihood of DUT2 
The following section is related to two models predicting the likelihood of a firm having engaged in 
DUT2 from defence to non-defence and vice versa. These firm-level independent variables were 
operationalised in a survey instrument which will be described in the following chapter. The two 
models have a high degree of symmetry, which is mirrored in the development of hypotheses, 
however there are several key differences which are highlighted in this section. 
 
3.2.1 Defence sector-specific organisational identity and DUT2 
This section deals with the relationship between the strength of an organisation’s defence sector-
specific identity and the likelihood that the organisation has engaged in DUT2 from defence to non-
defence and vice versa. Firstly, the direct relationship between identity and DUT2 will be presented. 
Then, the relationship between an organisation’s technology orientation and DUT2 will be described. 
Subsequently, the interaction between these two predictors will be addressed.  
Firms engaging in DUT2 are effectively redeploying their technological capabilities in new markets. 
The capabilities literature describes the capability – performance relationship in a rather generic 
manner, i.e. the presence of a capability leads to performance (Teece, 2007). Some authors have 
identified effects which moderate this relationship. For example, Slater et al. 2006 demonstrate that 
strategic orientation can moderate the capability – performance relationship, essentially stating that 
there must be a match.  
The concept of identity has not often been explored in the context of firm capabilities. However, 
there is a body of literature linking identity to learning (Kogut & Zander, 1996), which reveals that 
identity affects what will be learnt. There is an opportunity to close a gap in the literature by bridging 
the identity and capability literatures. 
The following section will link organisational identity to the capability – performance relationship. I 
suggest that organisational identity affects the deployment of capabilities, i.e. capabilities must be 
deployed to lead to performance, and identity moderates this deployment. 
The defence industry and DUT2 in particular present a particularly salient context in which to explore 
this phenomenon. 
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Albert & Whetten (1985) first defined the concept of organisational identity as the features of an 
organisation, which are deemed by its members to be most central, distinctive and enduring. Here, 
we specifically use a social constructivist approach, which describes “the members’ consensual 
understanding of ‘who we are as an organisation’” (Nag et al., 2007, p. 824). In this view, the 
components of endurance and distinctiveness may be less stringent than in Albert & Whetten’s 
original definition, however, they are still crucial to an organisations survival and growth (Gioia et al., 
2000; Glynn, 2000).  
Taking the view that organisational identity is more than a metaphorical device suggesting a 
resemblance between individual characteristics and the characteristics of a collective, we adopt the 
view that organisational identity is “a phenomenon experienced by organisational members, 
perceived by outsiders, and central to social processes with real outcomes in organisational 
contexts” (Corley et al., 2006, p.89). Therefore the collective level organisational identity is distinct 
from individual identity, however it is conceptually related. 
However, as the organisational identity is an attribute of the collective of individuals, it is in fact 
grounded in the concept of social identity6. In this sense, many organisational behaviours are driven 
by this identity, as it provides a basis for e.g. “leadership, group motivation, communication and 
indeed organisation itself” (Cornelissen et al., 2007, p. S5). In essence, the cognitive categorisation 
processes within individuals lead to collective activities and processes. 
Further, Cornelissen et al. (2007, p. S5) state that:  
“once a particular organisational identity has become salient for a particular 
organisational group and once the particular norms and values associated with that 
identity have been internalized, then that identity not only structures the psychology of 
individuals (e.g. their beliefs, attitudes and intentions) but also allows that psychology to 
be translated into the structures and products (e.g. the plans and visions, goods and 
services, practices and institutions) that are material building blocks of organisational 
life.”  
Drawing on this, it is central to my conception of identity that it is “more than a metaphor as it can 
be defined and measured as a distinct psychological construct that plays a specific role in 
organisational behaviour” (Haslam et al., 2003, p. 359). Equally crucial is that we refer to social 
(collective) identity, not a personal one. (ibid.).  
The socially constructed nature of identity, based on the concept of social identity, is often treated as 
a different – although closely related – concept, to organisational behaviour. Organisational 
                                                          
6
 Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987, 1994) 
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behaviour is conceived as an organisational-level phenomenon, which is distinct from the individual- 
and collective levels of analysis. At this level, organisational identity can be seen as a cognitive frame 
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), or a perceptual lens (Fiol, 2002), i.e. a self-representation which is 
“generally embedded in deeply ingrained and hidden assumptions” (Fiol & Huff, 1992, p. 278). 
Additionally, the identity can be manifested in language, i.e. firm names and narratives within the 
firm (Glynn & Abzug, 2002). These complex organisation-level constructs, and their meanings may 
not be directly apparent to the individuals within the firms, as they may be seen as a part of the 
intrinsic nature of the organisation. 
Therefore, we suggest at this point that organisational identity can be viewed as an emergent 
phenomenon of a complex system of actors within the firm, affected by a complex institutional 
environment external to the firm. This complex structure then leads to behaviours which can be 
explained with the theory of social identity and self-categorisation, however, certain higher level, i.e. 
distinctively organisational-level behaviours, cannot be seen as a function of the “sum of the 
system’s parts”, but are uniquely characteristic of the system. 
The link between collective agency and organisational identity is in fact crucial to the understanding 
of the effects of organisational identity on observed firm behaviour. As firm-level organisational 
behaviour is rooted in the collective agency implied by social identity theory, it is imperative to view 
the concept of organisational identity as a complex adaptive system of organisational members (i.e. a 
social system of “real people”). As these members themselves possess skills, attitudes and 
personalities, the organisation is a system composed of individual components, which in themselves 
can be seen as demonstrating complex, emergent behaviour. Therefore the firm can be seen as an 
aggregation of complex individual components bound by an array of heterogeneous connections – 
which lends itself to the conception of the organisation as a complex adaptive system.  
Therefore, the organisational identity is built upon inputs from its members, however can drive 
behaviour which is not immediately explainable by analysing the individual members. In addition, 
organisational identity feeds back into the individual attitudes and behaviours of organisational 
members, creating a dynamic feedback loop. This aspect accounts for the relaxation of the 
endurance characteristic of identity proposed by Albert & Whetten (1985). 
We suggest that the organisational identity can be seen as a lens, through which intended actions by 
firm management passes on course for the external environment. The “refractive index” of this lens 
can then affect the outcomes of actions initiated by the firm’s management, potentially in 
unexpected or at least unplanned ways (Figure 12).  
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Figure 12: Social identity theory of technological capability delivery 
Yolles et al. (2011, p. 644) state that “a collective agency may behave independently from the 
individual agents that compose it because the normative anchors for social behaviour may be 
different from the anchors of individual agent behaviour”. They go on to note fact that this is 
supported by literatures on strategic groups (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995), herding (Hirshleifer & 
Teoh, 2003; Welch, 2000) and Groupthink (Janis, 1972).  
The above demonstrates that organisational behaviour can be conceptualised as a system level 
phenomenon, with attributes which are directly traceable to individual level actions and attitudes, 
however with an additional set of system-level, potentially emergent attributes which are not under 
the direct control of organisational members.  
Following the assumption that the system, and the organisational identity, are both affected by and 
affect the cognitive frameworks of individual members, it can be assumed that each individual can 
have an effect on organisational identity. The effect of an average individual will of course diminish 
as the number of members grows. However, it is highly likely that more senior members of the 
organisation (i.e. senior management and board members) will exert a greater influence. This can be 
conceptualised with respect to the power distribution among organisational members, as more 
powerful members will have greater influence on the direction the organisation takes. 
  59 
Following Livengood & Reger (2010, p.51), the beliefs held by executives as to the fundamental 
nature of their organisation, i.e. “’who’ they are as a firm, ‘what’ they stand for and ‘why’ they are 
successful [Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Kimberly, 1979; Reger, Mullane, Gustavson & DeMarie, 1994]”, 
are likely to become closely aligned with the system-level identity, as the beliefs of these top 
managers will be more closely related to firm-level actions than the beliefs of other members, in part 
due to the abovementioned power dynamics.  
Selznick (1957) had already argued that the self-definition of the members within an organisation 
affects the organisation’s distinctive competences. The central, distinctive and enduring components 
of the organisation’s identity will then impact decisions regarding the top management’s “theory of 
action”, i.e. where and how the firm will compete (Livengood & Reger, 2010; Barney et al., 1998). 
Further, this will impact on the acquisition and maintenance of organisational resources, as these, 
especially knowledge, skills and expertise, are likely to be influenced by the underlying assumptions 
associated with beliefs in “who we are” as an organisation (Nag et al., 2007; Kogut & Zander, 1996; 
Oliver, 1991).  
These underlying assumptions constitute the cognitive aspects of organisational identity. The 
cognitive aspects also underlie behavioural and subsequent structural manifestations of 
organisational identity. Corley and Gioia (2004) found that there is a distinct behavioural element to 
identity, as they showed that changes to organisational identity are associated with changes in 
behaviour among the organisation’s members. Dutton & Dukerich (1991) found that identity is 
associated with the organisational routines, skills and decision-making processes within an 
organisation. Nag et al. (2007, p. 841) demonstrate that “the ways in which the organisation 
members *…+ used knowledge in their work practices affected and were affected by their collective 
notion of who they were as an organisation”. 
Livengood and Reger (2010) introduce the concept of identity domains, whereby some “external, 
competitive environments are also viewed by managers as more central, distinctive and enduring 
arenas where competitive actions and reactions carry greater psychological consequences for the 
very definition of the firm” (Livengood & Reger, 2010, p. 49). These domains can be constructed 
around economically important markets, geographical markets, or particular products and services. 
This concept addresses the issue that firms’ identities are not just constructed internally, but also in 
reaction to the actions of their perceived competitors and other stakeholders. 
In this context, identity can be decomposed into components. Previous research has shown that 
some organisations can have dual or multiple identities, and describe the management implications 
for navigating the complex environment this creates. However, we suggest that an identity in itself 
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can be constituted of distinctive “traits”. We suggest that in the context of this study, the alignment 
of an organisation with the defence industry-specific identity domain can be seen as a distinctive 
trait. This concept of identity domains, and the application of this model to the DUT2 context, will be 
elucidated in the next section.  
 
3.2.2 Defence industry identity and the defence industrial identity domain 
In this study, we focus on the transfer of technology between defence and other markets. There are 
many anecdotal tales of technologies being developed in the defence industry, and then diffusing 
into the wider economy. Many of these technologies were developed within the defence industry as 
defence agencies often act as early adopters of new technologies, and are willing to contribute to the 
development costs of such technologies. In fact, there are significant institutional forces extant 
within the DIB, which is heavily influenced by the MOD.  
These institutional forces and sometimes idiosyncratic market forces, as well as the perceived 
isolation of the defence industry from the wider economy, characterise the defence industry, and are 
often a significant factor in defence firm’s perception of their identity domain. In fact, these 
institutional forces are likely to have an isomorphic effect on any firms involved in the industry, and 
this isomorphism is likely to be more pronounced the stronger the firm’s strategic focus on the 
industry. 
The effects of these forces are often manifested in certain structural, behavioural and cognitive logics 
within defence firms. As the concept of identity domain operates at the firm level, i.e. each firm 
constructs its own domain, we suggest that the stronger a firm’s self-definition as a member of this 
exclusive group, the stronger these structural, behavioural and cognitive logics will be present within 
the firm. Further, as these logics are developed and maintained within the defence sector context, 
they are likely to inhibit the firm’s awareness, motivation and capabilities regarding non-defence 
opportunities (Livengood & Reger, 2010).  
In this context, firms are likely to generate cognitive representations of action-outcome relationships 
specific to the environmental conditions within their identity domain. Therefore the stronger a firm’s 
defence sector-specific identity, the stronger their beliefs will be regarding the behaviours and 
structures required to achieve success. Combined with the lock-in associated with strong institutional 
forces, past success in defence markets is likely to have a reinforcing effect on these beliefs, leading 
to a path-dependent development of such cognitive representations.  
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The following tables (Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6) provide a brief overview of several articles 
relating to the concept of organisational identity:  
Authors Main Theme Research Setting Data Collection Data Analysis Main Results
Clark et al., 2010
organisational identity 
change during a merger of 
two rival organisations, 
"transitional identity"
2 American healthcare 
organisations
33 interviews (in two top 
management teams), 
observation, archival data
grounded-theory-
building
identification of a "transitional 
identity" as critical to 
organisational identity change
Clegg et al., 2007
Identity formation in 
emerging industries, 
temporal and spatial 
strategies and resources as 
means to create 
organisational identity
Australian business 
coaching industry
53 firms surveyed, 11 
interviews (company 
principals)
grounded-theory-
building
spatial and temporal 
dimensions as part of the 
organisational identity 
construct
Corley, 2004
identity differentiation 
based on hierarchy level
spin-off from a global 
technology service 
provider (Fortune 100 
company organisational 
unit)
38 interviews (managers), 
archival data, observation 
over more than 6 months 
(pre-, during-, and post-spin-
off)
grounded-theory-
building
Higher levels of the hierarchy 
see identity in l ight of the firm’s 
strategy,lower ones in relation 
to the firm’s culture
Corley & Gioia, 2004
process of organisational 
identity change
spin-off from a global 
technology service 
provider (Fortune 100 
company organisational 
unit)
38 interviews (managers), 
archival data, observation 
over more than 6 months 
(pre-, during-, and post-spin-
off)
grounded-theory-
building
Model of identity change 
through a state of collective 
identity ambiguity as a process 
during identity change
Corley et al., 2006
Review of the theoretical 
concept of organisational 
identity, definition of the 
concept and particular 
aspects of identity and 
future research 
suggestions
Body of Literature on 
Organisational Identity
Body of l iterature Literature review
Definition of organisational 
identity
Cornelissen et al., 
2007
Integration of social, 
organisational and 
corporate identity into the 
concept of collective 
identity
Bodies of Literature on 
social, organisational, 
and corporate Identity
Bodies of Literature
Literature review 
and synthesis of 
corporate, social 
and organisational 
identity
Synthesis of corporate, social 
and organisational identity 
l iteratures and definition of 
requirements for the integration 
of macro- and micro-level 
analyses
Dukerich et al., 2002
Attractiveness of perceived 
organisational identity, 
construed external 
image,strength of system 
identification and 
cooperative behaviours
1,504 physicians surveyed 
in 3 different not-for-ptofit 
health systems including 
focus groups, additionally 
one-year follow-up of 285 
physicians
survey with some 
longitudinal dimension
statistical analysis 
incl. factor 
analysis, 
structural equation 
modelling
Positive relationship of 
attractiveness of perceived 
identity and construed external 
image to physicians' 
identification with the system. 
Positive relationship between 
this identification and 
cooperative behaviour
Dutton & Dukerich, 
1991
Influence of organisational 
identity and construed 
image on issue 
management
Municipal transportation 
company (Port Authorities 
of New York & New Jersey)
25 open-end-interviews 
(employees) over 9 months, 
internal and external 
archival data
grounded-theory-
building
Construct of organisational 
identity and image linked to 
impression management and 
organisational adaptation
Fiol, 2002
Identity transformation 
model for firms undergoing 
strategic change
high-technology firm
participant observation over 
a 10-year period of identity 
transformation
longitudinal 
grounded-theory-
building (based on 
Lewin's unfreeze, 
change, refreeze 
model)
Development of a model of 
identity transformation linking 
individual and organisational 
levels
Gioia & Thomas, 
1996
Relevance of envisioned 
identity and image during 
strategic change
American academic 
institutions (colleges and 
universities)
25 interviews (university 
management and faculty), 
and 611 executives from 372 
institutions surveyed
grounded-theory-
building, external 
metaphor analysis
Under conditions of change, 
perception of identity and 
desired future image are crucial 
l inks between the firm's internal 
context and the members' issue 
interpretations
Gioia et al., 2000
Concept of organisational 
identity as a fluid, rather 
than stable construct
Body of Literature on 
Organisational Identity, 
ist ontology and literature 
on organisational image
Bodies of Literature
Literature Review 
and development 
of a process model 
of identity 
instability
Emergent model of adaptive 
instability of organisational 
identity. The need to create and 
maintain an enduring image of 
identity but simultaneously 
adapt  to environmental change.
Gioia et al., 2010
The formation of a new 
organisational identity
Founding of an American 
College
33 semi-structured 
interviews (faculty), 
observation, internal 
archival data
grounded-theory-
building
Internal, external, micro and 
macro influences as affecting 
factors during the formation of 
organisational identity. Social 
construction and social actor 
views of identity-related 
processes as mutually 
constitutive in the creation of 
identity  
Table 4: Organisational identity literature review (Part 1 of 3) 
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Authors Main Theme Research Setting Data Collection Data Analysis Main Results
Glynn, 2000
conflict over 
organisational identity 
within a cultural 
institution due to different 
professional backgrounds
Atlanta Symphony 
Orchestra
13 semi-structured 
interviews (managers and 
musicians), internal and 
external archival data
qualitative field 
study with 
interpretive 
analysis
Model of the construction of 
core capabilities as a function 
of identification and interpretive 
processes within an 
organisation
Glynn & Abzug, 2002
Effects of institutional 
isomorphism on corporate 
name change as a symbol 
of organisational identity
"Predicasts F&S Index of 
Coporate Change" and 
public audiences
2 simultaneous studies: -
Study 1: 1,587 name changes 
of firms in a period of 5 
years taken from public 
archival records   -Study 2: 
several public audience 
groups surveyed with 41 to 
612 respondents
Multi-part 
investigation with 
statistical 
regression 
analyses
Organisational name is 
isomorphic with culutural 
patterns, increasing the 
legitimacy of organisations
Golden-Biddle & 
Rao, 1997
Board directors' role 
conflicts and conflicts of 
commitment in a multiple 
(hybrid) identity 
organisation
American not-for-profit 
organisation
interviews, observation
Descriptive 
analysis
Influence of organisational and 
individual identities on a firm's 
board's role and the emergent 
concept of conflicts of 
commitment in a multiple 
identity organisation
Hambrick & Mason, 
1984
"upper echelon 
perspective" on 
organisational behaviour 
and outcomes
N/A literature, theory building
Synthesis of 
l iterature on 
managerial 
characteristics and 
resulting 
organisatioanl 
outcomes
Strategic choice and firm 
performance are partially 
predicted by managerial 
background characteristics
Haslam et al., 2003
approach to definition and 
delineation of 
organisational identity
N/A literature, theory building
literature sythesis 
and theory 
building drawing 
heavily on 
psychology and 
sociology 
literatures
Identity is "more than a 
metaphor": It can be both an 
externally shared and and 
negotiated product and an 
internalised aspect of the 
collective self
He & Baruch, 2010
Interplay between 
organisational identity and 
legitimacy during change
2 British building 
societies
8 pilot interviews, 37 semi-
structured interviews, 
archival data (in particular 
annual reports over 20 
years)
grounded-theory-
building
Effective role of narration and re-
narration of organisational 
identity as a means to gain 
organisational legitimacy
Kjaergaard et al., 
2011
effects of positive media 
coverage on the 
reconstruction of 
organizational identity 
within oganisational 
change
Danish hearing aid 
manufacturer
232 semi-structured 
interviews (all  levels) over 
10 years, internal and 
external archival data, direct 
observation
longitudinal field 
study, grounded-
theory-building
positive media representations 
foster members’ alignment 
around an emergent new 
understanding of organisational 
identity but may impede the 
development of the identity over 
time in order not to contradict 
previously positive media 
responses
Kogut & Zander, 
1996
The effect of identity on 
learning and 
organisational processes
N/A
drawing on literature, l inking 
identity and learning
theory 
development and 
literature review 
using prisoners 
dilemma thought 
experiment
Identity influences what is 
learnt in organisations, 
affecting  e.g. Procedures, 
practices etc.
Livengood & Reger, 
2010
The relationship between 
organisational identity and 
competitive dynamics
N/A
drawing on literature, l inking 
identity with competitive 
dynamics
Development of a 
theory of Identity 
Domains and 
Competitive 
Dynamics
Organisational identity affects 
the firm's awareness, motivation 
and capability in engaging in 
new activities
Lowe et al., 2012
Organisational Identity 
and organisational 
capability development 
during internationalisation
Large international 
retailer (Tesco) during US-
market entry
participatory research with 
observation and semi-
structured interviews of 16 
key participants, internal 
and external archival 
sources 
grounded-theory-
building with 
longitudinal 
dimension
Organisational identity and 
structural coherence in 
capabilities are necessary to 
achieve growth. Introduce 3 
processes of capability 
development  (transference, 
splicing, enhanced imitation). 
Actions to adapt or maintain 
organisational identity 
moderate the relationship 
between these 3.
Nag et al., 2007
organisational identity 
during strategic change
American high-tech 
telecommunications R&D 
organisation
34 in-depth interviews (with 
8 senior and 12 middle 
management executives)
grounded-theory-
building
the intersection of 
organizational identity, 
knowledge, and practice 
hindered the development of the 
new knowledge and undermined 
the broader strategic 
transformation effort  
Table 5: Organisational identity literature review (Part 2 of 3) 
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Authors Main Theme Research Setting Data Collection Data Analysis Main Results
Ravasi & Phill ips, 
2011
coherent identity 
management during 
strategic change
Danish audio-video 
systems manufacturer 
(Bang & Olufsen)
16 semi-structured 
interviews (with 10 senior & 
middle management 
executives), internal and 
external archival data
longitudinal case 
analysis with 
grounded-theory-
building
identity management as a means 
to preserve congruence between 
organisational and individual 
identity of organisational 
members. Support for the 
concept of social validation of 
organisational identity 
dependent on actual firm 
behaviour, practices and 
structures
Ravasi & Schultz, 
2006
Organisational reaction to 
identity threats
Danish audio-video 
systems manufacturer 
(Bang & Olufsen)
50 semi-structured 
interviews with 40 
organisational members 
(some retired), identity 
seminars, archival data
longitudinal case 
analysis with 
grounded-theory-
building
development of a theoretical 
framework for the interplay of 
construed images and 
organizational culture shapes 
and ist effect on institutional 
claims and shared 
understandings about the 
organisational identity
Reger et al., 1994
Acceptance of TQM as an 
example of organisational 
change
cases of TQM 
implementation
drawing on literature and 
specifically quotes by TQM 
specialists
Development of a 
dynamic model 
relating current 
and ideal identity, 
image, and ideal 
TQM
Implementation of change may 
be most successful if carried out 
incrementally, with individual 
changes large enough to 
overcome inertia but not too 
large to seem undesirable
Tripsas, 2009
Identity and organisational 
response to technology 
change
spin-off in the digital 
imaging industry
30 semi-structured 
interviews (senior & middle 
management), observation, 
internal and external 
archival data
longitudinal case 
analysis with 
grounded-theory-
building, content 
analysis
Identity as a fi lter resulting in 
an interpretation of external 
conditions consistent with the 
organisation's identity, thus 
potentially hindering the 
exploration of identity-
challenging technologies. 
Shifting identity to avoid 
missing such opportunities 
proves very difficult.
Voss et al., 2006
Divergence in 
organisational identity 
perception and firm 
performance
113 not-for-profit 
professional theatres
113 managing and marketing 
directors survey responses, 
interviews, organisational 
performance data
Descriptive 
statistical analysis
Negative effects of disagreement 
about organisational identity on 
organisational performance
 
Table 6: Organisational identity literature review (Part 3 of 3) 
 
3.2.3 Identity and DUT2 
As identity is essentially a cognitive concept, we suggest that it explains why firms will often refrain 
from activities which may be economically lucrative, but are incongruent with what is perceived to 
be central, distinctive and enduring to the firm’s members. 
Previous literature on strategic change has highlighted problems associated with obstacles firms can 
encounter when confronted with new imperatives, as members have been described as resistant to 
learning in order to preserve their pre-existing conceptions regarding their organisation (Brown & 
Starkey, 2000). In this context identity can be seen as the “cognitive, affective and psychological 
antecedent to competitive action and reaction” (Livengood & Reger, 2010, p.51). 
On the cognitive level, the question of “who we are as a firm” may preclude the awareness and 
motivation regarding opportunities outside the firm’s familiar market. Such opportunities may be 
simply incongruent with what is central, distinctive and enduring within the firm. In such cases, this 
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cognitive dimension will explain why firms may not engage in activities, which may be economically 
lucrative, and theoretically plausible (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008).  
On the behavioural level, strong defence sector-specific identity is likely to lead to specialisation, 
manifested in routinisation and idiosyncratic structures and processes within the firm. This will arise 
from a drive for efficiency in the firm’s familiar environmental context. Previous research has shown 
that the dismantling of routines is difficult, both due to cognitive constraints and due to the fact that 
such routines are often distributed throughout the firm and its functions (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Zahra et al., 2006).  
Entry into non-defence markets will confront the firm with differing environmental conditions, and is 
likely to present to firm with challenges to its established beliefs, and many of these challenges will 
be unpredictable or subtle. This uncertainty, combined with cognitive rigidity regarding appropriate 
action in their more familiar markets will increase the likelihood that the firm will ignore, 
misinterpret or simply reject relevant feedback from the non-defence target market (Nadkarni et al., 
2011). Further, they will not adapt their cognitive representations and routines sufficiently to the 
new market. 
Additionally, a strong defence sector-specific identity is likely to lead to the firm favouring resource 
commitments to familiar markets and projects, making them less willing to engage in markets 
outside their familiar environment. 
Due to isomorphic pressures within the defence industrial context, in particular the institutional 
forces emanating from the MOD, firms are likely to structure themselves to be aligned with the 
expectations of the MOD, as well as its own structures. Such structures may hamper the firm’s ability 
to operate outside this environment.  
These optimised routines and structures are likely to lead to structural inertia within firms with a 
strong defence identity. This will in turn affect the applicability of the firm’s capabilities to the new 
context, and will likely affect the performance outcomes of any projects undertaken by the firm. 
In summary, a defence sector-specific identity will be manifested at cognitive, behavioural and 
structural levels within a firm engaged in the defence industry. The strength of this identity will be 
correlated to the strategic focus of the firm on the industry, and its previous focus on such activities. 
These cognitive, behavioural and structural aspects will affect the likelihood of engagement in DUT2 
projects by reducing their awareness of such opportunities, their motivation to pursue such activities 
and the applicability of their capabilities to achieve the goals of such projects. 
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Building on the above arguments, firms with strong defence sector-specific identities are will be less 
likely to identify and evaluate candidate technologies from non-defence sources, and their potential 
for application to solve defence sector problems. Such firms will in fact not be looking outside their 
traditional remit of defence, when searching for opportunities. The concept of the “wall of 
separation” therefore works both ways – the defence sector is idiosyncratic, and a firm with a strong 
sector-specific identity may feel it would in inappropriate to leverage non-defence technologies in 
defence contexts. Therefore this construct is likely to negatively affect the transfer of technology 
from non-defence to defence applications. 
H1a: Strength of defence sector-specific identity will be negatively associated with a firm’s likelihood 
of engaging in DUT2 projects from defence to non-defence 
H1b: Strength of defence sector-specific identity will be negatively associated with a firm’s likelihood 
of engaging in DUT2 projects from non-defence to defence 
 
3.2.4 Technology Orientation & the Delivery of Technological Excellence 
Technology orientation has been defined as “the use of sophisticated technologies in new product 
development, the rapidity of integration of new technologies, and proactively developing new 
technologies and creating new product ideas” (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997, p.82). 
This orientation is generally considered to be an internally focussed, “technology-push” approach, in 
comparison to a more market-oriented “customer- or demand-pull”, and is based on the assumption 
that customers prefer technologically superior products and services (Wind & Mahajan, 1997). In 
essence, the firm focuses on product ideas and other courses of action, which emphasise state-of-
the-art technologies, seeing innovation as a strategic and cultural priority (Hurley & Hult, 1998).  
Firms with a strong technology orientation are likely to invest heavily in R&D, and be technically 
proficient, flexible and creative with regards to the technologies they employ. These technical skills 
enable the firm to entrench their position in existing markets, but also to exploit new market niches 
(Mu & Benedetto, 2011). Essentially, the firm is able to develop and commercialise innovative, 
better-designed products to the market (Wind & Mahajan, 1997), and use this technological 
superiority and distinctiveness to differentiate its products.   
This focus on technological advantage, and rapid application of cutting-edge technologies, can form 
the basis of a competitive advantage, and in fact one that is not easy to imitate (Gatignon & Xuereb, 
1997). This is driven by the role taken by defence agencies as early adopters of new technology, as 
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they essentially create markets for technological innovations, which may provide strategic 
advantages (Middleton et al., 2006).  
In addition to driving this inimitability, defence agencies’ role as early adopters can lead to the 
technological capability also being rare, particularly in the context of a civilian market. This rarity is 
caused by the idiosyncratic, defence sector-specific environmental conditions, which influenced the 
inception and evolution of the technological capabilities, which differ from the conditions in non-
defence markets. Additionally, the development of these technological capabilities may have been 
funded by revenue streams, which were not available to potential non-defence competitors, such as 
direct R&D funding contracts, or revenues from procurement. This may enable defence suppliers to 
overcome the “cash-flow valley of death” which can otherwise inhibit the development process in 
commercial markets (Murphy & Edwards, 2003). 
Evidence has shown that the technological foci in defence procurement have shifted radically since 
the end of the Cold War, and that they are moving considerably more in-line with technologies, 
which have greater potential for Dual-Use. For example, defence agencies frequently refer to 
C4ISTAR (or similar abbreviations) as a strategic priority, and it is unavoidable that these systems, or 
subsystems and components thereof, will find a range of non-defence applications. This can be 
contrasted to the heavy investment in procurement based on large-scale symmetrical warfare, which 
dominated Cold War strategy. Essentially, the potential for these capabilities to be valuable in non-
defence contexts is likely to be enhanced. 
In such a case, if a firm is appropriately organised, it may be possible and lucrative to leverage the 
technological capabilities of the firm into new non-defence markets. Therefore, we propose that a 
strong technology orientation will have a positive effect on the likelihood of DUT2. 
H2: Technology orientation will be positively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in 
DUT2 projects from defence to non-defence 
When considering the transfer of technology into the defence sector, we suggest expanding the 
technology orientation concept to a construct of the delivery of technological excellence. Due to the 
unique demands of defence agencies, and the high levels of specification and requirements for 
ruggedness and performance, many defence agencies build legitimacy by communicating their 
commitment to delivering technological excellence, going beyond leveraging the latest technologies 
and combining this with a dedication to highest quality, performance and reliability. In fact, several 
interview targets associate terms such as “pushing the envelope” with defence business. In order for 
technologies originating from non-defence applications to be applicable and legitimate in the 
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defence context, they must in fact provide superior solutions to what is available in the defence 
sector, as at least similar performance at a lower cost.  
This focus on highest quality, performance and reliability levels is however likely to constrain the 
ability of a firm to transfer technology out of defence into non-defence markets. This is due to the 
fact that on average, the defence sector is willing to act as an early adopter of new technologies, pay 
a premium for this technological advantage. This is combined with the requirement for higher levels 
of performance and ruggedness in many projects which may not be needed in non-defence markets. 
It can be argued that price elasticity in the defence sector is lower than the average across the wider 
economy. This is supported by a statement by the defence secretary, Philip Hammond (Wright, 
2012): 
“That’s the thing that I’m learning - that the application of the lean commercial model 
does have relevance in areas of the MOD, but, equally, you can’t look at a warship and 
say, ‘How can I bring a lean management model to this?’ – because it’s doing different 
things with different levels of resilience that are not generally required in the private 
sector.” 
A firm’s commitment to the delivery of technological excellence is therefore likely to increase the 
likelihood that they can leverage technologies originally developed for non-defence purposes in the 
defence sector, going beyond the commitment to sophisticated technology, and including a 
commitment to quality, performance, resilience and operational excellence.  
H3: Technological excellence will be positively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in 
DUT2 projects from non-defence to defence 
 
3.2.5 The moderating effect of defence identity on the relationship between technology 
orientation and DUT2 
The above section describes the mechanisms whereby the strength of a firm’s technology orientation 
will positively affect the likelihood of the firm’s engagement in DUT2. A technology oriented firm 
operating within the defence industry is likely to develop technological capabilities, leveraging 
funding opportunities and procurement revenues which are essentially different to those operating 
in non-defence markets.  
This can lead to the creation of a competitive advantage, based on the firm’s development of such 
technological capabilities, and their repeated use over time. This may therefore form the basis for a 
firm to leverage this technological capability in non-defence markets. 
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However, we have previously shown that certain cognitive processes are present within firms, which 
consider themselves part of the defence industrial identity domain. These can lead to rigidities, 
which can inhibit a firm’s ability to identify potential DUT2 projects, their willingness to pursue these 
projects DUT2 projects, and their success in initiated projects. Therefore, we suggest that this 
cognitive rigidity will moderate the effect of the firm’s technology orientation on the likelihood of 
engagement in DUT2 projects.   
If we assume that there is variation in the strength of firms’ defence sector-specific identities, then it 
is likely that a stronger sector-specific identity will constitute a stronger inhibiting factor on the 
exploitation of a given technological capability in a given non-defence market (i.e. on which falls 
outside the perceived identity domain). 
H4a: Strength of defence sector-specific identity moderates the effect of technology orientation on 
the likelihood of the firm engaging in DUT2 projects from defence to non-defence, in that high 
identity strength will weaken the positive effect of technology orientation 
H4b: Strength of defence sector-specific identity moderates the effect of technological excellence on 
the likelihood of the firm engaging in DUT2 projects from non-defence to defence, in that high 
identity strength will weaken the positive effect of technological excellence 
 
3.2.6 Human asset specificity 
This dimension refers to the technical and professional skills and knowledge underpinning the 
activities of the firm. This dimension is often regarded as the key to core capabilities (Teece et al., 
1990) and this factor is likely to be particularly strong in technology-intensive defence procurement. 
Small changes from a technological standpoint may challenge the existing identity prevalent among 
organisational members, if by pursuing this path, the organisation violates the beliefs regarding the 
central, distinctive and enduring features associated with its existing identity (Tripsas, 2009).  
Participating in the defence sector is likely to require a high level of adaptation to the particular 
setting. This includes the specialisation of knowledge to the context. Nonaka (1994) illustrates that 
social processes underpin the creation of specialised knowledge, and that these processes encourage 
the validation, refinement and enrichment of knowledge within a given context of action.  
In this context, we describe human asset specificity as the organisation’s ability to access and deploy 
this specific body of knowledge and skills outside the organisation’s existing (defence) context 
(Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Nonaka, 1994; Teece, 1998). In essence, the construct describes the 
degree to which critical areas of knowledge of a defence firm are specific to the requirements of the 
defence industry as a whole (Subramani & Venkatraman, 2003). Prior research has shown that 
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specialised knowledge is often domain specific, and imperfectly transferable to other contexts 
(Shanteau, 1992). Human asset specificity has also been described as assets arising from “learning by 
doing” (Williamson, 1996).  
The nuances of a particular domain, and the organisation’s members’ adaptation to these, will affect 
the problem solving behaviour as well as cognitive approach to identification and pursuit of 
opportunities by the organisation as a whole, as the members’ skills are deployed in a context with a 
specific, often idiosyncratic set of rules and expectations.  
Von Hippel (1994) also demonstrates that knowledge generated in specific contexts is subject to 
social factors which lead to the knowledge itself becoming inherently “sticky”, i.e. “manifested in 
context-specific judgements in which some events are deemed meaningful and worth attending to 
while others are considered irrelevant and ignorable” (Subramani & Venkatraman, 2003, p.50). This 
is particularly likely in situations where the knowledge, as well as the ability to coordinate this 
knowledge, is distributed among many actors within the firm, and underlies a complex technological 
capability. 
Previous literature on inter-firm relationships has shown that patterns of specialised expertise are 
often embedded in the context of their industries, and the particular requirements of firms / buyers 
further upstream (Uzzi, 1997). We suggest that this effect will be particularly strong in an 
environment with strong institutional pressures such as defence. 
Therefore, we expect a stronger degree of skills & knowledge specialisation to be negatively 
associated with the likelihood that a firm will engage in DUT2, and the success of any initiated 
projects.  
In essence, if the firm’s skills and knowledge are highly optimised for one context, this may have 
several negative effects on the ability of the firm to deploy these knowledge resources in other 
contexts. Firstly, a high focus on optimisation of the depth of knowledge in a particular area, rather 
than the breadth of knowledge in ancillary fields, will constrain the firm’s strategic options to this 
particular area, although it may allow them to gain dominance in the specific field. Essentially, 
weaknesses may exist in non-dominant fields. Further, such dominance in a particular field may also 
inhibit the firm’s ability to attract new employees (and their knowledge and skills) from other fields, 
as they may not associate the firm with their chosen field. Particularly if the field is defined and 
perceived to be heavily aligned with the defence industry, this may constrain the abilities and 
willingness of employees to recognise and pursue related projects which may in fact be technically 
similar, but do not fit the employee’s concept of his/her skills and knowledge set. 
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The term field may refer to technical fields, but also to other professional fields. This may have 
effects on the power relations between, for instance, marketing managers and technical specialists 
within a firm. The implication of this is that the firm may be lacking in skills in areas necessary to 
identify and take advantage of new, non-traditional opportunities. This is a result of the three-fold 
effect of low importance placed on employment and compensation of such employees, as well as 
their relative lack of power in determining strategic direction and decision-making on e.g. new 
product development projects, as well as the lack of prestige associated with such functions. In fact, 
employees who take on marketing roles may be tightly aligned with the defence sector. In several 
interviews, industry experts and participants mentioned that many MOD-facing personnel 
themselves ex servicemen and -women are “selling to their old friends”. 
In essence, in the defence context, this will lead to the skills and knowledge embedded within a 
heavily defence-focused firm being based upon a combination of technical competencies and selling 
specifically to the MOD and other defence agencies. This specificity of this skill and knowledge set 
may present a hindrance, if the firm were to seek and attempt to engage in non-defence markets.  
In conclusion, the above factors can be distilled into the following two aspects of skills and 
knowledge specificity, which will be negatively associated with DUT2. 
Firstly, the knowledge embedded in employees is likely to have been socially constructed within the 
defence domain context. The stronger this effect, the more likely it is that the particular nuances of 
the understanding, coordination and deployment of this knowledge will be defence specific and 
therefore inapplicable in non-defence markets. This will often be manifested in particular behaviours 
and routines which have evolved over time through codification and institutionalisation of 
repeatedly successful actions, as well as the cognitive understanding as to wherein the individuals’ 
skills and knowledge lie.  
Secondly, the strategic-level investment in areas of skills and knowledge, which are particularly 
relevant to defence, is likely to be stronger in firms with a strong defence identity. Therefore, this is 
likely to lead to lower general applicability of the fields and technologies to which these skills and 
knowledge belong outside of the defence context. This in itself will lead to a reduction in the number 
of related opportunities for DUT2. As competitive advantage is to a large extent based on employees’ 
specialised skills and knowledge, and these skills and knowledge are socially constructed, a high 
status might be associated with working for such a defence-focussed organisation, which in turn will 
attract more individuals with such skills, knowledge and experience, which may then reinforce this 
effect over time.  
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H5: Human asset specificity, as embodied in the optimisation to the defence sector of employee 
knowledge and skills, will be negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in DUT2 
projects 
 
3.2.7 Business function specificity (Procedural asset specificity) 
Nelson & Winter (1982) illustrate that over time, specialised routines and standard operating 
procedures evolve, through the codification and institutionalisation of successful patterns of 
behaviour and execution of activities. Here, we suggest that such routines are embedded in the core 
business functions of the focal firm, and that these functions are adapted by the organisation to 
meet the requirements and expectations embodied in the institutional forces within the defence 
industrial identity domain. 
The resource-based perspective (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982) proposes that firms acquire the 
necessary resources to compete within a certain environment, and exploit these resources to 
generate revenues. Barney (1991, p. 101) defines resources as “all assets, capabilities, organisational 
processes, firm attributes, information, firm knowledge, etc., controlled by a firm that enable the 
firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness.” As these 
resources can include organisational routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), or in fact managerial capacity 
(Hambrick, 1987), and can be highly specific, difficult to imitate, and difficult to substitute (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989), the question of fungibility becomes complex. Taking a bounded rationality approach, 
Cyert & March (1963) argued that managers may be constrained in the application of potentially 
fungible assets in domains, which are not closely related to their original use. Further, informational 
constraints on this usage may exist (Anand & Singh, 1997). Taking an evolutionary approach, it can be 
said that industry- and business-specific factors positively influence the specificity of routines and 
resources (Levinthal, 1991). Furthermore, these resources and routines are embedded in specific 
business functions within the organisation. Therefore, highly adapted business functions in the 
defence sector may constitute a barrier to DUT2. 
Business functions consist of systems of workflows and routines, which are customised to meet the 
requirements of the organisation’s customers and other stakeholders. As such, it is difficult to alter 
such routines once established. This concept of procedural asset specificity (Malone et al., 1987; 
Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1994) can constitute a lock-in effect, as it can make it costly for the 
organisation to escape its immediate institutional environment, should these adaptations be 
inappropriate in other contexts. 
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High-technology firms in particular are likely to invest heavily in technical systems and skilled 
employees, and may therefore be subject to a degree of technological lock-in. It is also realistic to 
assume that these systems may be tailored to meet the requirements of particular customers. This is 
likely to be particularly relevant in the defence context, where the customer has very specific 
requirements and is often in the market for technologically sophisticated, customised equipment, 
and is willing to pay a premium for products, which meet their requirements and bestow them with a 
technological advantage. This phenomenon has been noted in a defence-specific context by Stowsky 
(2004), stating that often military R&D projects result in products which, when leveraged for dual 
use, are inferior in price and quality to comparable products originating from commercial firms. If the 
environment in which defence contractors operate influences the development of specific and 
therefore distinct routines, procedural assets and business functions, this may influence the 
opportunities for technology transfer. As the opportunities for learning and innovation can be 
constrained by the organisations previous experience and technology base (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997), it can be assumed that the fungibility of such procedural assets can be a function of 
organisational conditions (Anand & Singh, 1997). 
In order to conform with the expectations associated with the defence identity domain, and the 
specific rules and regulations of customers and other stakeholders within the defence industry, a 
focal firm is likely to adapt its specific functions within the product development process, such as 
R&D, design, manufacturing and after-sales support. We propose that these processes are 
underpinned by a firm’s ability to codify, structure and deploy the knowledge of its employees to 
perform such functions.  
Our Case Studies have shown that, for instance, defence focussed firms may be more inclined to 
value functionality significantly higher than “aesthetics” – i.e. a military customer does not have the 
same demand for industrial design as a civilian customer, in particular a consumer, will have. Military 
customers will place significant value on ruggedness and reliability, particularly in the context of 
demanding environments, such as the significant environmental challenges regarding current 
operations in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.  
Defence agencies are also likely to set additional, detailed specifications in their tendering process, 
further inducing firms to adapt significantly to their needs (Cronberg, 1994). In this context, firms 
may have to greatly adapt their technical systems in order to meet this demand. In fact, “over-
specification” is an often-mentioned barrier to successful involvement in defence projects. Significant 
investment and optimisation of capabilities in order to foresee and meet these specifications is likely 
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to be a disadvantage compared to civilian-oriented firms who will have a stronger focus on being 
lean and cost effective, and launching larger runs of more homogeneous products.  
Another characteristic of defence markets is that production runs are generally relatively small, 
compared to many civilian markets (Hartley, 2011). This will lead to a smaller number of units over 
which capital investment, R&D costs and other functions can be spread. Case studies of firms with a 
relatively low defence focus have shown that firms usually expect higher margins (albeit perhaps 
lower volumes) from defence projects.  
Another important point is that many defence projects, in particular larger, more technologically 
sophisticated ones, have very long life cycles, potentially running into decades (Bennett, 2010). The 
development process alone can be significantly longer than in comparable civilian high-technology 
sectors. As time to market is a major source of competitive advantage in fast moving civilian 
technology markets, this adaptation to the long, highly specified, controlled and monitored defence 
procurement process must present a potential barrier to DUT2.   
These aspects lead to the perception that defence firms are generally less lean than comparable 
civilian firms. Although there will be macro-level effects driving this, manifested in the procurement 
process, we propose firm-level effects will also drive the lack of leanness.   
This optimisation is likely to have an effect on the applicability of these systems in the context of 
entering new markets. For instance, if we assume that defence customers are likely to purchase low-
volume, highly customised and technologically sophisticated products at a relatively high price (and 
margin to the firm), it may be challenging for a firm to adapt its processes, procedures and systems 
to access commercial markets which may not be willing to pay such a high price, and would be more 
willing to accept a lower level of technological sophistication and customisation. In such a case, a 
technologically sophisticated firm highly adapted to defence markets may be at a Competitive 
Disadvantage as it may not be able to engage in high-volume, low margin (mass)-markets.  
H6: Business function specificity (procedural asset specificity), manifested in highly optimised defence 
sector-specific core functions, will be negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm engaging in 
DUT2 projects 
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Figure 13: Model of the likelihood of DUT2 
3.2.8 The value placed on secrecy and confidentiality 
Additionally, another aspect which is often associated with DUT2 is the firm’s attitude to secrecy. 
This attitude is embedded in managerial systems related to the control of knowledge within the firm, 
and in relation to other stakeholders. In this particular context, where technological advantage is 
paramount within the military environment, and secrecy is highly regarded within high-technology 
projects, a high propensity to attach a value to secrecy will have an effect on DUT2. This effect goes 
beyond the regulative aspect of security classification in the defence industry, and extends to 
cognitive affects associated with the values and norms dimension of capabilities, and hence also 
rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
It must however be noted that a strong sense of the value of secrecy or confidentiality is not solely a 
characteristic of defence markets. Many firms whose competitive advantage is based on advanced 
technology will be faced with challenges relating to knowledge regarded as commercially sensitive. 
The following quote from a senior figure in a defence supplier illustrates this point: 
“The technology we deal in rarely has any military sensitivity but does 
have a lot of commercial sensitivity.” 
There are, however, additional challenges relating to military secrecy, as even the involvement of an 
organisation in certain projects may be coercively regulated by government. This leads to significant 
measurement issues, which will be discussed in a subsequent section. 
Although a strong and rigorous attitude to secrecy and control of information is likely to strengthen 
the legitimacy of a defence firm in the eyes of defence agencies and other actors in the wider 
defence industrial institutional environment, it may hinder their ability to achieve success in 
commercial markets. 
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Literature exists, which links the strength of an industry’s appropriability regime and the preference 
of secrecy over IPR to the nature of relationships in the context of inter-firm technology transfer 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2008). This article cites several previous studies which had found there to be a 
large number of industries which prefer to use secrecy to protect their technologies (Cohen et al., 
2000; Arundel, 2001). As in firms with otherwise weak appropriability regimes, firms in industries 
with significantly secretive environments tend to favour closer collaboration through partnerships 
and embedded agreements over standard, arms length, market based transactions. These broader 
agreements offer the transferor a higher degree of monitoring and control (Anand & Khanna, 2000), 
which may be due to regulative forces, but also subsequent cognitive structures inherent in the 
industry.   
A strict adherence to secrecy will likely be negatively associated with successes in collaborative work. 
Although there is a need to protect proprietary information in many cases, many potential partners 
may not be willing or able to engage with a firm which is systematically and culturally not willing to – 
or capable of – engaging in collaborative, knowledge-sharing activities. Building such relationships 
requires the gradual development of trust, which takes time. As market knowledge and other specific 
capabilities may be weak in the transferor firm, a lack of willingness to openly share technology may 
lead to lost opportunities. Again, this may have legitimate regulatory reasons, but may be due to 
industry specific cognitive effects. 
Additionally, a strong focus on technological leadership, and this leadership being the foundation of a 
firm’s competitive advantage, may incentivise the firm to remain within the highly controlled 
defence markets where this strong regard for secrecy acts as an additional barrier to entry in the 
firm’s strong market segments. This may be reinforced by the long development cycles involved in 
defence work. Commercial, civilian-oriented high-technology firms are likely to be incentivised to 
develop products quickly, and get them to market swiftly, already predicting the product’s 
replacement. Although this will be the case in the defence industry, the process is likely to be slower, 
thereby increasing the importance of contemporary technological developments, and hindering their 
ability to compete in faster-moving civilian markets.  
H7: A strong value placed on secrecy will be negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm 
engaging in DUT2. 
Unfortunately, this hypothesis was not tested in the quantitative analysis due to significant 
measurement issues. Briefly, responses to questions regarding level of secrecy seemed positively 
associated with the actual sensitivity of the target firm’s activities, however, several non-responses 
and minimum responses were received from firms which are likely to be involved in sensitive work. 
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These responses, combined with discussions with industry practitioners in the survey development 
phase, led to the measure being dropped from the quantitative analysis. This omission is further 
detailed in the questionnaire design segment in the methods section. 
 
3.3 The effect of reliance on defence revenues on strategic reorientation to non-
defence activities 
This section will first outline the contextual background relating to pressures for defence suppliers to 
diversify to non-defence activities. Due to recently announced defence spending cuts, these 
pressures are likely to intensify. The section will differentiate between the diversification options 
open to defence firms and the effects the government narratives regarding the cuts will have on 
firms, and the firm-level effects which may lead to different strategic responses. Subsequently, a 
theoretical approach to these effects will be outlined and hypotheses developed. 
The UK domestic defence market is currently characterised by cost pressures on procurement and a 
downsizing of the military in general. This of course poses a threat to defence firms who rely on MOD 
spending. 
Critically, cuts to defence spending are affected by the long lead times, contractual arrangements 
and complexity of the relationship between MOD and the DIB. In essence, defence cuts will lead to a 
lack of new business, however, firms involved in existing, especially large, complex projects, will likely 
retain these revenues. Therefore, on balance, at least in the short- to medium term, these defence 
cuts in the UK are likely to preclude the opportunity for business growth, as opposed to leading to a 
loss of existing business. 
As a case in point, several current large development and procurement projects (e.g. JSF, Astute, 
CVX) are likely to proceed, albeit perhaps in a smaller number. Particularly the JSF programme adds 
an additional level of complexity, namely the international dimension. 
As the cost and complexity of defence systems has risen, coupled with cost pressures on defence 
which have existed for decades (albeit not so severe), most nations cannot afford a complete 
“cradle-to-grave” capacity across a range of defence capabilities. This leads to international 
collaboration on development and procurement projects, or to trade of existing systems (or 
arrangements which fall between these two points on a continuum). The JSF project is an excellent 
example of these forces and mechanisms in action. 
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It can be argued that the US possesses the only defence industry with the breadth and depth (and 
funding) to cover the “cradle-to-grave” capacity across a wide range of capabilities. However, even in 
the US context, the JSF project has involved collaboration with international partners, notably BAE 
Systems and Rolls Royce. As the manufacturing stage of the project is currently in its early stages, 
and planned to continue until 2016, substantial involvement in this project will provide considerable, 
relatively certain revenues for the future (Gertler, 2012). In addition, additional services such as 
spare parts, maintenance etc. will only add to this. 
As mentioned before, large UK defence firms have become increasingly global. These firms have long 
recognised the advantages of hedging their geographical dependencies, and become large, global 
entities with access to multiple markets. This is a key factor in the effect of defence spending on 
firm’s strategic orientation regarding which markets they intend to operate in. 
Furthermore, although the above relates primarily to prime contractors with the structural and 
financial resources to grow globally, these implications can be expanded to include smaller firms who 
make up constituent parts of the supply chains for complex defence systems. Although a prime 
contractor takes the role of supply chain manager in large defence projects, they still draw upon a 
range of suppliers within the UK. These suppliers will not have the direct access to these foreign 
markets, but are still likely to experience a spill-over effect of the prime contractor’s activities in 
other markets.  
Therefore, due to many factors, which have been affecting the UK defence industry for many years, 
the UK defence industry has become a large, globally oriented industry. In fact, UK defence exports 
rank sixth behind the US leading the statistics (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
2012) (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Arms exports US$ in millions (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012) 
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In this context, the question arises: How does a strong reliance on defence revenues affect a firm’s 
planning for future strategic orientation? Specifically, how does it affect the firm’s intentions 
regarding the strength of their orientation to non-defence markets? 
The global nature of the defence industry can be seen as a hedging mechanism against defence cuts 
in a particular country or region. In spite of this it can be argued that in many circles, defence firms 
are seen to be heavily affected by defence cuts, making the business less attractive overall. There are 
essentially two camps regarding this issue. 
On the one side, it is argued that budgetary pressures in the domestic markets of the major defence 
suppliers (US and UK) will be detrimental to these firms, particularly to those with a strong reliance 
on defence business, with little non-defence business to compensate for these reductions. Also, the 
winding down of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan contribute to a bleak outlook for defence in 
general. Reductions in defence budgets and the number of armed forces personnel would seem to 
lend credence to this view.  
However, this opinion is countered by several influential factors. Firstly, as discussed above, the 
major global defence contractors have been repositioning themselves substantially to gain global 
presence and market access. Although the size of their main, traditional markets may be declining, 
the economies of many countries in Asia, and South America (most notably Brazil) are growing 
significantly, and defence markets in these countries grow accordingly (ReutersVideo, 2011). Many 
UK based defence firms (or firms such as Thales or Lockheed Martin with a strong UK presence) are 
well positioned to benefit from this growth, as Thales’ CEO pointed out in the interview mentioned 
before (ReutersVideo, 2011). 
Secondly, the changes in defence agencies demands must be considered. Since the end of the Cold 
War, there have been great changes in the technologies employed in the armed forces. Technologies 
relating to C4ISTAR, Unmanned Aerial Systems, and other electronics-intensive technologies and 
systems have displaced the “traditional” defence procurement of Cold War era equipment, as these 
new technologies have been developed with the modern threat environment in mind. These changes 
in technologies, military strategy and tactics, and indeed the scope of defence and in particular its 
relationship to “security”, have redefined the landscape of the defence industry. In fact, it can be 
argued it is much more difficult to differentiate it from other industries, as many of these 
technologies are inherently dual-use.  
Many of these particular technological fields are characterised by the fact that technological 
leadership is often driven by non-defence sales and technological breakthroughs. Therefore, it can be 
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argued that the non-defence sector has been driving many advances in areas such as 
semiconductors. Additionally, the cost pressures to which these firms are often exposed to have 
driven them to evolve leaner, more cost effective structures, albeit often associated with high 
throughput.  
This feeds back into the decline in defence spending, increase in transparency and move toward 
more competitive procurement. I.e. defence agencies seem more likely to engage with non-
traditional suppliers, if they can offer high technology at a lower price than a dedicated defence 
supplier who may have been exposed to the traditional defence environment and not achieved the 
same level of efficiency, which is driven by mass production, standardisation and price sensitive 
consumers. 
These forces have been recognized by many defence suppliers. Although many of the largest firms 
continue to base their competitive advantage around their strong ties to defence agencies and 
government, and therefore are strongly reliant on defence revenues (e.g. BAE, Lockheed Martin), 
many have been increasingly moving into non-traditional, but technologically related markets, such 
as non-defence satellite technology, telecoms, aerospace, etc. One example of such a move is the 
recent acquisition of Thrane & Thrane by Cobham, which has increased the share of Cobham’s 
revenues from non-defence from roughly one quarter to nearly a third (Financial Times, 08.08.2012). 
Cobham’s CEO underlines this strategy in an interview, stating that: 
“[Cobham has] an overall strategy that [they are] happy with [… and that they] like 
defence, but [their] future acquisitions will be designed to tilt the balance of the business 
towards commercial aerospace programmes. [They] do a lot with Airbus; [they would] 
like to do more with Boeing. Managing that shift means making strategic acquisitions...” 
(Shotter et al., 2012). 
Therefore, defence suppliers who have recognised these trends, and have structured themselves 
accordingly, are likely to be shielded from the effects of defence cuts. Firstly due to their 
geographical spread, and secondly due to the fact that they have been at the forefront of the 
development of technologies, which may potentially have non-defence applications.  
The resource-based view indicates that firms acquire the necessary resources to compete in a given 
context, and leverage these in product markets to generate revenues (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982). 
Further, competitive advantage can be gained by the acquisition and maintenance of resources 
which are highly specific, difficult to imitate and difficult to substitute (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). These 
resources are often embedded in routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), or in fact in managerial capacity 
(Hambrick, 1987). Due to path dependency in the development of such resources, they may acquire 
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“stickiness” (Barney, 1991). This can be contrasted with the fungibility necessary to apply these 
resources in other contexts. The stickiness can be compounded by managers’ inability or 
unwillingness to find uses for otherwise fungible assets. However, this may be counteracted if 
performance levels in certain domains fall below certain “aspiration levels” held by managers (Cyert 
& March, 1963). Effectively, industry decline may act as an impetus for managers to seek 
diversification opportunities they otherwise may not had sufficiently valued, or had associated 
perceived uncertainty and risk.  
 
The effect of overall defence revenue on strategic reorientation to non-defence activities 
In line with the above arguments, the question arises: Will high reliance on defence revenues affect 
the firm’s future plans regarding non-defence activities? Specifically at this point in time, pressures 
on the defence industry are often reported in the media, due to austerity measures and the winding 
down of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this climate, heavy reliance on defence revenues may 
be seen as a weakness going forward. Therefore, it can be argued that reorientation toward non-
defence revenues may be positively influenced by defence revenues as a percentage of overall 
revenue.  
However, this effect cannot be taken in isolation. As outlined above, many defence firms have been 
hedging their bets with regards to traditional sources of revenue. The two methods of doing this 
have been identified as: 1) geographic diversification, and 2) commercialisation of technologies 
outside the traditional defence sector (see matrix based on Ansoff, 1957 - Figure 9).  
Therefore, this relationship is likely to be influenced by many factors, which may not be clearly 
separable. At the high end of defence specialisation, one finds heavily entrenched, specialist defence 
suppliers whose competitive advantage is heavily based on their relationships and position within 
defence industries. There are also many smaller firms whose technological capabilities lie in fields for 
which there is little non-defence interest. However, there are also a significant number of 
technology-based firms of all sizes, who are already strategically oriented to leverage their 
technologies in defence as well as non-defence markets.  
Therefore, the measure of overall defence revenue as a percentage of total revenue is problematic 
and likely diluted, as total defence revenues can come from many sources, such as exports or selling 
to downstream defence contractors. However, in the case of the UK, the measure of MOD spending 
is more likely to have an effect on an organisation’s intent to move toward a higher degree of non-
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defence activities in the future, as it is a clearer measure of exposure to revenue sources which are 
commonly believed to shrink in the short- to medium term. 
 
The effect of MOD revenue on strategic reorientation to non-defence activities 
The UK MOD has announced that it will cut defence spending in the coming years. Due to the forces 
described above, this is likely to have a lagged effect on actual defence spending, as many projects 
have very long life cycles, however, the government and MOD are communicating quite clearly that 
they wish to cut spending. This will have a signalling effect on a tangible as well as 
cognitive/psychological effect to firms operating in the market. 
Whereas the overall percentage revenue from defence figure constitutes a figure, which is 
potentially geographically heavily dispersed, this figure is a clear indication of a firm’s reliance on the 
UK MOD. Therefore, the relationship between this figure and intent to strategically reorient toward 
non-defence activities is likely to be positive and significant, on average. 
H8: A higher percentage of revenues from UK MOD will be associated with a stronger intent to 
reorient to non-defence revenues 
 
The effect of defence sector identity on strategic reorientation to non-defence activities 
We have outlined in sections 3.2.1 - 3.2.3 our theoretical framework regarding the effect of defence 
sector-specific identity on DUT2. In this case we use the same construct to predict a firm’s intent to 
grow its activities in non-defence markets.  
Given the current climate in the UK defence sector, it is likely that the “aspiration levels” (Cyert & 
March, 1963) of defence business are weakening, as it would seem opportunities to grow in this 
domain are reducing. However, a strong identity in the sector, which is often built upon path-
dependency and strong experiences of success in the industry, are likely to diminish this effect. 
Therefore we expect a strong defence sector-specific identity to have a negative effect on the intent 
to strategically reorient into non-defence activities. 
H9: A strong defence sector-specific identity will be negatively associated with the intent to reorient 
to non-defence revenues 
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Technological Excellence and strategic reorientation to non-defence activities 
We do however expect technological excellence to be positively related to the intent to grow non-
defence activities. This is due to the fact that firms with a strong commitment to excellence and with 
a proven track record of delivering high technology are likely to perceive potential value-creation 
activities due to potential competitive advantage in non-defence markets, where they may offer 
technologies which may be superior to those of potential competitors. Again, as we are considering 
intentions for future behaviour, this relationship is based on the perceptions of top managers as to 
how they may effectively grow their businesses. Also, the responses were given at a time where 
many defence contractors are being forced to re-evaluate their business strategy going forward, and 
non-defence markets may present a higher potential for growth than the defence sector. 
H10: Technological excellence will be positively associated with the intent to reorient to non-defence 
revenues 
 
The interaction of defence sector-specific identity and technological excellence 
Based upon the reasoning set out in section 3.2.5, we argue that defence sector-specific identity will 
moderate the positive relationship between technological excellence and the intent to strategically 
reorient away from defence, in that a stronger identity will weaken the effect. As outlined above, this 
is due to the fact that a strong sector-specific identity is likely to be associated with sector-specific 
managerial mental models and cognitive schemas, which will limit the ability and willingness for 
managers to engage in activities which are perceived to be incompatible with this embedded 
identity.  
H11: Strength of defence sector-specific identity moderates the effect of technological excellence on 
the intent to strategically reorient to non-defence activities, in that high identity strength will weaken 
the positive effect of technological excellence 
These hypotheses will be tested using data collected using a survey of the database of the 
Aerospace, Defence and Space trade association A|D|S. The following section outlines the steps 
taken to construct this survey, providing detail on the methodological aspects of the project. The 
methodological approach is based primarily on a combination of exploratory qualitative work and 
empirical quantitative analysis (Kim & Miner, 2007). By adopting this approach, we take into account 
that the DUT2 phenomenon is complex, and embedded in a unique and intricate context, i.e. the 
defence industry. Therefore I use the exploratory field work to build a strong link between the theory 
and statistical analysis, ensuring a high degree of validity by iteratively consulting with industry 
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experts and other sources to capture the complexity inherent to the phenomenon throughout the 
phases of the project.  
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4 Methodology 
The overarching goal of this project was to investigate the phenomenon of DUT2, namely to identify 
cases in which technology has transferred from defence to non-defence applications, and cases 
where this has not occurred. Subsequently, patterns were to be identified which are correlated with 
successful DUT2 outcomes. These patterns were then to be formalised and ultimately, a 
contemporary overview of the phenomenon, and factors contributing to it was to be created. The 
PhD studentship was set up to this end with EPSRC funding.  
Early in the process it became clear that operationalising this research context was challenging. The 
area of DUT2 is multifaceted, and involves a range of business functions, institutional stakeholders 
and environmental forces. In fact, the defence industrial environment itself is complex and 
challenging in its own right.  
This study combines exploratory fieldwork with quantitative hypothesis testing in order to establish a 
strong link between our theories and our statistical methods. This approach is based on the 
methodology of Kim & Miner (2007). 
Therefore, significant time and effort had to be spent in an exploratory phase in order to take stock 
of previous attempts to address the phenomenon, and to leverage and synthesise expert opinions as 
to precisely what is actually happening in the case of DUT2. Additionally, understanding the 
phenomenon requires a rich understanding of the idiosyncratic defence industrial context. This is 
again complicated by the fact that the defence industry has undergone many changes since the end 
of the Cold War, and since the rise of asymmetric warfare7 and threats posed by opponents other 
than sovereign nation-states.  
Therefore, one contribution of this study is an up-to-date overview of the forces affecting defence 
suppliers in the UK. This overview was created in the form of the previous sections dealing with the 
defence industrial environment. Only after generating this overview could a more rigorous, 
explanatory research methodology be developed.  
During the exploratory phase, it clearly emerged that a focus on defence to non-defence technology 
transfer would only capture a part of the relationship between technologies in the defence sector, 
and in the wider economy. Therefore, technology transfer in the other direction has been included in 
                                                          
7
 Asymmetric warfare can be defined as warfare between opponents whose relative military strength and/or 
strategy or tactics differ significantly – in this case the shift from the Cold War doctrine of opposing the USSR 
and its allies to the current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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the study. By taking this bi-directional view, a richer overview of the phenomenon can be created. In 
fact, a significant number of respondents claim that this non-defence to defence technology transfer 
occurs at a greater magnitude, and its magnitude is increasing.  
The following section outlines the research process, starting with the exploratory phases taking stock 
of existing knowledge, and synthesising knowledge from a range of experts at different points in the 
system. Subsequently, using theoretical lenses from the management literature, a theoretical 
construct was created which will enable extrapolation of the study’s findings to other industries, 
which have similar characteristics to defence. Only then could testable hypotheses be generated and 
a survey instrument be designed. Only rarely have researchers attempted to survey a population of 
defence firms to this end, and existing studies must be updated to take into account the 
contemporary defence environment.  
Subsequent to the research process section, the elements of the survey study methodology will be 
described in greater detail and justified. Then, the next section will describe the survey questionnaire 
and its variants. 
Despite the challenges in obtaining responses in this context, a novel dataset has been constructed 
and used for quantitative analysis, in order to identify firm-level factors influencing DUT2.  
This section will continue with an overview of the research process, divided into steps covering the 
convergence of methods from the exploratory phases, to survey design and implementation and 
finally data analysis and discussion. Subsequently, the section provides more detail on questionnaire 
development, including scale development and treatment of reliability and validity.  
Firstly, Table 7 presents an anonymised list of interview participants contacted during this study. 
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Position Company Description
Procurement Officer Government
Scientist Government
(former) Defence Science Strategy Director (CTO) Industry
Engineer Industry
Engineer Industry
Engineer Industry
Managing Director (SME) Industry
Defence & Security Consultant Industry
Technology Consultant Industry
Director of Strategic Consulting Industry
Principal Technology Consultant Industry
Chief Technology Officer Industry
Technical Director Industry
Former Technical Director Industry
Managing Director (SME) Industry
Director of Sales & Marketing Industry
Director, Business Strategy Industry
Managing Director (SME) Industry
Commercial Director Trade Association
Technology Advisor Trade Association
Deputy CEO and Divisional Managing Director Trade Association
Managing Director Trade Association
Divisional Director Trade Association
Professor (Emeritus) University
Senior Lecturer University
Institute Programme Manager University
Business Development Manager University
Senior Lecturer University  
Table 7: Anonymised list of interview participants 
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4.1 Research process 
This section gives a general overview of the process carried out in this research project. Figure 15 
provides an overview of the process of which each step is briefly outlined below. Although the 
process is described as being linear, in practice it was iterative in nature. During the project, experts 
were interviewed and later re-visited to add depth and detail to the theoretical model and to ensure 
validity regarding empirical design choices. This is based on the methodology of combining 
exploratory qualitative work with quantitative hypothesis testing to ensure the effective treatment 
of this complex phenomenon (Kim & Miner, 2007). 
Conclusion & Discussion
Data Analysis
Survey Implementation & Data Collection
Survey Instrument Design
Hypothesis Development
Theory Formulation
Management Research Literature Review
Exploratory Phase
DUT2 Literature Review
 
Figure 15: Overview of the research process (based on Kim & Miner, 2007) 
 
1) DUT2 Literature review phase: The literature regarding the DUT2 phenomenon is sparse and 
fragmented. An in-depth review of literature pertaining directly to DUT2 was undertaken, and 
complimented with other literatures. These included research regarding defence firms, their 
idiosyncrasies and interactions with the wider economy, and literature regarding related 
forms of technology transfer, e.g. public to private sector technology transfer. One 
particularly important point is that a large amount of the DUT2 literature was written several 
years or decades ago, giving rise to the opportunity to update knowledge in the field taking 
into account to modern defence institutional environment (post Cold-War, post 9/11) 
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Goals: To assess existing work and findings in the field; to avoid duplication of work; to review 
previous research questions and methodologies within the DUT2 context; to assess the 
contemporary value of existing studies and identify areas in need of updating; to create a 
fundamental framework of known or proposed factors which may influence DUT2 
 
2) Exploratory phase: A considerable amount of time in the early stages of the study was taken 
to gather preliminary information, opinions and other input regarding which firm-level 
characteristics impact the likelihood and success of DUT2 projects. This phase included semi-
structured interviews, visits to firms and an industry association, attendance at MOD and 
other stakeholders’ conferences, seminars and other events, as well as telephone interviews 
and informal discussions with industry experts. In addition, many other sources were used 
such as government White Papers, internal MOD procedural and particularly procurement 
guidelines (where available), websites and documentation created by MOD and related 
organisations aimed at engaging suppliers. Furthermore, interviews throughout the 
questionnaire design phase were used to ensure validity regarding empirical design choices. 
Goals: To add depth to the characterisations of the defence institutional environment, and the 
isomorphic responses of firms within this environment; to identify and characterise firm-level 
structures, procedures and cognitive frameworks which may affect DUT2; to refine the 
research questions and to approach a formal operationalisation of these constructs. 
 
3) Management Research literature review phase: Once an overarching overview of the industry 
and its important stakeholders had been created, it was necessary to identify and leverage 
appropriate management literature in order to create an ordered, formalised and 
theoretically anchored systematic overview of the phenomenon and influential factors. 
Several streams of literature were considered, however the Capabilities literature lends itself 
well to this phenomenon, complimented with the body of institutional literature, and a 
particular emphasis on the organisational identity literature. Synthesising these three streams 
enables a firmly anchored conceptional framework to describe and analyse DUT2, but also to 
capture the particular idiosyncrasies of the defence industrial environment.  
Goals: To further refine the study’s research questions and constructs; to select appropriate 
theoretical lenses and theoretical background to underlie and support the development of a 
theory of DUT2 
 
4) Theory formulation: Equipped with in-depth knowledge of the field, and appropriate “lenses” 
and tools to view the phenomenon from a management perspective, theory was formulated 
to conceptualise and relate various constructs in a formalised manner. The overarching goal 
was to formulate theory which can both a) capture the industry-specific forces at work in the 
context of DUT2, and b) be generalisable to other comparable industries. The defining 
characteristics of the defence industry, such as strong institutional forces, a long history of 
close cooperation with government agencies, the manifold influential roles of these agencies 
as regulator and customer, can be compared to some degree with other industries, such as 
state-run health systems, or the “security” industry. Defence can be seen as a critical case of 
such highly regulated industries with a single (or small number of) centralised buyer(s). In 
essence, the identity and institutional literatures are being synthesised with the Capabilities 
  89 
literature to identify the effects the former have on capability development and the diffusion 
of technological innovation between sectors. 
Goals: The creation of a theoretical framework, which explains the relationships between 
certain firm-level characteristics and the likelihood and success of DUT2; to refine this 
framework to be feasibly expanded with testable hypotheses 
 
5) Hypothesis development: In order to test the theory of DUT2, a set of testable hypotheses was 
created, which can be tested by means of a quantitative study based on survey data.  
Goals: To generate a set of testable hypotheses to test the theoretical framework proposed in 
4) 
 
6) Survey instrument design: A survey questionnaire was designed using a combination of scales 
designed for this study and scales based on previous studies. Factor analysis was employed to 
test the reliability of these scales. The survey instrument was designed through an iterative 
process of collecting feedback from industry experts to optimise the clarity of language and 
validity of the constructs. Initial testing and piloting was also used to ensure respondents 
comprehension. Two versions of the survey were created, a long version and a short version. 
The long version has been used in face-to-face interviews, and contains questions relating to 
specific DUT2 projects. It was also used in the initial implementation phase of the survey. It is 
however time consuming, which had a negative effect on response rates. The short version 
was finalised after analysis of the results of the initial implementation of the long version, and 
several poorly-performing scales were dropped. The short version was designed with the 
express purpose of obtaining a high response rate by focusing on the well-performing, firm-
level scales. It is critical to note the difficulties in obtaining responses from the targets of this 
survey. Senior managers in defence firms may be reluctant to disclose information relating to 
the technologies they develop in the defence context. This can be due to cognitive constructs 
extant in the industry, or due to firm-wide policies stipulating that employees may not 
respond to questionnaires focussing on their technology and operations. In fact, several 
respondents stated that they were bound to MOD regulations to this effect.  
Goals: To create a feasible, efficient survey, specifically adapted to the demands of surveying 
senior managers of defence suppliers 
 
7) Survey implementation and data collection: The survey was transcribed in MS Word .doc form, 
and into the online survey software package Limesurvey. The online version was used as the 
primary delivery mechanism for the survey. A list of contacts was acquired from the trade 
association A|D|S. This included senior managers from the ca. 500 applicable member firms 
of the trade association. Difficulties in obtaining responses were predicted and did in fact 
present themselves. In order to counteract the reluctance to respond, many actions were 
taken to add legitimacy to the survey. Firstly, the Limesurvey mailing shots were conducted 
using the Imperial College smtp service, allowing for an Imperial College sender address. 
Secondly, the survey was hosted on a website which was secured with SSL/TLS. Thirdly, the 
cover letter of the survey explicitly stated that all responses would be kept anonymous, and 
that no references would be made to individual replies. Including the term “Commercial in 
Confidence” throughout the survey reinforced this point. This wording was chosen as it was 
suggested by one expert who was consulted on the project, as it is a recognisable term 
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relating to sharing information with public bodies, such as universities, and may provide a 
certain level of protection. It must however be added that the questions were almost 
exclusively designed as to not arouse any sensitivities in the respondents. The Limesurvey 
invitation email also included a link to the .doc version of the survey, in order to avoid any 
additional reluctance due to security associated with web-related content. 
Goals: To administer the survey in such a way as to minimise the reluctance of potential 
respondents to complete the survey; to efficiently collect responses by leveraging email and 
online questionnaire software; to provide alternative response mechanisms if the online 
version is not favoured. 
 
8) Data analysis: The survey data was analysed using the statistical software package Stata. 
probit models were applied to test hypotheses relating to factors which influence the 
likelihood of DUT2 from defence to non-defence applications and vice versa. Traditional linear 
regression techniques were employed to test hypotheses relating to firm’s aims to 
strategically reorient away from defence activities. 
Goals: Use of statistical techniques to provide a quantitative empirical analysis of the survey 
data; test hypotheses generated through interviews with experts and literature review. 
 
9) Conclusions and Discussion: Results from the data analysis phase were interpreted and put 
into the context of the wider literature and expert opinions. Discussion and implications 
sections were written to reflect the conclusions generated from this interpretation. 
Goals: To provide empirical evidence for the advancement of theory and to inform industry 
practitioners; to package this information in an accessible, impactful concise manner. 
 
 
4.2 Sample 
The sample for the DUT2 survey was drawn from the Register of A|D|S Group. Their entire database 
comprises around 900 member firms active in these industries.  
The database constitutes a group of firms, which is very heterogeneous regarding size. It includes 
very large companies such as BAE Systems with over £30 billion revenue per year, but also many 
relatively small SMEs. A wide range of technological fields is also represented, however with a focus 
on manufacturing firms and therefore engineering and the physical sciences. 
The A|D|S Defence registry is divided into three sections: 1) Full systems manufacturers; 2) 
Equipment and component manufacturers and 3) Service providers. As this study deals with the 
development and transfer of technologies, the third group has been omitted from the sample. In 
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addition, several firms not engaged in R&D, technology maturation or technology demonstration 
have also been excluded. 
The database of contacts provided by A|D|S includes the nominated contacts responsible for the 
interaction between the firms and A|D|S itself. In the majority of cases this includes the heads of the 
companies. In the case of most SMEs, these contacts are ideal candidates to complete the 
questionnaire. In the case of the larger firms, several board-level individuals are included in the 
database. In such cases, the most relevant first contact was selected on the basis of knowledge of the 
technology development and transfer activities.  
First contact with the firms was made in the form of an email from A|D|S’s commercial policy 
coordinator, sent directly to the contacts’ email addresses. The email included an introduction of the 
principle investigator, a statement of support for and endorsement of the project, and a request for 
the recipient to complete the survey, as it would be beneficial to the Group. The email also included 
the request for the recipient to provide an alternative contact if this would improve the quality of the 
response.  
 
4.3 Survey Design and Implementation  
This section will outline the various steps in the process of survey design and execution, and justify 
why these steps were taken in relation to the design of the overall study. It will follow a structure 
developed in Pinsonneault & Kraemer (1993), with specific focus on elements of research design, 
sampling procedure and data collection.  
This structure confronts the researcher with several questions relating to the justification and 
effectiveness of carrying out specific tasks in the course of implementing the survey, and making 
conscious decisions relating to these tasks.  
 
4.3.1 Research Design 
Initially, it is imperative to be clear as to the type of survey, which is to be conducted. In this case, a 
cross-sectional survey was executed. Although this limits the scope for causal inferences, as it does 
not allow the detection of temporal priority, a cross-sectional survey can still be used to generate 
valuable data. Additionally, the time and cost associated with carrying out longitudinal studies is a 
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significant barrier, as is the pursuit of repeat responses over time in an environment such as the 
defence industry, which already poses significant challenges to response rates. 
Secondly, it is imperative to be clear on the unit(s) of analysis, which the study addresses. This study 
focuses on firm-level factors predicting firm-level outcomes. This unit of analysis is considered both 
in hypothesis development and in sampling procedures and data collection. With the proposed 
sampling procedures, however, it is clear that a survey questionnaire will be completed by 
individuals, and that this must be considered when using a firm-level unit of analysis. The section on 
sampling frame will demonstrate that a consistent, targeted approach can be used to alleviate this 
potential for disturbances. 
Thirdly, it is necessary to ensure that the targeted respondents are representative of the unit of 
analysis. In this case, the respondents are drawn from a list of members of a defence industry 
focussed trade association. Individual respondents are selected from senior management positions 
ensuring they are knowledgeable regarding their organisations’ strategy and the DU phenomenon. 
Also, the survey introduction describes the unit of analysis.  
Next, careful consideration must be taken to produce clearly-stated, testable hypotheses, and that 
these are adequately categorised into constructs, which are addressed in the questionnaire. They 
must again also be conformant with the unit of analysis. This survey employed a mixture of 
previously used multi-item scales, as well as scales constructed for this study. Validation of the 
instrument in the early phases showed that most scales were performing well. Poorly performing 
scales were dropped from the subsequent analysis. The hypotheses are clearly firm-level in nature 
and adequately measurable by the survey instrument. 
Finally, it is imperative to remain aware of the planned subsequent data analysis phase, to ensure 
the survey instrument is adequate to collect all necessary variables. This was a significant issue in the 
execution of this survey, and any variables available from secondary sources were not included in the 
survey, to reduce the length of the questionnaire. We focused on collecting data relating to the 
theoretically important and interesting concepts, which are not available elsewhere. Although 
proxies may be potentially available for some of these measures, these tend to be imprecise (Grant, 
1996). One contribution of this study is the incorporation of these measures as they are theoretically 
interesting, although, as Spender & Grant (1996) express, often the theoretically most interesting 
concepts are the most difficult to measure (Sapienza et al., 2004).  
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4.3.2 Sampling Procedures 
One particularly relevant finding from Pinsonneault & Kraemer (1993) is that many studies employ 
underdeveloped or inadequate sampling frames. Before sampling itself can commence, it is 
necessary to ensure that the frame is in itself representative of the population to which conclusions 
are to be generalised. Often, studies are based on sampling frames that are either ill-defined, or in 
fact potentially mis-targeted due to issues pertaining to convenience. In the case of this study, it was 
fortunate that the sampling frame combines representativeness and convenience, as the 
membership of the UK’s largest defence-focused trade association can be used as a reasonable 
indicator for a firm involved in the industry. This relationship was discussed with a senior Defence 
Economics academic in a face-to-face meeting. By additionally pruning away firms, which were 
purely involved in services in the defence sector, the sampling frame is set so as to ensure 
representativeness. In essence, it can be said that this study employs complete sampling of the 
entire set of firms which are members of A|D|S, but are not solely involved in the service sector. 
It must be noted that there are a number of UK firms involved in the defence industry, but are not 
A|D|S members. However, due to the wide spectrum of A|D|S members across all defence-relevant 
sectors, this is unlikely to affect the representativeness of the sample. In part, these firms will include 
organisations with minimal involvement in defence, who may either have no focus on the industry - 
solely generating opportunistic sales of generic products, or potentially firms further up the supply 
chain, who are not necessarily aware of their involvement in the industry (as shown in Hartley, 
1997). 
Regarding the representativeness of the sample itself, significant effort was put into not only 
removing irrelevant firms from the study, but to also ensure that the individual respondents held 
senior management posts within the target firms, so as to ensure they 1) possessed the requisite 
knowledge regarding the firm’s strategic orientation and operations, as well as the DU-concept, and 
2) were comparable to each other with regard to their position within their organisation. In this case 
we can ensure a good degree of representativeness and data quality when posing questions 
regarding the perceptions of senior managers (i.e. influential decision makers) within defence firms 
in the context of DUT2. In essence, we are equating the perceptions of Top Management Teams to 
the firm-level attributes, which we seek. 
Finally, sample size and response rate had been predicted to be one of the most difficult challenges 
of this methodological approach to this research. As mentioned, the complete sample of relevant 
A|D|S members was targeted for the survey, totalling 611 organisations.  
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4.3.3 Data Collection 
Data was collected using an online survey. This method ensured an efficient and effective 
opportunity to gather a large number of responses at low financial and time-related cost. In order to 
ensure no responses were lost due to respondents’ potential to refuse to access the survey due to 
cookies, a downloadable MS Word .doc file was made available, and a link was inserted into the 
invitation email. Additionally, some responses were gathered in face-to-face interviews when the 
opportunity arose.  
A large amount of time and effort was invested in order to maximise the response rate, by the 
following means: 
- Negotiating access to the A|D|S members’ contact database, to reduce the perception of 
“cold-calling” 
- Clearly stating that the survey is part of a publically funded, academic research project 
- Clearly stating the various degrees of involvement of Imperial College, EPSRC and A|D|S 
- Emphasising the confidentiality with which the data will be handled, also including the 
wording “commercial in confidence” to demonstrate attention to detail regarding data 
protection and security when dealing with a public institution 
- Ensuring the maximum possible level of brevity within questions without diminishing the 
quality of the measures or clarity of language 
- Specific attention to potentially discouraging questions which may cause respondents to 
discontinue the survey due to sensitive information (a major component of the validation 
phase with industry experts) 
- Reduction in the number of questions in the short form version of the survey by removing 
poorly-performing measures, also resulting in a positive effect on the response rate 
Despite these steps, obtaining a sufficient response rate was challenging, due to the relatively small 
sample, combined with the cognitive barriers apparent when approaching the defence industry, and 
the potential for issues of sensitivity regarding the firms’ technological capabilities, operations or 
strategic orientations. 
In order to ensure the quality of the survey, and to improve wording, clarity and structure, a 
validation phase was carried out prior to execution of the survey. This involved several interviews 
with industry experts, with backgrounds within industry and academia. This phase did not lead to 
substantial content changes; however several wording changes were made.  
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4.4 Questionnaire design 
This section will now provide more detail regarding the development of the survey instrument. A 
survey questionnaire was designed and implemented with the support of the A|D|S Group, a trade 
association advancing the UK Aerospace, defence, security and space industries. A|D|S provided 
feedback on the design of the questionnaire, and access to its contact list. As mentioned above, two 
versions of the survey were created, a long version (Appendix 2) and a short version (Appendix 1). 
Due to the significant difficulties in gaining responses to surveys in this industry, the short version 
was used to gather data for the quantitative analysis.  
The following will provide an overview of the operationalisation of the measures referred to in the 
theory section. As will be discussed, several constructs were not included in the short version of the 
survey.  
Most variables were measured on multiple-item scales, using a Likert scale (unless otherwise stated). 
Some items were developed specifically for this study, although others are based on previously 
developed measures. All statement style items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  
 
4.4.1 Short form questionnaire 
The short form questionnaire focuses solely on firm-level characteristics. In particular, it enquires as 
to the organisations defence sector-specific identity, and the adaptation of its business functions and 
employees to the defence industry. Also included are measures regarding technology orientation, 
cost efficiency, and quality-to-cost ratio of the firm’s products and services (i.e. ranging from aiming 
for highest quality regardless of cost, to focus on low cost production).Table 8 shows the scales and 
alphas in the short form questionnaire: 
  96 
Strength of Defence sector -specific Identity α
Our management sees our organisation f irst and foremost as a 
defence supplier.†
0.828
Our important stakeholders (e.g. suppliers, customers, etc.)  see us 
f irst and foremost as a defence supplier.
0.8341
Our employees identify strongly with the values of  defence business. 0.8614
In our communication with important stakeholders, we consistently 
portray ourselves as a defence supplier.
0.8349
We see ourselves as supporting the national defence objectives rather 
than being purely prof it -oriented.
0.8725
We employ ex-service personnel at senior management levels. 0.9066
Test Scale 0.8785
Technological Excellence α
We build upon proven technological breakthroughs made by other 
organisations.
-
We strive to achieve technological leadership in the markets in which 
we compete.*
0.6775
We emphasise technological superiority to dif ferentiate out new 
products.*
0.6875
We aggressively adopt new technologies in the early phases of  their 
introduction.
0.7679
We focus heavily on cost eff iciency and strive to be a very “lean” 
organisation.
0.7693
We always prioritise quality over cost. 0.7862
Test Scale 0.7814
Human Asset Specificity α
Our organisation’s market knowledge is focused specif ically on the 
defence industry
0.8559
Our employees’ market knowledge and skills are tailored to meet the 
specif ic conditions of  our defence business.
0.8501
It would be very dif f icult for our employees to transfer market 
knowledge acquired in our organisation’s defence business to 
applications outside the defence sector.
0.9062
Many of  our employees can be considered specif ically defence sector -
specialists.
0.8437
We often hire new employees with a strong record in the defence 
sector.
0.859
Our employees are intrinsically motivated to work on defence sector 
projects.
0.857
Test Scale 0.8838
Business Function Specificity - Product Adaptation to Defence α
Our research activities (e.g. selection of  technological f ields, 
fundamental research) .
0.8431
Our development activities (e.g. meeting defence customer 
specif ications, product/service customisation, integration into 
defence systems/platforms).
0.7122
Our product design activities. 0.7461
Our manufacturing activities. 0.8494
Test Scale 0.836
Business Function Specificity - Service Adaptation to Defence α
Our marketing/customer relationship management activities (e.g. 
tendering, contracting, identif ication of  customers’ needs).
0.8617
Our distribution activities ( i.e. we sell mainly to MOD/other defence 
agencies or within defence supply chains) .
0.8757
Our after-sales support activities (e.g. monitoring, maintenance) 0.8495
Our other service activities (training, consulting, f inancing) 0.9034
Test Scale 0.9018
† dropped due to poor performance
* these items also constituted a 2- item scale of Technology Orientation with a 
scale alpha of 0.9154
 
Table 8: Scales, items, scale- and item-alphas for the short form questionnaire 
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Dependent Variables: Occurrence and directionality of DUT2 
Respondents were asked to state whether their firm had transferred technology from defence to 
non-defence applications, or vice versa. Therefore, there were four possible outcomes: 1) The firm 
had never transferred technology in either direction, 2) the firm had transferred technology from 
defence to non-defence applications, but not vice versa, 3) the firm had transferred technology from 
non-defence to defence applications, but not vice versa, and 4) the firm had transferred technology 
in both directions.  
Initially these responses were coded into two separate binary variables, one for each direction of 
DUT2.  
 
Dependent variable: Strategic reorientation to non-defence activities 
This measure constitutes the difference between two statements on seven-point Likert scales. The 
first statement relates to the firm’s intent to engage in non-defence markets in the future, and the 
second relates to their past engagement with non-defence activities. The difference signifies the shift 
in their strategic orientation.  
 
Strength of defence industry-specific identity 
The defence sector-specific identity (ID) scale was created for this study. Six items are included, and 
pertain to perceptions of senior management and important stakeholders regarding the firm’s 
belonging to the defence sector identity domain. It also includes items pertaining to communications 
generated by the firm to be disseminated externally, and the employment of ex-service personnel at 
senior management levels. 
 
Technology Orientation 
The technology orientation (TO) scale aims to capture the strategic focus of the target firm on 
technological sophistication and superiority. The four-item scale was developed from Jeong et al. 
(2006), based upon the work of Gatignon & Xuereb (1997) and Song & Parry (1997). The items refer 
to the firm’s willingness and determination to adopt and deploy innovative technologies early in their 
life cycle, and the firm’s dependence on such technology, which is acquired from external sources. 
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Human Asset Specificity 
Differing opinions regarding the specificity of human assets within the defence context were 
discovered during the exploratory phase. In particular, several authors in the DUT2 literature 
remarked that there are difficulties in transferring knowledge acquired in the defence sector to other 
sectors, and that there are various cognitive barriers associated with employees’ intrinsic preference 
for defence-related projects. However, several interviewees stated that the essential technical skills 
are applicable beyond the defence sector (if there is demand for the particular technological field). 
The human asset specificity (HAS) scale seeks to address this issue, by including items relating to the 
transferability of technical knowledge, and also referring to cognitive aspects relating to employee 
motivation to work on defence projects and not non-defence projects. The scale is based on a similar 
scale employed by De Luca & Atuahene-Gima (2007), modified to be applicable to the defence sector 
context.  
 
Procedural Asset Specificity 
This group of questions breaks down the firm into eight functions, and asks the respondent to rate 
each the adaptation of each individual function to the defence industry. The functions are: 1) 
Research activities, 2) development, 3) design, 4) manufacturing, 5) marketing & customer relations, 
6) distribution, 7) after sales support and 8) other service activities (e.g. training, consulting, 
financing).  
The first four functions can be seen as product dimensions (ProDim), whereas the subsequent four 
are service dimensions (SerDim). This structure was taken consciously, in order to explore the notion 
that the locus of the defence specific rigidity could be located in one or the other of these 
dimensions.  
 
4.4.2 Long form questionnaire 
As mentioned earlier, the long form questionnaire included an additional section with project-level 
questions. It also included several additional firm-level scales. This section will first deal with the 
firm-level scales, which were subsequently dropped, then it will describe the project-level variables 
included in the additional section.  
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Secrecy / confidentiality 
There is a common perception that the defence industry is heavily secret, and separated into its own 
silo. Although this is surely true of several sensitive industries (particular NRBC – Nuclear, 
Radiological, Biological and Chemical), we argue that the importance of commercial secrecy is also 
held in such high regard by commercial entities with no defence involvement, if they define their 
capabilities along the lines of their technical knowledge and technological superiority [to patent or 
not to patent].  
However, if a defence firm does engage in activities that are regulated by government, and are 
deemed a strategic priority, or as sensitive and dangerous, these firms will be subject to additional 
forces, which may influence the likelihood of technology transfer. This important effect is of great 
research interest; however, it must be stated that effect of the transfer of such technologies out of 
the defence environment is likely to be detrimental to national security and in fact highly undesirable 
to the wider population. 
At this point it is necessary to explain that the degree of secrecy/confidentiality regarding a firm or 
project is not an operationalisable construct within the context of this work. This is due to the fact 
that a firm may be engaged in sensitive work, and may in fact be inhibited in technology transfer 
activities by the barriers government control and regulation may cause (Petroni & Verbano, 2000). 
However, as the level of secrecy and government control increases, at some point any respondents 
or other organisational members will in fact deny the existence of such restrictions [X-list etc.] (see 
Figure 16). In addition to this, even prior to this shift to non-response, this question can lead to 
misreporting. This is due to the fact that respondents are naturally likely to be more unwilling to 
respond to such a survey if they are cognitively adapted to behaviours associated with the sensitivity 
of their work (either on a personal/individual level, or as part of an organisational policy). 
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Figure 16: Actual versus reported secrecy level 
 
Therefore, the variable concerning the degree of secrecy/confidentiality was dropped from the final 
analysis.  
 
Focus on aesthetic design 
The long form survey included a scale of the organisation’s focus on the aesthetic elements of design. 
This rather unintuitive avenue of inquiry arose due to several interviews and other statements from 
experts, who described some differences in designing products for military use versus civilian, 
particularly consumer use. There is a conceptual continuum between a focus on functionality and 
ruggedness, which is imperative for military equipment, and aesthetic aspects that are mostly 
ignored by firms designing defence equipment. 
The aim was to identify if a lacking capability in this area was a significant barrier to DUT2. This was 
always considered an outside chance and unfortunately the measure did not function as hoped. 
Several respondents noted the items seemed out of place, and the scale itself did not perform well. 
We do however believe that future research into this concept is not without merit. Although the B2C 
market is by no means a major focus of DUT2, it must be noted that consumer electronics markets 
are becoming increasingly competitive regarding these aesthetic elements of design.  
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Project-level variables 
The following variables were included in an additional section which was only included in the long 
form questionnaire. As such, only several dozen responses were collected, and the project-level 
analysis could not be carried out with the same quantitative methods used for the abovementioned 
firm-level variables. They do however shed some light on factors influencing the success of initiated 
DUT2 projects.  
 
Market similarity 
Market similarity refers to the degree of difference between the target market and the defence 
sector. As the firms engaging in DUT2 are engaged in the defence sector, they are likely to be 
affected by exposure to the defence-specific institutional forces present in this sector. Therefore, 
they are likely to be adapted to this sector. We suggest that this leads to the firm being subject to a 
defence sector-specific cognitive framework, and that they also build defence-specific capabilities, 
which will be optimised to improve performance in the defence sector.  
It is hypothesised that the higher the degree of market dissimilarity, the less likely the firm will be to 
engage in a DUT2 project, due to the market uncertainty associated with the project.  
We also suggest that a high degree of market dissimilarity will have a negative effect on DUT2 
success. This is due to the fact that the firms will not be effectively adapted to this new environment, 
therefore decreasing the likelihood of success while operating in such markets. This could be due to a 
lack of market knowledge, as well as the fact that the firm is likely to be adapted to the defence 
sector in particular, which is regarded as an insular environment, characterised by strong institutions 
and unique practices (Hartley, 2007).  
Several studies of cases of DUT2, (e.g. Brown & Franck, 1998) show that DUT2 is more common when 
the target market is similar, in this case involving transfer to law-enforcement or medical 
applications, both highly regulated markets with a high degree of government involvement.  
 
Required level of customisation 
This measure intends to capture the level of customisation required in order to transpose a 
technology from a military setting or application to a civilian application. Increasing application 
similarity decreases the required level of customisation, as the civilian application is relatively similar 
to the original military application, and vice versa.  
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This concept does not refer to a requirement for scientific and engineering R&D work, but to a 
difference in the adaptation of an existing technology. The defence firm wishing to engage in DUT2 
must understand the needs of the civilian customers, and be able to sell a product (or service) which 
meets their requirements. It also involves the creation of infrastructure to support the new product 
(or service). Teece (1986, p.285) states that “innovators with new products and processes which 
provide value to consumers may sometimes be so ill positioned in the market that they necessarily 
will fail.” In this case we argue that the defence firm may not be able to take advantage of its 
technological capabilities as they are not able to effectively customise the technology to the needs of 
the target market customers. 
We expect that the required level of customisation with respect to the DUT2 project will be 
negatively associated both with the likelihood of the firm engaging in a DUT2 project, as well as the 
success of an initiated project. This is due to three reasons: First, an increased level of required 
customisation will give rise to increased costs, thereby increasing the barriers to DUT2. Second, an 
increased level of customisation will bring with it an increased level of market uncertainty. Third, the 
need for customisation implies greater service intensity and associated need to invest in building and 
maintaining service functions in the civilian market. Such investment would distract focus and 
attention from the core military market and would likely face resistance within the company. 
Combined, the three mechanisms increase the challenges that the firm will face in transposing the 
technology from its existing military application to the proposed civilian application. The magnitude 
of these challenges will be positively correlated with the level of required customisation. 
If the required level of customisation increases, it is likely to strengthen the negative effects of 
defence sector rigidities on the likelihood and success DUT2. If the required customisation is high, 
defence-specific rigidities will operate as a potent deterrent against an investment of effort into 
DUT2. On the other hand, if the required customisation is minimal, little additional effort will be 
required to try out DUT2 projects even if the firm would experience defence-specific rigidities. A firm 
with highly optimised capabilities to the defence sector context is likely to encounter a higher degree 
of market uncertainty when engaging in civilian markets. Therefore the following three arguments 
must be seen as manifestations of the effect of increased required customisation level in the context 
of the relationship between defence sector-specific rigidities and DUT2.  
If the level of required customisation is known to be high before the decision to engage in DUT2 has 
been made, the associated costs will affect management decision-making with regard to whether or 
not to engage in a DUT2 project. This is because higher costs will reduce the attractiveness of the 
project in the eyes of the management. 
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The required customisation will also bring with it market uncertainty associated with the project. This 
leads to increased anticipated costs, some of which will be foreseeable while others are not. A higher 
level of market uncertainty alone will reduce the likelihood of a firm engaging in a DUT2 project. 
In addition, the market uncertainty will have a negative effect on DUT2 success, as these challenges, 
whether anticipated or not, will lead to an increase in costs associated with the project, or may even 
present an unforeseen, insurmountable obstacle.  
This effect may interact with defence sector rigidities due to the fact that this uncertainty will be 
higher if the firm has little experience in this market, or similar markets, and there is a resulting 
misalignment of capabilities to the target market, and a limited understanding of its nature. 
 
Technology maturity 
There are numerous examples of technologies for which, although a civilian commercial application 
can be imagined, this application does not materialise due to the high cost of the R&D required to 
bring the technology to market. Military spending is known to have been essential in “bridging the 
funding gap” in many such cases as mentioned. Military procurement is often driven by factors other 
than the return on investment, most obviously the acquisition of a relative advantage in military 
capability. This advantage can be gained by possessing a technological advantage on the battlefield 
(Middleton et al., 2006).  
Murphy & Edwards (2003) refer to the “cash flow valley of death” between research in government 
agencies, and their subsequent development to be commercialised in the private sector. Within the 
defence sector, the Technology Readiness Levels scale (TRL) is widely used. This measure of maturity 
of the technology in question will be used to capture how well developed the technological 
foundation, i.e. the transfer object, of the DUT2 project was before the project was initialised. 
Essentially this metric can be used to measure how far from the market a technology is. The TRL 
scale is illustrated in Figure 17. This shows the nine TRL levels and their descriptions (Great Britain, 
Ministry of Defence, 2009a). 
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Figure 17: The MOD Technology Readiness Level scale (Great Britain. Ministry of Defence, 2009a) 
 
As this scale is widely used in the defence sector, defence firms will be well aware of it. This scale 
was used to measure the level of development of a DUT2 transfer object at the inception of the 
DUT2 project.  
It is argued that a DUT2 project where the DUT2 transfer object is highly developed, i.e. it has a high 
TRL, will have a positive effect on DUT2. This is due to the fact that previous military funding has 
contributed to the development of the technology, therefore reducing the necessary investment 
required for the development process. It will also imply a reduction in technological uncertainty 
associated with the DUT2 process.  
After a certain point, military spending is likely to be geared toward the development of the military 
application of a technology, which will reduce the positive effect of this spending on DUT2. 
Effectively, after a certain point, the trajectory of the technological development will move away 
from fundamental proof of concept etc., to adapting and inserting the technology into military 
operations, potentially moving it away from the civilian application.  
This is not to be confused with the requirement for customisation, which is a measure of the 
dissimilarity in the military vs. the civilian application, and the subsequent requirement of the firm to 
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customise to meet the market needs. Technologies can be highly mature (TRLs of 8 or 9), but require 
vastly different levels of customisation to meet two different applications. This is also the case of 
immature technologies, whereby the future trajectory of their R&D process may lead to any level of 
technological dissimilarity, and therefore required customisation for the purposes of DUT2.  
For example, if a military transport helicopter which is in-service is to be transposed to a civilian 
application, the required level of customisation will be extremely low as it will not need to be 
significantly adapted to the civilian application. At the same time, the TRL will be very high, as all 
components etc. will be fully developed and tested.  
However, a military radar system is likely to be a complex technological system which is integrated 
into military command and control systems, as well as into its platform (e.g. fighter aircraft, air-
defence destroyer). It may be integrated into e.g. weapons guidance systems etc. If a firm with the 
technological capability in military radar systems were to wish to leverage this capability in civilian 
markets, the transfer object would be considerably lower down the TRL scale. The technological 
foundation underlying the DUT2 process would be significantly less developed. The DUT2 process 
would include significant further R&D work. 
An increasing level of maturity of a pre-existing technology, technological capability, or technology-
based- product or service (constituting the transfer object) will decrease the costs and uncertainty 
associated with a DUT2 project, and therefore increase the likelihood of engagement in such a 
project. It will reduce the associated technical uncertainty associated with the project, therefore 
having a positive effect on its success.  
 
4.5 Model Specifications 
The survey responses were collated, cleaned and appropriately coded for statistical analysis using the 
statistics software package Stata. We ran three models with numerous specifications for each model. 
The following three models were constructed: 
1) A probit model predicting the likelihood of DUT2 from defence to non-defence 
2) A probit model predicting the likelihood of DUT2 from non-defence to defence 
3) An OLS model predicting the level of strategic reorientation toward non-defence activities 
Model 1) specifications- included strength of ID, Technological Excellence (TExc), Human asset 
specificity (HAS), product dimensions (ProDim) adaptation and service dimensions (SerDim) 
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adaptation. Additionally, various controls for firm size and liquidity ratio were included, drawn from 
Bureau van Dijk’s FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database. First, a full model including all of 
the direct effects of these variables was estimated, then the interaction between TExc and ID was 
introduced, then subsequently the variables with no significant effect were dropped. This process 
was carried out to ensure robustness of the coefficients and p-values across the differing 
specifications.  
Model 2) was similarly specified, however with the TO variable in place of the TExc scale. This change 
was executed to capture the differing technological, quality- and cost-related demand conditions 
between the defence industry and the wider economy. More detail on this theoretical choice can be 
found in the theory section.   
Model 3) included TExc, ID, but also percentage revenue generated from MOD sales (MODSales), and 
percentage revenue generated from overall defence sales (DefSales), as well as the same controls. 
This was also initially set up as a full main-effects model. Then the interaction was introduced, and 
subsequently the model was estimated without the controls and non-significant scales.  
The following section will report the results from these three models in turn.  
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5 Analysis and Results 
This section will report and analyse the results from the three models outlined in the previous 
section. It will begin a section reporting descriptive statistics, and continue with the probit model 
predicting the likelihood of DUT2 from defence to non-defence, will then continue with the probit 
model for non-defence to defence, and conclude with the OLS model predicting strategic 
reorientation to non-defence activities.  
The first two models were also run as logit models, as a robustness test, with no significant 
differences in significance.  
It is critical to note at this point that our study is limited by a relatively low response rate from an 
already small sample. The underlying data for the probit models has 71 observations, and the OLS 
model is restricted to 67 observations, due to several non-responses regarding firm’s revenue source 
breakdown. This must be taken into account when making conclusions from the following results. 
This is one major justification for combining the quantitative analysis with expert interviews in an 
iterative process (Kim & Miner, 2007). At all stages, hypothesis development was supported by in-
depth discussions with experts, and the results were compared in detail to the statements collected 
in the interview stages.  
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The survey was emailed to a total of 611 email addresses, of which 42 proved to be no longer 
current. Alternative contacts were sought for these “bounced” emails, leading to a total of 583 
successfully sent emails.  During the long form questionnaire implementation phase, several 
respondents were logged as having accessed the survey, but did not proceed to complete it. This was 
one driver in following up with the shorter version. Several additional responses were incomplete to 
such a degree that they were not included in the final analysis.  
After cleaning and following up for missing responses where possible, a total of 71 usable responses 
were used for the subsequent analysis. This represents a response rate of 12.2%. Under the 
circumstances this is an acceptable response rate, as willingness to participate was perceived to be 
low. It is likely that it was significantly raised by the steps taken to ensure legitimacy of the survey, 
and the reduction in length for the short form survey. 
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Four respondents of the 71 did not include responses regarding the breakdown of their revenue 
sources (% MOD, % defence, % exports). We were unable to gain these figures through follow-up or 
secondary data sources. Therefore, the N in the third model to be presented is equal to 67.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 DUT2 defence to non-defence -
2 DUT2 non-defence to defence 0.4516* -
3 Strategic Reorientation -0.0294 0.1915 -
4 Organisational Identitiy -0.0358 0.0343 0.2663* -
5 Technological Excellence 0.1906 0.4208* 0.4557* 0.1950 -
6 Human Asset Specificity 0.0007 -0.0035 0.2480* 0.8562* 0.1083 -
7 Product Dimensions 0.1779 0.2907 0.3384* 0.6470* 0.2661* 0.6435* -
8 Service Dimensions 0.0585 0.1518 0.1726 0.8312* 0.2816* 0.7728* 0.7242* -
Mean 0.6478 0.74678 0.0035 0.0067 0.0397 0.000 0.0067 0.0073
S.D. 0.4810 0.4381 1.0066 0.8005 0.9482 1 1.0054 1.0052
Min. 0 0 -4.2616 -1.4502 -4.1175 -1.5864 -2.0258 -2.0057
Max 1 1 3.7603 1.4584 1.3951 2.2203 1.5884 1.4651
*p <0.05
 
Table 9: Correlation matrix, means and ranges 
5.2 Defence to non-defence DUT2 
Table 10 shows that in the main-effects model, it cannot be said with confidence that the coefficient 
relating to defence identity strength is not zero. This result in itself is surprising, as it would seem to 
indicate that a strong defence sector-specific identity does not affect the likelihood of DUT2 from 
defence to non-defence. Therefore, hypothesis 1a is not supported. However, the expected negative 
sign is present on the (albeit very small) coefficient. 
DUT2 D to non-D Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ID -0.00243 -0.0588 -0.295 -0.0856
(-0.00) (-0.12) (-0.69) (-0.40)
TO 0.470* 0.414* 0.406* 0.459*
(-1.67) (-1.69) (-1.66) (-1.92)
IDxTO -0.708** -0.707** -0.656** -0.713**
(-1.98) (-2.18) (-2.08) (-2.28)
HAS -0.166 -0.00166 0.0569
(-0.47) (-0.01) -0.18
ProDim 0.41 0.336 0.23
(-1.38) (-1.18) (-0.89)
SerDim -0.0946 -0.208 -0.0166
(-0.24) (-0.55) (-0.05)
LqR -0.123 -0.218
(-0.63) (-1.20)
Turnover 15.07
(-0.84)
Employees 2.975
(-0.45)
_cons 3.449 0.406** 0.396** 0.404**
(-1.22) (-2.39) (-2.35) (-2.4)
N 71 71 71 71
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
 
Table 10: Probit model of DUT2 from defence to non-defence 
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Also, the table shows that technology orientation does have a significant positive effect, which 
constitutes evidence for the argument that defence firms may be able to leverage their technological 
advantage (partially funded by and otherwise supported by defence agencies incentivised to act as 
early adopters of new technology). With this result, hypothesis 2 can be supported. 
It cannot be confidently asserted that the coefficient regarding human asset specificity is non-zero. 
Therefore, hypothesis 5 is not supported. Although several sources in the literature argue that a high 
level of employee skill specificity may hinder DUT2, several interviews have shown that this is not 
likely to be the case. This result could therefore potentially be seen as preliminary evidence that this 
previously held belief must be revised.  
The next column of Table 10 shows the results from the second specification, where the interaction 
between defence specific identity strength and technology orientation has been included. The 
coefficient of this interaction is negative, and significant, indicating that a strong defence sector-
specific identity weakens the positive effect of technology orientation on the likelihood of DUT2. It 
can be argued that the technology orientation is in effect a necessary condition of sorts in this 
model; however, it is not sufficient, as a strong defence sector-specific identity will inhibit DUT2, 
even in the presence of a strong technological foundation. This supports hypothesis 4a. 
Product dimensions and service dimensions of business functions also have no significant effect of 
DUT2, thus not supporting hypothesis 6. Again, this is surprising, in that it would be expected that a 
strong adaptation would hinder efforts to transfer technology to non-defence applications. However, 
these results would seem to support to premise that a significant portion of the defence-specific 
rigidity is cognitive in nature and located in the top-managerial domain, as well as in sector-specific 
managerial competencies.  
We also control for firm size (employees and revenue) as well as the firm’s liquidity ratio; however, 
there is no significant effect related to these variables.  
  
5.3 Non-defence to defence DUT2 
Table 11 shows the results from a model, which was set up similarly to the model in Table 10, 
however, with the DUT2 from non-defence to defence used as the dependent variable. The 
significant coefficients have the same sign as in the previous model, as is expected.  
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As in the previous model, defence sector-specific identity strength does not have a significant effect, 
such that we do not support hypothesis 1b. Again, this can be considered surprising, however falls in 
line with the theoretical concept that the identity itself does not constitute a direct effect, but as a 
moderating effect.  
We see that Technological Excellence has a positive effect and is significant, the magnitude of which 
is robust across specifications, therefore we support hypothesis 3. This constitutes evidence for the 
positive effect that the focus on the delivery of excellence constitutes a strong positive factor in 
relation to the likelihood of transferring technology into defence. In essence, technologies developed 
by these firms can access the demand for such technologies created by defence agencies. These 
agencies are in the market for high-end technologies, for example in the areas of surveillance and 
communications. Commercial solutions are often superior to specifically developed defence sector 
solutions in such fields.  
The coefficient on the interaction of defence sector-specific identity strength and Technological 
Excellence is also significant and negative. This supports hypothesis 4b in that the strength of identity 
weakens the positive relationship between Technological excellence and DUT2 from non-defence to 
defence. A firm with a strong defence sector-specific identity is likely to be inhibited by sector-
specific cognitive schemas and mental models, as well as structural and behavioural aspects that act 
to reduce the likelihood of DUT2 from non-defence to defence.  
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DUT2 non-D toD Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ID -0.868 -0.9 -0.491 -0.159
(-1.28) (-1.35) (-0.83) (-0.64)
TExc 0.940** 0.885** 0.834** 0.905***
(-2.51) (-2.5) (-2.39) (-2.66)
IDxTExc -0.697* -0.682* -0.650* -0.897**
(-1.70) (-1.78) (-1.67) (-2.38)
HAS -0.276 -0.211 -0.293
(-0.65) (-0.51) (-0.72)
ProDim 0.396 0.35 0.447
(-1.24) (-1.13) (-1.43)
SerDim 0.625 0.599 0.305
(-1.15) (-1.14) (-0.65)
LqR 0.485* 0.404
(-1.69) (-1.5)
Turnover -1.233
(-0.57)
Employees 3.559
(-1.05)
_cons 1.207** 0.887*** 0.844*** 0.857***
(-2.25) (-4.09) (-4.11) (-4.23)
N 71 71 71 71
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
 
Table 11: Probit model of DUT2 from non-defence to defence 
These results also show no evidence of effects of the adaptation of product or service dimensions on 
DUT2 from non-defence to defence, again not supporting hypothesis 6.  
The control variables relating to firm size are also not significant. Interestingly, employees have a 
positive sign and turnover a negative sign, but due to the large p-values these results do not allow 
any meaningful interpretation.  
We must point out that in the full main-effects specification, liquidity ratio has a positive effect and is 
significant. The effects of this variable can be conceptualised in terms of a proxy for slack resources, 
an abundance of which would be expected to function as an enabler for DUT2 projects. We did not 
however find consistently robust evidence for this effect.  
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5.4 Firm’s shifting focus toward non-defence activities 
Table 12 shows the results form an OLS regression using the firm’s intent to shift their activities from 
defence toward non-defence in the future. Principally, three variables appear to be significant in 
predicting the eagerness to shift.  
Strategic Re-orientation 
towards non-D activities
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ID
-0.148
-0.0904 -0.0819
(-0.49) (-0.31) (-0.29)
TExc
0.699***
0.459** 0.463**
(-4.11) (-2.47) (-2.56)
IDxTExc -0.605** -0.610***
(-2.63) (-2.72)
DefSales 0.118 0.113 0.127
(-0.48) (-0.48) (-0.56)
MODSales 0.412* 0.526** 0.525**
(-1.98) (-2.58) (-2.66)
Employees 0.459 0.178
(-0.28) (-0.11)
Turnover -0.416 -0.147
(-0.25) (-0.09)
LqR 0.0815 0.0715
(-0.49) (-0.45)
_cons 0.294* 0.396** 0.395**
(-1.84) (-2.52) (-2.57)
N 67 67 67
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
 
Table 12: Probit model of strategic reorientation towards non-defence activities 
Firstly, defence sector-specific identity has no significant direct effect on the intent to grow non-
defence activities, therefore not supporting hypothesis 9. Again, technological excellence seems to 
be a significant influencing factor, leading us to support hypothesis 10. This relationship falls in line 
with similar explanations for DUT2, i.e. the firms that have such a commitment to delivering 
technological excellence are more willing to find opportunities in non-defence sectors, and have a 
stronger belief that they possess potentially valuable technological resources. They are also more 
likely to have attractive candidate technologies that can be transferred. 
It would seem that a defence firm with a focus on high-quality operationally excellent activities 
involving cutting edge technologies are attracted by the potential opportunities to transfer these 
capabilities to non-defence applications.  
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In this case we also see a significant interaction effect between defence sector-specific identity 
strength and Technological Excellence. The negative sign on the effect can be interpreted in the 
following terms: A strong sector-specific identity weakens the positive effect of technological 
excellence on the firm’s intent to strategically reorient away from defence, therefore we support 
hypothesis 11.  
The direct effect and the interaction effect are both robust in the presence of control variables for 
size and liquidity ratio.  
Interestingly, it can be seen that the issue of the effect of dependence on defence revenues is 
relatively complex. The exposure to overall defence revenues would not seem to be a significant 
driver in this context. This can be explained by the fact that a move to non-defence is a form of 
diversification, but that such firms have other options in international markets. However, 
dependence specifically on UK MOD revenues does have a significant positive effect, and in fact a 
strong one, therefore we support hypothesis 8. This provides evidence for the assertion that the 
reduction in UK defence spending is having a real effect on firm’s strategic orientations in the 
defence sector, in that it is driving firms to strategically reorient themselves away from defence 
business. 
Table 13 shows an overview of the hypothesis tests indicating whether they were supported or not: 
H1a: Strength of defence sector-specific identity will be negatively associated with a firm’s
likelihood of engaging in DUT2 projects from defence to non-defence
not supported
H1b: Strength of defence sector-specific identity will be negatively associated with a firm’s
likelihood of engaging in DUT2 projects from non-defence to defence
not supported
H2: Technology orientation will be positively associated with the likelihood of the firm
engaging in DUT2 projects from defence to non-defence
supported
H3: Technological excellence will be positively associated with the likelihood of the firm
engaging in DUT2 projects from non-defence to defence
supported
H4a: Strength of defence sector-specific identity moderates the effect of technology
orientation on the likelihood of the firm engaging in DUT2 projects from defence to non-
defence, in that high identity strength will weaken the positive effect of technology
orientation
supported
H4b: Strength of defence sector-specific identity moderates the effect of technological
excellence on the likelihood of the firm engaging in DUT2 projects from non-defence to
defence, in that high identity strength will weaken the positive effect of technological
excellence
supported
H5: Human asset specificity, as embodied in the optimisation to the defence sector of
employee knowledge and skills, will be negatively associated with the likelihood of the firm
engaging in DUT2 projects
no supported
H6: Business function specificity (procedural asset specificity), manifested in highly optimised
defence-sector-specific core functions, will be negatively associated with the likelihood of the
firm engaging in DUT2 projects
not supported
H7: A strong value placed on secrecy will be negatively associated with the likelihood of the
firm engaging in DUT2.
dropped
H8: A higher percentage of revenues from UK MOD will be associated with a stronger intent
to reorient to non-defence revenues
supported
H9: A strong defence sector-specific identity will be negatively associated with the intent to
reorient to non-defence revenues
not supported
H10: Technological excellence will be positively associated with the intent to reorient to non-
defence revenues
supported
H11: Strength of defence sector-specific identity moderates the effect of technological
excellence on the intent to strategically reorient to non-defence activities, in that high identity
strength will weaken the positive effect of technological excellence
supported
 
Table 13: Hypothesis test results 
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6 Discussion 
This section will present a discussion based on the results reported above. Once again, it is necessary 
to highlight that due to the relatively small N on which the analysis is based, we have sought to find 
supporting evidence from interviewees and other secondary sources wherever possible. 
The structure of this section mirrors the structure of the analysis and results section. First, the 
phenomenon of DUT2 is discussed in relation to the factors which influence this transfer. We then go 
on to discuss the results from the models of DUT2 first from defence to non-defence, then from non-
defence to defence. Subsequently, we take the discussion further by examining the factors which 
influence firms’ intent to move toward a higher proportion of non-defence activities.  
6.1 Factors influencing the likelihood of DUT2 
One major goal of this study was to identify the factors, which influence the likelihood that a firm will 
transfer technology from defence to non-defence applications, and vice versa. Particular emphasis 
was placed on the role of the strength of a firm’s defence sector-specific identity. These results show 
that identity is not likely to be directly associated with this likelihood. However, this identity does 
have a moderating effect on the relationship between technology orientation and DUT2, in that it 
weakens the positive relationship. 
Unlike other studies, this project has generated empirical evidence for this relationship. It can be said 
that the “wall of separation” (Alic et al., 1992) does in fact exist to a certain extent, but that it 
functions as a filter, or as a refractive medium that influences the trajectory and delivery of the firm’s 
capabilities. One major potential advantage that defence firms can gain and maintain is access to 
R&D funding and procurement markets for high technology products and services. The “cash flow 
valley of death” (Murphy & Edwards, 2003) concept may be involved at this stage, as the firms may 
be able to conduct R&D which may not have been economically feasible in non-defence markets. 
Defence agencies, as explained earlier, are willing to fund R&D, and to subsequently procure military 
equipment that integrates sophisticated technologies. In essence, this external funding and market-
making can drive technological development and the creation of technological capabilities in these 
firms. By developing technologies in such an environment, defence firms can subsequently possess 
technologies and technological capabilities that would not have been developed in other 
environments. Thus, provided there is demand for such technologies and capabilities, it can provide 
the basis for competitive advantage.  
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There are however barriers to this exploitation. These barriers are partially incorporated in the 
defence identity construct, which embodies the defence sector-specific cognitive schemas and 
mental models, which develop and are entrenched in this highly institutionalised, idiosyncratic 
market. These factors constitute the “wall of separation”, but this study provides evidence of the 
aforementioned filter- or refraction effect that the wall has on DUT2.  
Other barriers to DUT2 suggested in the literature have been tested in this study. Human asset 
specificity was built into the probit models in this study. However, this factor does not seem to have 
an effect on the likelihood of DUT2. The argument which is present in some of the literature, namely 
that defence sector specialists may be cognitively biased against non-defence projects, and therefore 
may inhibit DUT2 can therefore be disputed. In fact, several interviewees have claimed that the skills 
and knowledge embedded in these employees could be transferred to non-defence projects. It 
would seem that a capable engineer with a technical function is not subject to the cognitive rigidities 
to which top-level managers are subject in their efforts to set firm strategy. This would illustrate the 
differing effects of defence industry specific firm identity at different levels of an organisation. 
Unfortunately, this issue was beyond the scope of this study, would however be a valuable avenue 
for future research.  
 
6.1.1 Defence to non-defence technology transfer 
We see from the results in the previous section that the transfer of technology from defence to non-
defence applications is affected similarly to technology transfer in the other direction. The major 
difference in this model is however that the delivery of technological excellence is not an appropriate 
construct in this direction. This is likely due to the fact that defence agencies are often in the market 
for technologically sophisticated products, and are willing to pay a premium and act as early 
adopters. Therefore, it can be argued that the defence market is characterised by a lower level of 
price elasticity when compared to the average of the wider economy.  
Many defence firms in fact communicate narratives which underline this commitment to the delivery 
of excellence. While a similar approach may be important in the context of transferring technology 
into the defence sector, in order to gain legitimacy and match the technical sophistication in many 
defence projects, this construct is not likely to positively affect transfer of technology to the wider 
economy on average. Several interviewees discussed this issue, in particular making the point that 
many defence firms are highly adapted to the defence context and are relatively inefficient in terms 
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of productions costs. Additionally, existing literature as well as interviews have emphasised the point 
that production runs in the defence sector are often relatively small, also increasing unit costs.  
However, technology orientation can be seen to have a positive effect on technology transfer from 
defence to non-defence. This emphasis on technological sophistication can constitute the foundation 
for competitive advantage in non defence markets due to the fact that defence firms can often 
receive funding to develop technologies which may not have been feasible in non-defence sectors. 
This would support the assertion that the defence sector can be a source of innovative technologies, 
which may then spread to the wider economy, which is anecdotally captured in the histories of 
technologies such as the internet, radar and the jet engine. However, the adaptation of these 
technologies to non-defence uses has usually been linked to a significant increase in scale effects, 
and decreases in unit costs which increase accessibility. Although it can be argued that many such 
technologies, such as the jet engine, are still significantly capital-intensive to procure for non-defence 
uses, the increase in standardisation, larger production runs, and considerable increases in efficiency 
of production have led to their diffusion into non-defence sectors. Additionally, often such 
technologies diffuse into markets which can be seen as relatively similar to defence, for example 
civilian aerospace, security or maritime sectors.  
However, the ability to leverage such technologies in non-defence would seem to be influenced with 
the strength of a firm’s defence sector-specific identity. This interaction effect negatively affects the 
positive effect of technology orientation on the likelihood of DUT2 from defence to non-defence, 
meaning that the management of a firm with a strong identity in this context is likely to be 
influenced by cognitive schemas leading to a lack of the realisation of opportunities to diffuse such 
technologies, and subsequently a lack of success in attempting to do so. As in DUT2 in the opposite 
direction, this effect of identity can be seen as an embodiment of a phenomenon which has in the 
past been described as a “wall of separation”, however its lack of direct effect on DUT2 seems to 
indicate that it affects technology transfer in an indirect manner, constituting a “drag” like effect on 
this transfer, in the presence of other factors which amount to the necessary conditions to successful 
transfer.  
We find no evidence of an effect of human asset specificity on the likelihood of DUT2. This highlights 
the view, also supported by interviews, that this form of asset specificity does not pose a barrier to 
DUT2, in either direction. This would then lead to the assumption that the locus of the filter- or drag 
effect is situated in the managerial domain more than the technical domain. Although there will be 
technical specialists in the defence sector whose skills are not applicable in non-defence sectors, it 
would seem that the training and experience engineers receive in order to work on complex 
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technical issues has a low degree of domain-specificity in this context. As an example, a expert in 
stealth technology, which in itself is unlikely to have applications in non-defence contexts, is almost 
certain to have a skill set based on either radar technology or materials science.  
Similarly, and perhaps surprisingly, we find no evidence of a negative relationship between product- 
or service dimensions in business functions and DUT2 from defence to non-defence. This may 
highlight further that the main barrier to DUT2 is located in the managerial domain, but the 
possibility of perceptual bias of respondents cannot be excluded. Unfortunately, particularly as this 
result does not seem to align with interviewee statements, our results regarding the effect (or the 
lack of an effect) of such adaptations are inconclusive.  
Overall, we can argue that these results indicate that the strength of the firm’s identity can affect the 
likelihood and success of technology transfer. It therefore also affects the firm’s ability to leverage its 
capabilities in markets which are considered to be inconsistent with the firm’s super-ordinate social 
identity (Kane, 2010), i.e. outside the firm’s identity domain (Livengood & Reger, 2010). The defence 
sector serves as a critical case in terms of sector-specific identity, as it is still an idiosyncratic 
environment characterised by strong institutional forces and rigorous requirements for conformity to 
regulations and norms. The adaptation to this environment, in cognitive and behavioural terms, has 
been shown here to negatively affect the transfer of technology and the redeployment of capabilities 
outside of this familiar environment.  
 
6.1.2 Non-defence to defence technology transfer 
The positive relationship between technological excellence and DUT2 from non-defence to defence 
applications indicates that firms with a strong focus on technology have been incentivised to transfer 
technology into the defence sector. This aligns well with government aims to procure more 
technology from non-defence sources (e.g. SDSR (Great Britain. HM Government, 2010)) as well as 
statements from many of the experts interviewed in this study. It would seem that there is scope for 
this transfer of technology, as many non-defence firms are technologically as advanced – or in fact 
more advanced in many fields which are of interest to defence procurement agencies. Such firms can 
then generate revenues by meeting this demand. The following quote from an industry expert 
emphasises this point:  
“The main driver is from commercial to defence, as commercial solutions are well in 
advance of military solutions in many areas of surveillance, communications and user 
interfaces (software).” 
  118 
This underpins the significance of the firm’s technological excellence on DUT2, as defence agencies 
will be in the market for advanced, “envelope-pushing” solutions to their often unique and complex 
problems. If superior technology is available outside the defence sector, and this technology fulfils a 
demand, it is likely that the transfer of such a technology will be supported. The alternative of 
developing such technologies “in-house”, and not leveraging existing capabilities from other sources 
is likely to carry with it considerable costs, which constitute a growing problem in the current and 
recent defence sector procurement landscape. The following quote of a senior defence firm manager 
and academic underscores this effect: 
“Accordingly, we find it relatively easy to present these benefits and, with the exception 
of some programmes that are not realistic, sell the cost-benefit analysis of exploiting 
such technology.” 
In order to gain legitimacy in such a context, the transfer object must be technologically rare and 
valuable, in that it must be superior to existing defence sector solutions. As this thesis has focused on 
high technologies as opposed to commodities or generic products, this point underlies the effect of 
technological excellence. Although a pure technology orientation within defence firms can lead to 
the development of technologies which may not exist outside the sector, in order to gain legitimacy 
in defence, the majority of suppliers consciously communicate this commitment to the delivery of 
excellence in their products, services and activities. The following examples of statements from 
defence contractor websites fall in line with this: 
Rolls Royce (n.d.):  
“Trusted to deliver excellence”  
Babcock (n.d.):  
“For over a century, Babcock has been a name synonymous with ultra-reliable engineering 
excellence” 
Finmeccanica UK (2012, p.1) :  
“Solutions through technology excellence – Proven performance. Worldwide” 
These three firms often operate as prime contractors and as such are likely to act as gatekeepers to 
the wider supply chain. As such they are likely to be heavily exposed to – and affected by – the 
isomorphic pressures of the UK MOD. Many lower-tier suppliers will also communicate such a 
commitment to excellence to varying degrees, but in order to enter such defence supply chains, this 
commitment to be superior in a given field is likely to improve the likelihood of a firm having 
something to offer which can be potentially valuable, and for such a transfer object to be accepted.  
It is interesting that defence sector-specific identity does not have a significant effect on the 
likelihood of DUT2 from non-defence to defence applications. This result seems to refute the concept 
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of a “wall of separation” between defence and non-defence industries, based on cognitive and 
cultural effects. It would seem, at least in the UK context, that this identity-effect does not pose a 
significant barrier to DUT2 in this direction, at least not as a direct effect. 
However, there is a significant interaction effect between defence sector-specific identity strength 
and the positive effect of technological excellence on the likelihood of DUT2 from non-defence to 
defence applications. This interaction, which weakens the positive effect of technological excellence, 
indicates that a strong defence sector-specific identity can inhibit the transfer of technology if there 
are existing prerequisites for such a transfer – in this case strong technological orientation. This can 
be seen as evidence that although there is statistically no direct effect, a strong identity can 
constitute a barrier, however, we propose this barrier is less of a “wall of separation” and more of a 
filter, or refractive medium. Given a potential candidate technology to transfer, identity can inhibit 
this transfer, as the concept captures cognitive rigidity of top level managers. [i.e. they may not see 
the applicability of the tech in the defence setting, or do not look for tech solutions in non-traditional 
fields].  
Human asset specificity does not significantly affect the likelihood of DUT2 from non-defence to 
defence applications. This would seem to support the statements made by several experts consulted 
in this study that defence sector-specific skill specificity is not necessarily a barrier to DUT2. In fact, 
one interviewee asserted that it is likely that jobs cut by defence firms will be absorbed by the 
civilian sector. It would seem that technical knowledge embedded in employees poses no significant 
barrier to DUT2. This is made very clear by the following quote from another senior manager: 
“Technology [transfer] = jobs [transfer], and the rest is academic” 
Therefore it would seem that technical skills do not pose a significant barrier, and that bottlenecks 
are more likely to appear in the areas of market knowledge and managerial factors. 
It is important to note that we find no evidence for an effect of the adaptation of either the product- 
or service dimensions, captured in business function adaptation, on DUT2. It is very likely that there 
is an underlying influence here that we were not able to detect. A more granular analysis may be 
required to capture the precise locations of rigidities within the DUT2 context.  
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6.2 The effect of dependence on defence revenues on firms’ intention to 
strategically refocus away from defence 
We see that a strong emphasis on technology and technological excellence is driving firms to grow 
their non-defence businesses. These firms are likely to seek new opportunities in non-defence 
markets in the future. Their belief in the value of their technological resources therefore underlies 
the perceived opportunity to create value in new non-defence markets, or to grow their activities in 
existing non-defence markets.  
However, we can see that a strong defence sector-specific identity moderates this effect, in that a 
strong identity weakens the positive effect. Again, this provides evidence for the hypothesised filter- 
or refraction effect related to a strong organisational identity. Although this effect may be driven by 
path dependency relating to a defence-centric strategic orientation, it is likely that this is also 
underpinned by cognitive rigidity of top level managers.  
Regarding the effect of defence sales on the keenness of firms to diversify away from defence to 
non-defence activities, it is noteworthy that dependence on MOD revenues seems to be deterring 
firms from continuing to strategically focus on defence. As the same is not true of dependence on 
defence revenues in general, it can be deduced that firms in the defence industry are being 
incentivised to diversify away from their traditional core business: sales of defence equipment to 
“traditional” home markets. This diversification can take the form of geographic diversification, 
which can be seen in the growth of defence firms to non-traditional markets, such as Brazil, Turkey, 
and several states in SE Asia, but also in product diversification outside of defence. A firm heavily 
dependent on MOD (and therefore less exposed to international revenues) is therefore highly likely 
to be driven to seek opportunities in DUT2 projects. However, they are also likely to be investigating 
the possibilities of geographic diversification. This is challenging, due to many political factors, 
however can be seen in the development of many defence firms over the last decades, whereby 
more or less all large organisations have significantly “hedged their bets” geographically.  
It is imperative to consider the timing of the study regarding this relationship. Recent government 
White Papers and other political narratives seem to be sending a strong signal that likely constitutes 
a large proportion of the effect measured here.  
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7 Implications 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
This project has contributed to management theory in several ways. We present a study of the 
antecedents of technology transfer in the idiosyncratic defence sector. Such studies have been rare, 
and we see that a strong technology orientation can increase the likelihood of successful technology 
transfer. This in itself is not surprising; however, we find evidence that organisational identity affects 
the likelihood and success of technology transfer, by moderating this effect. The analysis of this 
phenomenon specifically in the defence sector has allowed us to identify this relationship, as the 
defence sector can be seen as a critical case regarding strong organisational identities.  
This is a twofold contribution, as we have presented evidence that identity affects technology 
transfer into the defence sector and out of it. The effect of DUT2 from non-defence is affected by 
identity acting as a filter, or refractive medium, i.e. identity is a component of technological 
capabilities, and can in fact be seen as a dimension of these capabilities. Technological capabilities 
developed specifically in the defence sector can be seen to have this attribute, or “flavour”, and this 
may distinguish them from comparable capabilities developed in other sectors, but based in similar 
technological fields. In essence, a defence sector capability in radar, or human interfaces, although 
developed involving human assets which may be transferrable to similar non-defence applications, 
potentially also using similar or identical capital assets etc, can be qualitatively different from such a 
capability developed in non-defence contexts. This is due to a variation on the identity dimension of 
the capability. This can then hinder transfer of this capability to non-defence applications, despite 
the innate “transferability” of staff and potentially of equipment. This adds a new dimension to the 
concept of “turning swords into ploughshares”, but has management research consequences which 
reach into other sectors with specific identity domains.  
We also present evidence that asset specificity as a barrier to technology transfer, and as a factor 
inhibiting resource fungibility, cannot be seen in isolation of cognitive rigidity of organisational 
members. Organisational social identity can act to strengthen asset specificity, but can act as an 
emergent phenomenon. Therefore, this poses challenges to the measurement of asset specificity, as 
this emergent effect may not be identifiable at the same unit of analysis as the assets themselves, i.e. 
employees with specialised knowledge are embedded in networks of people, and routines and 
physical resources are embedded in the organisation – and the social identity of the organisation can 
only be appropriately viewed at the level of the organisation, as it is a property of the social group, 
and may not be measurable from the observation of individual components of the group. It does 
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however have effects on the fungibility of these resources in the context of the individual 
organisation.  
The other strand of this contribution to management research relates to a firm’s willingness and 
ability to adopt technologies within specific identity domains. As the defence sector constitutes a 
strong and well defined identity domain, this identity effect weakens the positive relationship of 
technological excellence on the transfer of technology to such defence applications. Essentially, 
similarly to the “not invented here” phenomenon, certain technologies with specific “heritage” may 
be seen as inappropriate, despite the potential for these to solve challenging defence problems. This 
is another side to the fungibility argument, as managerial cognitive schemas and mental models may 
preclude the potential for technology to be adapted and transferred. This is likely driven by the 
strong institutional forces in the sector. And this phenomenon is present in a sector which is subject 
to distinct government pressures to increase the adoption of non-defence originating technologies 
wherever this may be feasible.   
This again can be expanded to other sectors with strong identity effects. It is also feasible that this 
affects not only the adoption of technologies, but also of best practices, non-obligatory standards, 
external consultancy, etc. Perhaps this would even expand to the adoption of employment of staff 
with specific personality traits, or certain brands of equipment, for instance the firm’s decision to use 
only a particular brand of personal computer. Therefore, we can expand the underlying questions 
relating to organisational identity, i.e. “who we are as an organisation” to include such items as “how 
we do things as an organisation”. 
Regarding the defence sector-specific literature, this project contributes to the conceptualisation of 
the “wall of separation”. The existence of this phenomenon has been a subject of intense debate, 
and our results contribute by adding the qualitative dimension of the “wall” actually functioning 
more as a refractive medium or filter. It would seem to exist, but is not impermeable, instead it 
creates additional energy requirements to overcome it, and potentially the need to plan in detail the 
trajectory of the transfer object to achieve the intended goals of transfer.  
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7.2 Practical Implications 
7.2.1 Firms involved in the defence industry 
Our results indicate that firms involved in the defence industry must be aware of the effects of 
exposure to the strong institutional forces within the sector. Although it is clear that adaptation to 
the requirements, regulative and normative, is necessary to compete and sell to defence agencies, 
managers of such firms must be mindful of the wider ranging effects of such adaptation and focus. 
There will also be cognitive effects, stemming from involvement in the defence industry, combined 
with the strong technical focus which is often associated with engineering-led firms.  
The negative interaction effect between defence sector-specific identity and technology orientation 
in DUT2 from defence to non-defence shows that firms developing technologies and applying them 
to defence solutions may be beset by the effects of path dependency, and cognitive rigidity. It is 
likely that often, such firms may benefit from scanning for potential applications for their 
technologies which they may not have imagined previously. To this end they may have to acquire 
capabilities in marketing in non-defence markets, as well as market knowledge which may be lacking. 
This is however of course not a panacea solution, as many defence firms have attempted this 
through technology brokering, joint ventures, licensing and many other technology transfer 
mechanisms. However, this study provides empirical evidence to underline the existence of this 
identity effect, and the more precisely define its nature.  
We also provide evidence for a negative and significant interaction effect of defence sector-specific 
identity on the positive main effect of technological excellence, in the case of DUT2 from non-
defence to defence. This result, combined with the above result, adds depth to the phenomenon. 
Not only does it reduce the ability to explore the external environment for potential new markets, it 
also inhibits a firm’s ability to identify and leverage potential non-defence technologies, which may 
provide lucrative opportunities in defence. In order to transfer technology into defence, at least in 
the high-tech context, it is necessary to have some technological advantage over solutions already 
present in defence. If this is the case, it is necessary to be aware of the effects that identity strength 
can have. Similarly to the “not invented here” concept, it would seem that some individuals or 
entities in the defence sector are less able to identify and positively evaluate the potential for the 
adaption of technologies originating in non-defence sectors.  
Schemes such as the Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE) have of course improved this, as has the 
general shift in defence procurement to communications, surveillance, and other electronics-based 
  124 
technologies. In an interview a manager of a small defence contractor that also engages in 
commercial markets supported this by stating that:  
“the CDE is an excellent scheme for MOD to fund prototype developments, engage with 
the wider industry and has allowed our organisation to develop IP and products for our 
organisation ... [that…] a 3-person company cannot afford to do […] internally.”  
Recent MOD publications such as the SDSR (Great Britain. HM Government, 2010) and the Currie 
report (Currie, 2011) have also outlined the intent to procure more from “non-traditional” sources 
and to acquire commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and products wherever possible. But 
there is likely to be an inertia effect in the realisation of these aims. As many behaviours and 
cognitive schemas are institutionalised in the defence sector, the attempt to transfer technology into 
defence is still likely to be met with challenges based on a lack of communication, understanding and 
experience.  
 
7.2.2 Ministry of Defence and Wider Government 
Our research shows that MOD procurement practices and the wider institutional effects to which 
defence contractors are subjected may drive a sector-specific identity in such firms and subsequently 
constitute a negative effect on the likelihood and success of technology transfer into – and out of the 
defence sector.  
We have presented evidence that this effect takes the form of an interaction, whereby potentially 
successful candidate technologies may form the basis of a successful transfer of technology, but that 
this identity effect inhibits such transfers. This may lead to two overarching effects which may reduce 
positive outcomes for the MOD and the UK Government as a whole: 1) Reducing the scope for access 
to technologies originating in non-defence sectors; and 2) reducing the return on investment for 
defence technologies which may have been applicable to non-defence sectors (including the indirect 
effects of the diffusion of technological innovation throughout the economy).  
Although it is naturally necessary for governments and defence agencies to regulate the defence 
industry, and to seek value for tax-payers money, there must be an awareness of the effects of the 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive institutional characteristics. The UK has a relatively open 
and competitive defence procurement landscape compared to many other countries, due to the 
relatively low regulation concerning foreign suppliers and initiatives such as the Centre for Defence 
Enterprise which aims to engage “non-traditional” suppliers; however, defence will always be an 
idiosyncratic, complex landscape.  
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Therefore, in order to maximise the rate of defence sector adoption of technologies developed 
outside of defence, it is likely to be necessary to reduce the cognitive and regulative barriers which 
face non-traditional suppliers. In fact, often the administrative burden can pose a significant 
challenge, as stated by a senior defence firm manager: 
“The level of paperwork and administration on military programmes is also stifling at 
times. Some defence technology has moved in the other direction, but the costs 
associated with small production runs and the specific nature of the product has caused 
issues in obtaining market acceptance of the technology”. 
This underlines another significant barrier to DUT2, which also stems from MOD requirements. Small 
production runs do not allow firms to spread their overheads over large production volumes, and 
often a great deal of R&D spending is spent on meeting high customisation requirements laid out by 
defence agencies. This increases the difficulty of taking on military work. 
This can also have a negative effect on defence to non-defence DUT2, as firms engaged in military 
projects may in fact have developed novel, innovative technologies, but may have also spend 
significant amounts on R&D work aimed at meeting MOD customisation and specialisation 
requirements which may be redundant or in fact irrelevant in non-defence contexts.  
These points serve to underline that the already well-known phenomenon of “over-specification” can 
still pose a significant barrier to firms wishing to transfer technology into and out of defence.  
The strategic reorientation model has shown that firms heavily dependent on MOD revenues are 
likely to intend to refocus away from defence activities in the future. The implications of this are 
potentially far reaching. The UK Government and MOD have often stated their intention to retain on-
shore capabilities in critical defence industries due to national security concerns (Great Britain. HM 
Government, 2010). However the shift away from a defence focus for these firms could be construed 
as being caused by a strategic devaluation of domestic defence business going forward. This effect 
should be closely monitored in the future.  
In addition to this, as this study shows that there is growing evidence that the flow of technology into 
defence is of greater magnitude that the flow of technology out of defence, the future of specialised 
defence firms is potentially turbulent. Although the largest global defence firms represent some of 
the largest firms on the planet, much of the technology deployed by armed forces can be traced to 
non-defence origins. This is one symptom of a wider change in the relationship between the military 
and wider society. Whereas the idea of an insular defence industry protected by and funded by 
government was certainly the case many decades ago, this privileged position has been degrading. 
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Large defence manufacturers are now privately owned, profit-maximising entities, and not under 
direct government control. These points raise significant questions regarding the control of 
strategically critical but also potentially dangerous technologies. Although governments do heavily 
regulate defence exports, many actors in the industry operate from several “home” markets, and 
procure components from a range of suppliers that are also globally dispersed. This level of 
complexity and distributed control must raise questions regarding transparency and the implications 
of domestic level regulation and legislation.  
Another point, which we believe is relevant, pertains to the level of defence spending itself. 
Throughout the study we have assumed that defence spending occurs, and sought to explore and 
analyse the effects of this spending. However, if it is assumed that the technology requirements of 
defence and non-defence customers are more similar now than several decades ago, the question 
must be posed: Is the allocation – particularly of R&D funding – effective given that there are 
possibilities of duplication. Assuming a growing magnitude of technology transfer into defence, it can 
be argued that non-defence commercial entities may be equally, if not more capable of delivering 
the capabilities defence agencies require. Perhaps more communication, collaboration and 
cooperation in all stages of the R&D process should be considered to assure efficient allocation of 
resources.  
In order to gain from the non-defence technological base in the UK, MOD not only has to the practice 
of “smart acquisition” and behaving as a “smart customer”, but to employ effective, contemporary 
management principles in order to co-evolve with the wider industry. We hope that by carrying out 
this project based on contemporary management research methods and theory, a debate can be 
stimulated which can result in closer relations between MOD and the management community. 
Significant cooperation between business schools and other academic institutions with a focus on 
management has been fruitful in sectors such as healthcare, and it would be beneficial to expand this 
government-academic relationship in the defence sector context. This study has shown that the 
defence sector is a prime example of the management research concept of organisational identity, 
and brings to bear the findings from the literature in this field. As it would be beneficial for MOD to 
make use of this resource, cooperation with the MOD is likely to be the foundation of future research 
output into this and other related phenomenon. We believe this is an opportunity which should be 
pursued.  
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7.2.3 The armed forces 
There are also significant implications from this work for the UK armed forces. In times of significant 
budgetary pressures, it is imperative that MOD procurement strategy achieves value for money. The 
acquisition of technologies from non-defence sources may, if they are effective, contribute to this. 
Initiatives such as CDE demonstrate that the MOD is aware of this opportunity and of the challenges 
associated. However, doing business with commercial firms may bring with it challenges which MOD 
is not accustomed to, as we have shown that defence contractors, particularly prime contractors, are 
heavily affected by isomorphic pressures resulting from the institutional forces present in the sector. 
Firms with less experience in selling to MOD may be disincentivised to become involved due to 
detailed specifications, complex regulations and strong cultural differences. 
It is important to note at this point that the UK defence procurement landscape is relatively 
competitive and already has relatively strong ties to wider industry, compared to many other 
comparable nations. This bodes well for the future exploitation of technological innovation and 
cooperation between defence oriented- and wider research programmes, as well as firms, academic 
institutions and other stakeholders in general. In fact, there is strong evidence that technology 
developed in non-defence contexts is percolating into the defence sector.  
However, the diffusion of technologies into defence must be seen as an alternative to in-house 
development. It has been shown that defence R&D spending is correlated with military capability, 
with a lag of roughly 10 years. The move to source more and more technology from non-defence 
sources, and opt for COTS solutions where feasible complicates this picture, which is already affected 
by decreasing defence expenditure. As technological advantage can be seen as a force multiplier, 
enhancing or maintaining military capability going forward, it is necessary to be aware of the 
implications of sourcing more and more technology from open markets. Without the radical 
innovation which has at times characterised the defence sector, the armed forces may have to re-
evaluate what position, and which aims, are feasible for the UK in the future.  
As this study indicated that there may be a significant shift away from MOD contracting due to 
perceived decline in the market, the UK armed forces must realise that the DIB may become less 
focused on delivering to the needs of the UK military. This is likely to increase the pressures for the 
UK to procure equipment from overseas, which may jeopardise onshore capabilities. It is already 
apparent that the RAF’s next generation of combat aircraft will be procured from the USA, in the 
form of the JSF programme. Although BAE Systems is involved in the programme, the loss of a UK 
onshore capability in airframe development is likely to reduce the RAF’s ability to influence and 
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specify the nature of the equipment it procures. There are also many further strategic considerations 
of losing such onshore capabilities.   
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8 Limitations 
A primary limitation of this study was the restriction to a small sample size, confounded by the fact 
that it was challenging to attain a high response rate for the survey. We take care to indicate that this 
affects the degree to which the quantitative results can be interpreted, and conclusions made. We 
sought to compensate for this by employing an iterative approach throughout, combining the 
quantitative methods with exploratory and confirmatory interviews with a range of experts in 
industry, academia and other defence sector stakeholders. However, a large sample size would have 
been beneficial in terms of statistical results, and perhaps future studies could expand including a 
cross-country analysis, and/or with more formal and persuasive political or industrial support and 
coordination. 
Additionally, as we used quantitative methods and a broadly implemented survey to investigate 
highly complex organisational phenomena, we may have missed certain detailed conclusions which 
would have been possible with an approach enabling a more granular view. We compensated for this 
again by supporting the study with a significant amount of expert interviews, however, future studies 
may add to our contributions by e.g. conducting more in-depth case studies to map out the 
complexities of the DUT2 phenomenon qualitatively, particularly with the view to capture changes 
over time, as we have shown that the sector is in a transition state. 
In line with the above two points, it would be very beneficial to collect quantitative data over time to 
generate panel data. Not only would this capture changes over time, but also allow more robust 
conclusions to be made regarding temporal causality. This study was limited to a cross-sectional 
approach. 
Another limiting factor was our design choice to target top managers in defence firms. Future 
research, particularly the aforementioned in-depth qualitative approaches, could aim to distinguish 
between identity effects at different levels of the target firms. As we discuss that organisational 
identity can be an emergent property of a system, such a project could add significant value to 
mapping out the percolation of identity effects throughout an organisation, and also to capture the 
effects of the plethora of inter-organisational links between organisations, which do not only occur 
at management level. 
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9 Conclusion 
This study was conducted to investigate which firm-level factors influence the likelihood and success 
of DUT2. We have presented evidence that the phenomenon is primarily driven by the presence of a 
strong technology orientation, or the commitment to technological excellence at the firm level. 
Therefore, technology transfer is more likely if a technological advantage can be leveraged for 
competitive advantage in the target market. We have also shown that the firm’s sector-specific 
identity inhibits this effect. This relationship, and its nature as an interaction effect, contributes both 
the defence sector-specific literature and the management research literature. We provide empirical 
evidence that a firm’s identity can affect its ability to seek new opportunities in non-traditional 
markets, and to transfer technology into domains with strong sector-specific identities. 
We find no evidence that human asset specificity or business function specificity acts as an inhibitor 
in this context. We do however suggest that these factors should be considered in more detail in 
future studies, as the quantitative research techniques used in this study may not capture the 
granularity and complexity of such adaptations within the complex environment of individual firms 
operating in this complex landscape. However, we can conclude that the asset specificity and 
capabilities must be seen in the context of the emergent property of organisational identity.  
Evidence is also presented which would indicate that recent developments in the UK defence 
landscape are driving firms to diversify to non-defence activities and weaken their focus on the 
domestic UK defence market. This is likely due to strong signalling effects generated by narratives 
communicated by the current government. This is in line with a long-term reorientation of the UK 
defence market away from its traditional, classic isolated and heavily government-controlled roots, 
to a private sector, globally diversified industrial base of technologically sophisticated, innovative 
defence contractors, whose complex relationship with government and MOD is changing.  
The future of the UK defence sector is likely to be turbulent; however, government initiatives to 
improve the engagement with “non-traditional” suppliers, opening up lucrative defence supply 
chains, and coordinating research and development activities may allow the innovations synonymous 
with the defence industry to continue to benefit the wider UK economy. However, as this sector is 
idiosyncratic and still characterised by strong institutional forces and a centralised buyer who also 
acts as a regulator, it will remain to be a unique and complex landscape. The results of this study 
indicate that the identity of firms and other stakeholders in the industry must be taken into account, 
if we wish to maximise the benefit which can be driven by highly skilled engineers, working for well 
organised firms, delivering technological innovation and excellence to an institution uniquely 
positioned to carry UK engineering innovation far into the 21st century.
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Dear Participant, 
 
You are invited to complete the enclosed survey as part of a study into the effects of 
defence spending on the wider UK economy.  
 
This study focuses specifically on the transfer of technology between defence and 
non-defence (incl. dual use) applications, in both directions (Dual Use Technology 
Transfer – DUT2). This study seeks to produce primary empirical evidence on this 
important phenomenon – how much of it is going on, when it is likely to occur, and 
what are its consequences.  
 
This project is publicly funded (ESPRC), and the results will be made available after 
the project’s completion.  
 
All answers will remain strictly confidential. Results will be presented in aggregate 
format only. No references will be made to individual replies. Anonymity will be 
preserved.  
 
This issue is of great importance to the UK defence community, and your responses 
will be greatly appreciated. For questions, please contact Liam Harris via 
liam.harris@imperial.ac.uk or +44 (0)79 xxx xxx xx.  
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Section A  
A1. Name of the organisation and, if applicable, your specific business unit: 
      
A2. Please list the core technology- and service sectors, in which your business 
operates, for example Radar (maritime), Photo-optronics (all sectors), armour etc.: 
      
A3. How would you estimate the following figures?  
Please estimate the percentage… Percentage 
... of your organisation’s revenue currently generated by defence sales      % 
… of your organisation’s revenue from defence three years ago (if known 
– please think about if this figure has changed over the last three years)      % 
... of revenue currently generated by sales directly to UK MOD (if known)      % 
... of your organisation’s revenue generated by defence exports      % 
A4. How do you view your organisation’s primary position within the defence industry? 
Please choose one of the following: 
Prime Contractor 
Producer of Major Sub-Systems 
Lower Tier Supplier 
Other (please indicate)       
A5. This survey is aimed at organisations with a focus on technology.   
Does your organisation engage in Research, Development or Technology 
Demonstration (incl. software)? 
Research     Yes  No 
Development    Yes  No 
Technology Demonstration  Yes  No 
A6. How well do the following statements describe your organisation’s identity? 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our management sees our organisation first and foremost as a defence 
supplier. 
       
Our important stakeholders (e.g. suppliers, customers, etc.) see us first 
and foremost as a defence supplier.        
Our employees identify strongly with the values of defence business.        
In our communication with important stakeholders, we consistently 
portray ourselves as a defence supplier. 
       
We see ourselves as supporting the national defence objectives rather 
than being purely profit-oriented. 
       
We employ ex-service personnel at senior management levels.        
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A7. We are interested in specific functions carried out within your organisation: 
To what extent are the following functions adapted 
specifically to meet defence customers’ needs? 
N/A 
Not at allHighly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our research activities (e.g. selection of technological fields, 
fundamental research). 
        
Our development activities (e.g. meeting defence customer 
specifications, product/service customisation, integration into 
defence systems/platforms). 
        
Our product design activities.         
Our manufacturing activities.         
Our marketing/customer relationship management activities (e.g. 
tendering, contracting, identification of customers’ needs). 
        
Our distribution activities (i.e. we sell mainly to MOD/other defence 
agencies or within defence supply chains). 
        
Our after-sales support activities (e.g. monitoring, maintenance)         
Our other service activities (training, consulting, financing)         
A8. We are interested in your organisation’s attitudes to technological sophistication and 
design: 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We build upon proven technological breakthroughs made by other 
organisations. 
       
We strive to achieve technological leadership in the markets in which we 
compete. 
       
We emphasise technological superiority to differentiate out new 
products. 
       
We aggressively adopt new technologies in the early phases of their 
introduction. 
       
We focus heavily on cost efficiency and strive to be a very “lean” 
organisation. 
       
We always prioritise quality over cost.        
A9. We are also interested in how you view the skills and knowledge of your organisation’s 
employees: 
To what extent do you agree to the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our organisation’s market knowledge is focused specifically on the 
defence industry 
       
Our employees’ market knowledge and skills are tailored to meet the 
specific conditions of our defence business. 
       
It would be very difficult for our employees to transfer market knowledge 
acquired in our organisation’s defence business to applications outside 
the defence sector. 
       
Many of our employees can be considered specifically defence sector-
specialists. 
       
We often hire new employees with a strong record in the defence sector.        
Our employees are intrinsically motivated to work on defence sector 
projects. 
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A10. Please indicate whether or not your organisation attempts to interact with non-defence 
or dual use markets: 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In the past we have put considerable effort into engaging with non-
defence or dual use markets. 
       
We currently put considerable effort into engaging with non-defence or 
dual use markets. 
       
We plan to put considerable effort into engaging with non-defence or 
dual use markets  
in the future. 
       
 
A11. We are interested in the frequency and direction of knowledge and technology flows. 
Please indicate your assessment of the frequency of the transfer of the following items 
from non-defence or dual use to defence applications, and vice-versa: 
How would you rate the frequency of the 
transfer of technology regarding… 
Defence to  
Non-defence/DU 
 Non-defence/DU to 
Defence 
never    often  Never    often 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… basic research results                
… manufacturing techniques                
… materials                
… components                
… subsystems                
… platforms                
… complete systems                
 
A12. Has your organisation transferred technology from defence to non-defence or 
dual use applications or vice versa (as opposed to the parallel but separate 
development of technologies for non-defence or dual use and defence 
purposes)? 
 
  We have never transferred technology from defence to non-defence applications, 
or vice versa 
 We have only transferred technology from defence to non-defence applications 
 We have only transferred technology from non-defence to defence applications 
 We have transferred technology in both directions 
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Section B Additional Information  
The following questions are voluntary, but we would appreciate any additional 
information, including any comments you may wish to add. 
B1. In the light of this survey, we would be grateful if you could suggest any additional 
respondents who may be able to contribute. Please include their contact details. 
      
 
B2. Please indicate your name, and position within your organisation. If you are willing 
to participate in further related research, please leave an email address. Also, if 
you have any specific queries regarding this research project, please give your 
contact details here, and include any queries in the comments section. 
      
 
B3. We would appreciate any comments you may have which may help shed light on 
this topic 
      
 
Thank you for completing the survey, your information is very valuable to this 
study and the results will be made available upon request.  
 
For any other enquiries, please contact: Liam.Harris@imperial.ac.uk 
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Appendix 2: Long form Questionnaire 
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Dear Participant, 
 
You are invited to complete the enclosed survey as part of a study into the effects of 
defence spending on the wider UK economy. You have been selected as your 
organisation is a member of ADS. 
 
This study focuses specifically on the transfer of technology between defence and 
non-defence (incl. dual use) applications, in both directions (Dual Use Technology 
Transfer – DUT2). This survey is designed to identify which factors influence the 
success of DUT2 at the organisation and the project level. We would like to gather 
information on your organisation, as well as a recent DUT2 project carried out by 
your organisation (if available). 
 
This project is publicly funded (ESPRC), and the results will be made available after 
the project’s completion.  
 
All answers will remain strictly confidential. Results will be presented in aggregate 
format only. No references will be made to individual replies. Anonymity will be 
preserved.  
 
This issue is of great importance to the UK defence community, and your responses 
will be greatly appreciated. For questions, please contact Liam Harris via 
liam.harris@imperial.ac.uk or +44 (0)79 xxx xxx xx.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C O M M E R C I A L  I N  C O N F I D E N C E  
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Section A  
A1. Name of the organisation and, if applicable, your specific business unit: 
      
A2. Please list the core technology- and service sectors, in which your business 
operates, for example Radar (maritime), Photo-optronics (all sectors), armour etc.: 
      
A3. How would you estimate the following figures?  
Please estimate the percentage… Percentage 
... of your organisation’s revenue currently generated by defence sales      % 
… of your organisation’s revenue from defence three years ago (if known 
– please think about if this figure has changed over the last three years)      % 
... of revenue currently generated by sales directly to UK MOD (if known)      % 
... of your organisation’s revenue generated by defence exports      % 
A4. How do you view your organisation’s primary position within the defence industry? 
Please choose one of the following: 
Prime Contractor 
Producer of Major Sub-Systems 
Lower Tier Supplier 
Other (please indicate)       
A5. This survey is aimed at organisations with a focus on technology.   
Does your organisation engage in Research, Development or Technology 
Demonstration (incl. software)? 
Research     Yes  No 
Development    Yes  No 
Technology Demonstration  Yes  No 
A6. How well do the following statements describe your organisation’s identity? 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our management sees our organisation first and foremost as a defence 
supplier. 
       
Our important stakeholders (e.g. suppliers, customers, etc.) see us first 
and foremost as a defence supplier.        
Our employees identify strongly with the values of defence business.        
In our communication with important stakeholders, we consistently 
portray ourselves as a defence supplier. 
       
We see ourselves as supporting the national defence objectives rather 
than being purely profit-oriented. 
       
We employ ex-service personnel at senior management levels.        
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A7. We are interested in specific functions carried out within your organisation: 
To what extent are the following functions adapted 
specifically to meet defence customers’ needs? 
N/A 
Not at allHighly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our research activities (e.g. selection of technological fields, 
fundamental research). 
        
Our development activities (e.g. meeting defence customer 
specifications, product/service customisation, integration into 
defence systems/platforms). 
        
Our product design activities.         
Our manufacturing activities.         
Our marketing/customer relationship management activities (e.g. 
tendering, contracting, identification of customers’ needs). 
        
Our distribution activities (i.e. we sell mainly to MOD/other defence 
agencies or within defence supply chains). 
        
Our after-sales support activities (e.g. monitoring, maintenance)         
Our other service activities (training, consulting, financing)         
A8. We are interested in your organisation’s approach to confidentiality: 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
Disagree  
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our research is mostly specific to the defence sector and of a sensitive 
nature. 
       
We are willing to make our research results available to other 
organisations and industries. 
       
Keeping our organisation’s R&D knowledge from spreading to other 
organisations is important to our long-term success. 
       
We would adjust our approach to R&D in order to prevent potential 
competitors from benefitting from our work. 
       
A9. We are interested in your organisation’s attitudes to technological sophistication and 
design: 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
We build upon proven technological breakthroughs made by other 
organisations. 
       
We strive to achieve technological leadership in the markets in which we 
compete. 
       
We emphasise technological superiority to differentiate out new 
products. 
       
We aggressively adopt new technologies in the early phases of their 
introduction. 
       
We invest significant effort in the aesthetic elements of design.        
We always prioritise functionality over style.        
Our new products are generally more visually appealing than those of 
our competitors.  
       
We focus heavily on cost efficiency and strive to be a very “lean” 
organisation. 
       
We always prioritise quality over cost.        
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A10. We are also interested in how you view the skills and knowledge of your organisation’s 
employees: 
To what extent do you agree to the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our organisation’s market knowledge is focussed specifically on the 
defence industry 
       
Our employees’ market knowledge and skills are tailored to meet the 
specific conditions of our defence business. 
       
It would be very difficult for our employees to transfer market knowledge 
acquired in our organisation’s defence business to applications outside 
the defence sector. 
       
Many of our employees can be considered specifically defence sector-
specialists. 
       
We often hire new employees with a strong record in the defence sector.        
Our employees are intrinsically motivated to work on defence sector 
projects. 
       
A11. Please indicate whether or not your organisation attempts to interact with non-defence 
or dual use markets: 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
In the past we have put considerable effort into engaging with non-
defence or dual use markets. 
       
We currently put considerable effort into engaging with non-defence or 
dual use markets. 
       
We plan to put considerable effort into engaging with non-defence or 
dual use markets  
in the future. 
       
A12. We are interested in the frequency and direction of knowledge and technology flows. 
Please indicate your assessment of the frequency of the transfer of the following items 
from non-defence or dual use to defence applications, and vice-versa: 
How would you rate the frequency of the 
transfer of technology regarding… 
Defence to  
Non-defence/DU 
 Non-defence/DU to 
Defence 
never    often  Never    often 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… basic research results                
… manufacturing techniques                
… materials                
… components                
… subsystems                
… platforms                
… complete systems                
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A13. Has your organisation transferred technology from defence to non-defence or 
dual use applications or vice versa (as opposed to the parallel but separate 
development of technologies for non-defence or dual use and defence 
purposes)?  
 
We have never transferred technology from defence to non-defence applications, 
or vice versa 
 We have only transferred technology from defence to non-defence applications 
 We have only transferred technology from non-defence to defence applications 
 We have transferred technology in both directions 
 
     
If you have answered ‘No’ to the previous question, you have completed the survey. 
Thank you very much for taking the time. However, we would value any additional 
comments you may have, which you can include at the end of the survey. 
 
 If you have answered ‘Yes’, please continue with Section B of the survey. 
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Section B DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (DUT2) 
We would now like to enquire about a specific Technology Transfer project initiated by your 
organisation. Please provide as much information as you can within the bounds of 
confidentiality regarding your organisation’s most recent technology transfer project and 
indicate if the transfer was from defence to non-defence or dual use or vice versa. 
B1. Please indicate the name and the technology sector of the current/most recent 
DUT2 project that your organisation has been involved in. If a specific application 
was developed, please describe it:   
      
B2. When did the project begin (MM/YY)?        Project duration (Y+M):       
B3. Please indicate the direction of technology transfer:  
    Defence to Non-defence/DU    Non-defence/DU to Defence 
B4. Please indicate the mechanisms your organisation employed to transfer this 
technology: 
Internally-led commercialisation (in-house project)  Yes  No 
Technology licensing      Yes  No 
Technology brokering      Yes  No 
Formation of a spin-off company    Yes  No 
Collaborative partnerships (e.g. Joint Venture)  Yes  No 
Other (please specify):          Yes  No  
B5. Was the DUT2 project launched into the target market? Yes  No 
B6. We are interested in the way this specific project is/has been affected by the regulatory 
environment: 
Please indicate the level of challenge associated with… 
nonesevere 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
… granting of patents or other forms of intellectual property protection        
… management of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)        
… International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions        
… Intra Community Transfer Directive or UK export controls        
… Offsets        
Other (please specify):              
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B7. We are now interested in how mature the technology was at the point of transfer.  
What Technology Readiness Level (TRL) would you attribute to the technology or 
product at the time of transfer?  
  TRL  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
         
B8. We are interested in the required level of customisation relating to the DUT2 project: 
To what extent do you agree to the following statements? 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The product or technology transferred in/out required significant further 
work/customisation prior to launch in the market. 
       
The product or technology requirements/specifications for this market 
were substantially different from those of our pre-transfer market. 
       
This product or technology transferred in/out is used differently by non-
defence applications, as opposed to defence applications, or vice versa. 
       
This product or technology transferred in/out was primarily “off-the-
shelf”. 
       
The existing product or technology has been significantly worked on to 
produce a marketable product or technology. 
       
B9. We are interested in the relationship between the DUT2 project and your organisation’s 
other products and operations: 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
Related to our existing operations, the DUT2 project… 
DisagreeAgree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
... is targeted at the same or very similar customers.        
... utilises existing distribution networks.        
... utilises the same or very similar manufacturing processes.        
... is similarly impacted by changes in the market place.        
... requires raw materials we also use elsewhere.        
... is associated with similar accounting systems and practices.        
... makes use of existing or highly similar management skills.        
... shares the same quality emphasis as our broader range.        
B10. Did the project involve any other organisations or business units? If so, please 
estimate the proportion of project activities within the project which were carried 
out by the other organisation(s) or business unit(s) or indicate if it is not 
applicable.    
 
B11. Please briefly indicate the type(s) of external organisations involved in the 
DUT2 project (if applicable): 
      
Low Proportion                   Level of involvement of others                      Majority 
share N/A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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B12. Were any of the following funding arrangements involved in the project? 
Government grants      Yes  No 
EU grants       Yes  No 
MOD R&D contracts      Yes  No 
Other (please specify):          Yes  No 
 
B13. We are interested in the way you view the performance of the DUT2 project 
either currently, or on completion / abandonment of the project: 
How would you rate the performance of the DUT2 project in 
regards to the following aspects? 
Worse Better 
 than expected  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The project has been completed within budget.        
The project has met the staffing objectives.        
The project has been completed on time.        
The project has met the quality objectives.        
The project has met the reliability objectives.        
The project has met the efficiency objectives.        
The project has met the user/client satisfaction objectives.        
The project has met the service objectives.        
The project has achieved the revenue stream objectives.        
The project has achieved the market share objectives.        
The project has achieved the profitability objectives.        
The project has achieved the objectives overall.        
B14. In the context of funding the project, to what extent was having funding 
partners important? Did the project involve funding from outside parties? (for 
example Government Grants, EU Grants, MOD R&D contracts, etc.) If so, which 
funding source(s) were involved? 
      
B15. What revenue has the DUT2 project generated to this point?       £ 
 
B16. What is the product’s current market share?         % 
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Section C Additional Information  
The following questions are voluntary, but we would appreciate any additional 
information, including any comments you may wish to add. 
B4. In the light of this survey, we would be grateful if you could suggest any additional 
respondents who may be able to contribute. Please include their contact details. 
      
 
B5. Please indicate your name, and position within your organisation. If you are willing 
to participate in further related research, please leave an email address. Also, if 
you have any specific queries regarding this research project, please give your 
contact details here, and include any queries in the comments section. 
      
 
B6. We would appreciate any comments you may have which may help shed light on 
this topic 
      
 
Thank you for completing the survey, your information is very valuable to this 
study and the results will be made available upon request.  
 
For any other enquiries, please contact: Liam.Harris@imperial.ac.uk 
 
